State v. Aldape

• Decision Date: 29 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 64166,64166
• Citation: 14 Kan.App.2d 521,794 P.2d 672
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Richard ALDAPE, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

Page 672

794 P.2d 672

14 Kan.App.2d 521

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Richard ALDAPE, Appellant.

No. 64166.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

June 29, 1990.

Review Denied Aug. 28, 1990.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Statements made by a probationer (who is also on parole) to a parole officer while the probationer is in custody and which pertain to a condition of probation are admissible at a probation revocation hearing. The probationer is not entitled to receive Miranda warnings in this instance because the privilege against self-incrimination is not available to a probationer at a revocation hearing.

2. The suspension of imposition of sentence and placement of a defendant on probation by a district court is a final and appealable judgment which places the defendant under sentence from the beginning of the probation.

Charles D. Dedmon, Asst. Appellate Defender, Steven R. Zinn, Deputy Appellate Defender, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Melanie S. Jack, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gene M. Olander, Dist. Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before ABBOTT, C.J., BRAZIL, J., and FREDERICK N. STEWART, District Judge, Assigned.

BRAZIL, Judge:

Richard Aldape appeals from the district court's revocation of his probation, arguing the district court admitted an incriminating statement he made to his parole officer while in custody but without having been given Miranda warnings. We affirm.

In March 1988, Aldape entered into a plea agreement in which he was found guilty of one count of burglary as defined by K.S.A. 21-3715 and was placed on supervised probation for two years. As part of the conditions of probation, Aldape was required to maintain full-time employment when possible and to pay costs.

In May 1989, an order to show cause why probation should not be revoked was issued to Aldape. The order alleged that Aldape violated the terms of his probation by failing to make payments as authorized and failing to maintain full-time employment. Aldape, who was also on parole at the time, was taken into custody pending a hearing for violating the terms of his probation.

While Aldape was in jail pending the probation revocation hearing, his parole officer conducted a violation interview in which he questioned Aldape about his employment. The parole officer had contacted Aldape's employer and had been informed that Aldape had only reported for work one day. Aldape admitted to the officer he had quit his job. The parole officer did not read Aldape his Miranda rights prior to conducting the interview. The parole officer testified at the probation revocation hearing about the conversation he had with Aldape concerning his employment.

The trial court concluded Aldape had violated his probation by failing to maintain employment and sentenced him to the custody of the secretary of corrections for a term of not less than one nor more than five years for the offense of burglary. Aldape timely appeals.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court provided protection to the privilege against self-incrimination when an individual is subject to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. at 1629. Aldape argues that the protection against self-incrimination applies in this case and that this right was violated when the district court allowed the introduction of a statement made by Aldape to his parole officer when Aldape was in custody but had not been given Miranda warnings.

The issue of the admissibility of a probationer's statements to his probation officer without prior warning was addressed in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 reh. denied 466 U.S. 945, 104 S.Ct. 1932, 80 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984). In Murphy, the defendant was on probation for false imprisonment. As a condition of probation, Murphy was required to participate in a treatment program. At a counseling session, Murphy told the counselor he had raped and murdered a teenage girl. The counselor informed Murphy's probation officer, who asked Murphy about the crime when meeting with Murphy in her office. Murphy admitted that he had committed the rape and murder. At the trial for first-degree murder, Murphy sought to suppress the statement made to the probation officer on the grounds that it was in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Minnesota Supreme Court barred the use of Murphy's confession because the probation officer had failed to instruct Murphy as to his Miranda rights before questioning him. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Murphy was not "in custody" for purposes of receiving Miranda protections since there was no arrest or restraint on freedom of movement usually associated with an arrest. 465 U.S. at 430, 104 S.Ct. at 1143. The Court noted that custodial arrest conveys to the suspect a message that he has no choice but to submit to the officer's will, whereas a probation interview which takes place at the probation officer's office does not pressure the suspect into believing he cannot terminate the meeting. 465 U.S. at 433, 104 S.Ct. at 1145. In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated:

"A State may require a probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect his probationary status; such a requirement, without more, does not give rise to a self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the questions put to the probationer, however relevant to his probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution. There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would have created the classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer's answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution." 465 U.S. at 435, 104 S.Ct. at 1146.

The accompanying footnote provides:

"The situation would be different if the questions put to a probationer were relevant to his probationary status and posed no realistic threat of incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding. If, for example, a residential restriction were imposed as a condition of probation, it would appear unlikely that a violation of that condition would be a criminal act. Hence, a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questions relating to a residential condition could not validly rest on the ground that the answer might be used to incriminate if the probationer was tried for another crime. Neither, in our view, would the privilege be available on the ground that answering such questions might reveal a violation of the residential requirement and result in the termination of probation. Although a revocation proceeding must comport with the requirements of due process, it is not a criminal proceeding. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 [93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759, 36 L.Ed.2d 656] (1973); [citation omitted]. Just as there is no right to a jury trial before probation may be revoked, neither is the privilege against compelled self-incrimination available to a probationer. It follows that whether or not the answer to a question about a residential requirement is compelled by the threat of revocation, there can be no valid claim of the privilege on the ground that the information sought can be used in revocation proceedings.

"Our cases indicate, moreover, that a State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination. Under such circumstances, a probationer's 'right to immunity as a result of his compelled testimony would not be at stake,' [Citations omitted.]...." 465 U.S. at 435-36 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. at 1146-47 n. 7.

The recent Kansas case of State v. Hartfield, 245 Kan. 431, 435-36, 781 P.2d 1050 (1989), follows the law established in Murphy. The court, holding that the defendant's confession regarding a new crime made to his parole officer after the officer informed him of his Miranda rights was admissible, stated:

"A criminal suspect has the right to counsel during custodial interrogations under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the right not to incriminate oneself under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880 [1884-85] reh. denied 452 U.S. 973 [101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984] (1981); State v. Norris, 244 Kan. 326, 332-33, 768 P.2d 296 (1989). Law enforcement officers are required to inform the suspect of his right...