State v. Collins

Decision Date19 February 1962
Docket NumberNo. 45796,45796
Citation138 So.2d 546,242 La. 704
PartiesSTATE of Louisiana v. Woodman J. COLLINS.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

Herschel N. Knight, Stephen P. Coco, Grenese R. Jackson, Jennings, for defendant-appellant.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bernard N. Marcantel, Dist. Atty., Jennings, Alfred R. Ryder, Asst. Dist. Atty., Oberlin, for plaintiff-appellee.

FOURNET, Chief Justice.

Woodman J. Collins was tried, convicted and sentenced under an indictment charging him with aggravated rape upon one Gladys E. Vatis; and from his conviction and sentence to 'serve the death penalty as provided by law,' he has appealed, relying for reversal on a number of errors allegedly committed during the trial to which timely objection was made and bills perfected. 1

According to the record, Mrs. Vatis, a married woman thirty-five years of age, of the Caucasian race, who resided with her husband, a merchant seaman employed on the coastal route, and two teen-age daughters at Texas City, Texas, having received a message to meet her husband in Belle Chasse, Louisiana, on the morning of April 8th, 1960, departed from her home by car (1956 two door DeSoto) at about 8 P.M. on the night of the 7th; traveling alone, she proceeded on U.S. Highway 90 into Louisiana, passed through Lake Charles to Iowa, La., where, about 11:30 P.M., she stopped for gas, then continued, crossing an overpass into Jefferson Davis Parish and traveling north on Highway 165 at excessive speed; at about this time she became aware that a vehicle with one light was following her, and thinking it was a motorcycle policeman, she slowed--whereupon the vehicle passed, pulled up in front of her and stopped, so that she had a good view of its sole occupant, the driver; having become aware that the vehicle was an automobile but not a police car, she quickly pulled around it and speeded up to approximately 85 to 90 miles an hour; the driver of the other car pursued, and forced her off the highway onto the shoulder, where her car skidded and got stuck in the soft earth. The pursuing car, a light colored Pontiac stopped on the highway close beside her car; the driver, defendant Woodman J. Collins, a 30 year old Negro, jumped out and grasping the door handle beside Mrs. Vatis, wrenched it off; the door being locked, he broke the glass with his fist, and when Mrs. Vatis attempted to escape through the other door, he caught her, propelled her into his car, turned around and drove south to a gravel road, 2 then turned off, proceeded some distance and stopped, took Mrs. Vatis through a barbed wire fence and into a field adjoining the roadway, where he had sexual intercourse with her; returned with her to the car, and struck her numerous times on the head with a lug wrench, 3 then departed, alone, in his car, returning to his home in Iowa where, within a short time, he was sought and arrested. 4 Taken by police directly to the hospital (the time was then nearly 3 A.M.) and into the presence of Mrs. Vatis, who was being prepared for surgery because of head lacerations, he was promptly identified by her. Later that morning, at the Calcasieu Parish jail, the defendant made statements which were reduced to writing and signed by him, following which, in a police car and accompanied by police officers, he retraced the route taken on the previous night and pointed out the locations of the various happenings which had occurred. He also told where the lug wrench could be found; this he had hidden in an outhouse of his home before retiring on the night of April 8th. On April 11, 1960, defendant was charged with the crimes of rape, aggravated kidnaping and attempted murder, by warrant signed by the 31st Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson Davis; and on April 22, 1960, on order of the District Judge, counsel were appointed to defend him. He was indicted by the Grand Jury on October 5, 1960 and two true bills were returned, one being for aggravated rape under which the defendant is being tried in the instant case.

Prior to arraignment the defendant, through his counsel, filed a motion to quash the general venire list, the grand jury venire, the grand jury and the bill of indictment; and when in due course the motion was called for argument the defendant moved for a continuance due to the absence of one of the witnesses subpoenaed on behalf of the defendant, Mr. Charles A. Pitre. The Court overruled the motion, whereupon counsel objected and reserved Bill of Exception No. 2, the first assigned error urged on this appeal. In support of this bill it is counsel's contention that Mr. Pitre, Clerk of Court and ex-officio member of the Jury Commission, as its Secretary, was the only person who could have related the entire history of grand juries in Jefferson Davis Parish and the particulars surrounding the drawing of the grand jury venire from which was drawn the grand jury empaneled on October 5, 1960.

