State v. Reyes
| Decision Date | 29 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 46439 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MARIO A. REYES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon. George A. Southworth, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for domestic battery with traumatic injury, attempted strangulation, and aggravated assault, affirmed.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Maya P. Waldron, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Andrea W. Reynolds argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jeff Nye, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Andrew V. Wake argued.
____________________
Mario A. Reyes appeals from his judgment of conviction for domestic battery with traumatic injury, attempted strangulation, and aggravated assault. We affirm.
After patronizing a local bar, Reyes, the victim (Reyes's wife), the victim's niece, and her husband returned to the Reyeses' home and spent time on the back patio until after midnight. The gathering on the patio ended when Reyes and the victim began arguing over Reyes's involvement with another woman. The argument escalated into a physical altercation, which caused the niece to contact emergency services. When officers arrived, Reyes exited his home with the niece's husband. The victim was lying on the kitchen floor (bleeding and semi-conscious with a broken nose and three fractured teeth) and was being attended to by the niece.
The State charged Reyes with aggravated battery, attempted strangulation, malicious injury to property, and domestic battery with traumatic injury. After a jury trial, Reyes was found guilty of domestic battery with traumatic injury, I.C. § 18-918; attempted strangulation, I.C. § 18-923; and aggravated assault, I.C. § 18-907.1 Reyes appeals, arguing that the district court erred in admitting irrelevant character evidence and the victim's preliminary hearing testimony; that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument; and that, even if these errors are harmless singularly, they constitute cumulative error.
The decision to admit evidence is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 590, 301 P.3d 242, 248 (2013). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018). We review questions of relevance de novo. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993); State v. Aguilar, 154 Idaho 201, 203, 296 P.3d 407, 409 (Ct. App. 2012). A lower court's determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991); State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1059, 772 P.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1989).
When reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct where there has been a contemporaneous objection, we determine factually if there was prosecutorial misconduct and then determine whether the error was harmless. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 88, 156 P.3d 583, 589 (Ct. App. 2007).
Reyes argues that the district court erred by admitting irrelevant, prejudicial character evidence; allowing the State to read the victim's preliminary hearing testimony to the jury; and permitting prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Reyes further argues that, even if these errors are harmless individually, they constitute cumulative error. Despite conceding that the district court erred in permitting the jury to hear some inadmissible evidence, the State argues that the errors (both singularly and cumulatively) are harmless. We hold that Reyes has failed to show reversible error.
Reyes argues that the district court erred in admitting irrelevant, unfavorable character evidence. Specifically, Reyes contends the district court abused its discretion by admitting: (1) evidence of a 2015 domestic altercation between Reyes and the victim; (2) the niece's testimony explaining why she asked law enforcement not to tell Reyes who called emergency services; and (3) evidence of Reyes's probation status and prior criminal charges. The State responds that the district court properly admitted evidence of Reyes's conduct during the 2015 domestic altercation and the niece's testimony, but concedes that the district court erred in admitting evidence that Reyes had violated his probation and had prior criminal charges. The State further responds that any evidentiary error was harmless. We hold that Reyes has failed to show reversible error arising from the district court's challenged evidentiary rulings.
Relevant evidence is generally admissible. State v. Garcia, ___ Idaho ___, ___, 462 P.3d 1125, 1134-35 (2020). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. I.R.E. 401; Garcia, ___ Idaho at ___, 462 P.3d at 1134. Whether a fact is of consequence or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010).
During trial, Reyes testified that he locked himself inside his bedroom after arguing with the victim on the patio and that the victim, her niece, and the niece's husband broke into thebedroom and attacked him as he slept. Reyes further testified that it was his "usual" practice to lock himself in his bedroom after an argument with the victim.2 Subsequently, the district court permitted the State to impeach Reyes by cross-examining him regarding a 2015 domestic altercation he had with the victim in which Reyes did not lock himself in his bedroom. Reyes objected, arguing that the 2015 altercation was irrelevant I.R.E 404(b) evidence that was more prejudicial than probative. The district court reasoned that Reyes's testimony that he locked himself in his bedroom after conflicts with the victim made "instances of where [the Reyeses] have been involved in conflict and [Reyes] hasn't gone into the bedroom and locked the door highly relevant."
On appeal, Reyes contends that his testimony did not authorize inquiry into what he did during the 2015 altercation because he testified that he only usually locked himself in the bedroom after an argument, not that he always did so. Thus, according to Reyes, he did not testify to a habit that would permit impeachment through evidence of specific instances of conduct. We reject Reyes's argument for two reasons.
First, Reyes's argument on appeal is not preserved. Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented below. State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017). As noted, Reyes's objection at trial was based on I.R.E. 404(b) and the weighing required under I.R.E. 403. His argument on appeal, however, focuses on the nuances of his choice of words while testifying without regard to the purpose of his testimony. Reyes's objection in the trial court did not rely on the distinction between "usually" and "always," which is the basis of his appellate argument. In fact, such a distinction is arguably inconsistent with the purpose of his testimony on this point, which was to bolster hisclaim that he has a habit of locking himself in the bedroom during a domestic altercation. Because the theory Reyes advances on appeal is not preserved, he cannot show the district court abused its discretion on grounds never argued to it. See State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019) ().
Second, even if Reyes preserved his appellate challenge to the admission of the impeachment evidence regarding his "usual" habit of locking himself in the bedroom during a domestic altercation, the challenge fails on its merits. Evidence that Reyes acted inconsistently with his usual practice called into question Reyes's version of events and his credibility. Evidence relating to the credibility of a witness is always relevant. State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 926, 354 P.3d 462, 488 (2015). Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that whether Reyes locked himself in the bedroom during the 2015 domestic altercation was relevant.
Reyes also challenges the district court's conclusion that evidence of the 2015 domestic altercation was not substantially more prejudicial than probative. A lower court's determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991); State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1059, 772 P.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1989).
Reyes contends that the district court neither acted consistently with applicable legal standards nor exercised reason in concluding that evidence of Reyes's 2015 domestic altercation was more probative than prejudicial. Specifically, Reyes contends that evidence of his 2015 domestic altercation held little probative value because evidence impeaching his testimony that he usually locked himself in his bedroom after arguing with the victim did not go directly to any element of the crimes with which he was charged. We disagree.
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