State v. Alexander-Lindsey

Decision Date11 May 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15CA11.,15CA11.
Citation65 N.E.3d 129
Parties STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Tegan C. ALEXANDER–LINDSEY, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Gene Meadows, Portsmouth, OH, for Appellant.

Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jeffrey M. Smith, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, OH, for Appellee.

McFARLAND, J.

{¶ 1} Tegan C. Alexander–Lindsey appeals the court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence in the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas. On appeal, Ms. Alexander–Lindsey asserts her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, was violated when she was stopped in Lawrence County, Ohio, in October 2014. Thus, the trial court erred when it overruled her motion to suppress evidence discovered when she was stopped and detained. Upon review, we find no merit to Appellant's argument. The trial court did not err. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant's sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

{¶ 2} On December 16, 2014, Appellant was indicted on five counts: (1) aggravated trafficking in drugs, R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(d), a felony of the second degree; (2) possession of drugs, R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(c), a felony of the second degree; (3) tampering with evidence, R.C. 2921.12(A)(1)(B), a felony of the third degree; (4) furnishing false information to an officer issuing a traffic ticket, R.C. 4513.361(B) a misdemeanor of the first degree; and (5) possession of marijuana, R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(3)(a), a minor misdemeanor. The indictment arose from events which occurred on or about October 30, 2014, when Appellant made contact with Trooper Drew Kuehne of the Ohio State Highway Patrol. On that date, Trooper Kuehne initiated a lawful traffic stop for a marked lanes violation on U.S. Route 52 in Lawrence County, Ohio. During the stop and detention, troopers confiscated 363 oxycodone pills and 2 grams of marijuana.

{¶ 3} Appellant was arraigned on December 17, 2014. The parties engaged in discovery. On February 19, 2015, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence. On February 25, 2015, the trial court heard the motion. The State presented Trooper Kuehne's testimony and a video recording of the stop.

{¶ 4} At the suppression hearing, Trooper Kuehne testified he had been employed as a trooper for just less than 2 years. He was assigned to the criminal patrol unit and worked as a K–9 handler of "Rocky." The purpose of the unit is drug interdiction. Trooper Kuehne testified as to his training and certification with Rocky. Trooper Kuehne's additional relevant testimony will be set forth below. A summary of the events captured on the video will also be set forth.

{¶ 5} After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court overruled Appellant's motion by entry dated February 27, 2015. On April 22, 2015, Appellant entered no contest pleas to all counts of the indictment. She was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The judgment from which she appeals was entered on May 1, 2015. The appeal was timely filed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

"I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE DEFENDANTAPPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANTAPPELLANT'S FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION."
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 6} Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Gurley, 4th Dist., 2015-Ohio-5361, 54 N.E.3d 768, ¶ 16. See State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, at ¶ 100, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, at ¶ 8. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court acts as the trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. Id. Accordingly, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Landrum, 137 Ohio App.3d 718, 722, 739 N.E.2d 1159 (4th Dist.2000). Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine whether the trial court reached the correct legal conclusion in analyzing the facts of the case. Roberts at ¶ 100, citing Burnside at ¶ 8

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶ 7} "The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Crocker, 2015-Ohio-2528, 38 N.E.3d 369, ¶ 61, quoting State v. Emerson, 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 2012-Ohio-5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 15. "This constitutional guarantee is protected by the exclusionary rule, which mandates exclusion of the evidence obtained from the unreasonable search and seizure at trial." Id.; see also State v. Lemaster, 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3236, 2012-Ohio-971, 2012 WL 762342, ¶ 8 ("If the government obtains evidence through actions that violate an accused's Fourth Amendment rights, that evidence must be excluded at trial.").