It is apt to observe here, as did the Trial Judge in his Per Curiam, that the defendant, whose motion for a continuance was made orally, failed to comply with the formalities indicated, and these being general rules of procedure in criminal cases, they are sui generis and must be strictly followed: State v. Washington, 220 La. 963, 58 So.2d 195; State v. Jones, 233 La. 775, 98 So.2d 185. The mandatory requirements are that 'Every application for a continuance shall be by written motion alleging specifically the grounds upon which it is based * * *' (R.S. 15:321), and 'Every motion for a continuance based upon the absence of witnesses must show: (1) By a disclosure of all the facts which the absent witnesses are expected to testify to, the materiality of said testimony, and that said facts can be proved by no witness in attendance upon the court; (2) By a disclosure of facts and circumstances, a probability that the witnesses may be had at the time to which the trial is deferred; * * *' (R.S. 15:322).

However, the Trial Judge, in refusing to grant the continuance, did not rule on that ground, but rather for the reason that the motion lacked merit, in which we agree. Noting that Mr. Pitre's absence was caused by the fact that he had suffered a heart attack, the Court said it did not appear Mr. Pitre's testimony was essential, that he was only an ex-officio member of the Jury Commission, and the delay in waiting for him to recover his health 5 was not justified since it appeared to the Court that the five Jury Commissioners, all of whom were present, could readily answer any questions concerning the manner in which the grand jury was selected.

Bill of Exception No. 3 was taken to the Court's overruling of defendant's motion to quash the general venire list, the grand jury venire, the grand jury and the bill of indictment. The argument in support of the motion was that Collins was denied a speedy trial in that, notwithstanding the fact that the regular grand jury was in session at the time he was arrested (April 8, 1960) and charged with certain crimes by warrant signed by the 31st Judicial District Court (April 11, 1960), his case was not presented; and due to the failure of the District Attorney and the Court to request a special session of the grand jury, it was not until the date of the next regular session for the selection of a grand jury (October 5, 1960) that his case was presented, he having been meanwhile incarcerated in the parish jail; that in the grand jury venire from which the said grand jury was selected, the Jury Commissioners deliberately and purposely included six Negroes; and that on October 5, 1960, a grand jury composed of five Negroes and seven whites was drawn and empaneled which indicated the defendant for aggravated rape and attempted murder--whereas the prior grand jury might not have indicted him at all; that no other cases were presented to the grand jury empaneled on October 5, 1960; and that by this unusual handling of his case, as well as by the systematic inclusion of members of the Negro race, he was prejudiced.

The right guaranteed under the provisions of Article 1, Section 9 of the Louisiana Constitution to a speedy trial cannot be disassociated from the requirement that the trial be by an impartial jury and that no person can be held to answer for a capital crime unless upon the presentment or indictment of a grand jury. The right to a speedy trial does not operate to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting accused persons with all reasonable and necessary delays. State v. Frith, 194 La. 508, 194 So. 1. It is within the exclusive province of the district attorney, who is vested with the full charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in any parish where he is district attorney, to determine whom, when and how he shall prosecute. R.S. 15:17.

The Per Curiam to this Bill states that the grand jury in session at the time of the commission of the alleged crime was composed entirely of members of the Caucasian race, and any indictment might well be set aside for the sole reason that there were no Negroes on the grand jury; and that a special grand jury was not ordered because it would be argued that such a jury was empaneled to consider only the Collins case. The Court was unable to recall any suggestion by the attorneys for the defense (who, as stated earlier, were appointed on April 2i, 1960) as to any manner in which the defendant's case was prejudiced by the delay, and expressed the view that on the contrary, such delays usually favor the accused. At this juncture it may be well to point out that during this entire time no request was made by the accused for a speedy trial, either personally or through his counsel, nor did he make any objection to the conditions of which he now complains. The Per Curiam further recites that according to the records, from the time the 31st Judicial District was...

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18 cases
  • Collins v. Walker
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • 9 Noviembre 1964
    ...rape upon a white woman. The conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. State v. Collins, 1962, 242 La. 704, 138 So.2d 546, 547. Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States was denied, 371 U.S. 843, 83 S.Ct. 74, 9 L.Ed.2d His petition for habeas ......
  • State v. Alexander
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • 25 Marzo 1968
    ...217 La. 837, 47 So.2d 559, State v. Solomon, 222 La. 269, 62 So.2d 481, State v. Eubanks, 240 La. 552, 124 So.2d 543, and State v. Collins, 242 La. 704, 138 So.2d 546. We think, however, that this rule is subject to the reservation noted in the vast majority of the common law jurisdictions ......
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    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • 18 Febrero 1963
    ...is an arbitrary or unreasonable abuse of such discretion. LSA-R.S. 15:320. State v. Jones, 233 La. 775, 98 So.2d 185; State v. Collins, 242 La. 704, 138 So.2d 546; 19 LLR Under the circumstances of this case, fifteen days were not inadequate to prepare a defense to the alleged confession. W......
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    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • 7 Noviembre 1966
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