State v. Alexander

• Decision Date: 03 January 1889
• Citation: 8 S.E. 440,30 S.C 74
• Parties: State v. Alexander.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

8 S.E. 440

(30 S.C 74)

State

v.Alexander.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 3, 1889

1. Homicide—Murder—Intent.

A charge that it constitutes murder if the accused conceived a design to assault deceased, and in consequence of such assault he died, whether deceased intended to kill him or not, is proper.

2. Same—Insanity as a Defense—Burden of Proof.

On a trial for murder the court properly refused to charge that, where insanity is raised as a defense by evidence engendering a doubt, it devolves upon the state to remove this doubt, and to establish the sanity of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. ¹

3. Same—Irresistible Impulse.

Mere irresistible impulse to commit murder by reason of mental derangement at the time of the act is not a defense, as long as the accused knew that the act he was committing was a crime, morally, and punishable by the laws. ²

4. Same—Malice—Evidence.

The court charged that "when the killing is proven, and no more, the law will imply malice, and make the act murder; but when all the facts and circumstances of the killing are in evidence, then the jury must say from the testimony what was the intention with which the act was committed. Then it becomes a matter of proof, —no implication any longer. " Held a proper charge. ³

Appeal from general sessions circuit court of Pickens county; Wallace, Judge.

Thomas P. Alexander was indicted and convicted of wife-murder, and appeals from the judgment of conviction.

R. A. Child, Mr. Carey, and J. E. Boggs, for appellant. Sol. Gen. Orr, for the State.

Simpson, C. J. 1. The defendant was indicted and tried at the July term of the court of general sessions, 1888, for Pickens county, for the murder of his wife, Jane Alexander. He was convicted, and now appeals, upon exceptions to his honor's charge to the jury, alleging error both as to matters charged and in refusing to charge. The two first exceptions impute error, because his honor declined to charge, as requested, that in order to constitute murder the testimony must satisfy the jury that there was a premeditated and formed design to take life on the part of the accused, before the commission of the act, and that the killing took place under this premeditated and formed design.

His honor, declining to charge as requested, charged "that murder was the killing of a human being, with malice aforethought. Malice does not consist alone of a formed design to kill another. For instance, one man meets another on the street, and an altercation ensues, and raises a cane for the purpose of striking him, and strikes the blow, and death ensues. That is murder. He may not have formed a design to kill him, but to strike; and in striking him killed him. That is murder. That is the difference between the request and my view. All that is necessary is that he should have conceived the design to commit an assault upon him, or an assault and battery upon him, and in consequence of that he dies. That is murder, whether he meant to kill him or not. A formed design to take life is not necessary to make a killing murder. " In other words, the substance of his honor's charge was that murder might be committed as the result of some illegal act, whether the design to take life was actually present or not. This was in accordance with the common law, as found in Blackstone, (book 4, p. 192,) where he says: "And in general, when an involuntary killing happens in consequence of an unlawful act, it will be either murder or manslaughter, according to the nature of the act which occasioned it. If it be in prosecution of a felonious intent, or in its consequences naturally tended to bloodshed, it will be murder; but, if no more was intended than a mere civil trespass, it will only amount to manslaughter. "

2. His honor was requested to charge that, where insanity is raised as a defense by evidence engendering a doubt, it devolves upon the state to remove this doubt, and to establish the sanity of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. This was declined, and very properly; because insanity is a defense, and, whether sustained or not, must, like any other defense, depend upon the preponderance of testimony for or against, weighed and balanced by the jury, after it is all out. State v. Paulk, 18 S. C. 515; State v. Coleman, 20 S. C. 452; State v. Bundy, 24 S. C. 439.

3. His honor was requested to charge "that if, by reason of mental derangement at the time of the act, the prisoner had not power to control the disposition or impulse to commit the deed, he should be acquitted. " It seems that the effort here was to get the judge to announce the doctrine of irresistible or uncontrollable impulse, as distinguished from insanity, that a person, though not absolutely insane or demented to the extent of not knowing the difference between right and wrong, or not incapable of knowing the moral character of an act, yet might be led on by an uncontrollable impulse to commit the...