{¶ 8} "An officer's temporary detention of an individual during a traffic stop constitutes a seizure of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment * * *." State v. Lewis, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3226, 2008-Ohio-6691, 2008 WL 5266102, ¶ 14 ; see also State v. Eatmon, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3498, 2013-Ohio-4812, 2013 WL 5914938, ¶ 13 (quoting Lewis ). "To be constitutionally valid, the detention must be reasonable under the circumstances." Lewis at ¶ 14. "While probable cause ‘is certainly a complete justification for a traffic stop,’ it is not required." Eatmon at ¶ 13, quoting State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23. "So long as ‘an officer's decision to stop a motorist for a criminal violation, including a traffic violation, is prompted by a reasonable and articulable suspicion considering all the circumstances, then the stop is constitutionally valid.’ " Id., quoting Mays at ¶ 8. "Reasonable and articulable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause." Id., citing Mays at ¶ 23. " ‘To conduct an investigatory stop, the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences derived from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged or about to be engaged in criminal activity.’ " Id., quoting State v. Kilbarger, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 11CA23, 2012-Ohio-1521, 2012 WL 1139132, ¶ 15. "The propriety of an investigative stop by a police officer must be viewed in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances."Id., quoting State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980), paragraph one of the syllabus.

The Initial Traffic Stop

{¶ 9} Since Appellant challenges each "step" of her detention and subsequent search and seizure, we begin our analysis with Trooper Kuehne's stop. At the suppression hearing, Trooper Kuehne testified on October 30, 2014, he was on patrol in a marked cruiser and in uniform when he came in contact with Appellant. He identified her for the record. Trooper Kuehne was traveling eastbound on U.S. 52, in the left lane, when he noticed Appellant's vehicle cross the yellow line on the left side of the road near mile post 8. As they continued east, Appellant changed lanes across the white line on the right side of the road. Trooper Kuehne ran the license plate and was advised the car was registered to someone from Michigan.

{¶ 10} Trooper Kuehne initiated a traffic stop near mile post 11. He had a video camera in his patrol car that was recording the traffic stop; however, the camera wasn't activated in time to catch the initial violation.1 At this point, a CD of the recording of the traffic stop was offered as State's Exhibit 1, and accepted into evidence without objection. The video shows the car was pulled over about 2 minutes after the video began.

{¶ 11} At the time Trooper Kuehne initiated the stop of Appellant's vehicle, he had observed a marked lanes violation. State v. Debrossard, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3395, 2015-Ohio-1054, 2015 WL 1278401, ¶ 13. A police officer may stop the driver of a vehicle after observing a de minimis violation of traffic laws.

State v. Guseman, 4th Dist. Athens No. 08CA15, 2009-Ohio-952, 2009 WL 537198, ¶ 20 ; citing State v. Bowie, 4th Dist. Washington No. 01CA34, 2002-Ohio-3553, 2002 WL 1565710, ¶ 8, 12, and 16 ; citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). See also, Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996), syllabus. A marked-lanes traffic violation suffices. See, Crocker, supra, at ¶ 6; State v. Harlow, 4th Dist. Washington No. 13CA29, 2014-Ohio-864, 2014 WL 895494, ¶ 14 ; R.C. 4511.33. Although the initial violation was not captured on the dashboard video camera recording, the trial court was free to believe Trooper Kuehne's testimony. His testimony, combined with the video recording, demonstrated his reasonable articulable suspicion that Appellant committed a traffic violation. Therefore, the trial court found, as do we, that the traffic stop was constitutionally valid.

The Scope and Duration of the Stop

{¶ 12} Appellant's counsel argued that the continuation of the stop itself and the extended search was racial profiling. He argued the video shows the trooper saying at approximately 11 minutes and 20 seconds into the stop, "I'm concerned because you all are coming down here from Detroit." Counsel argued that was the real reason Trooper Kuehne expanded the stop into a detention and search.2

{¶ 13} "The scope and duration of a routine traffic stop ‘must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification * * * and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ " Crocker, supra, at ¶ 63, quoting State v. Jones, 4th Dist. Washington No. 03CA61, 2004-Ohio-7280, 2004 WL 3090198, ¶ 22. " ‘When a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle for a...

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