State v. Alicea

• Decision Date: 23 June 2021
• Docket Number: SC 20399
• Citation: 260 A.3d 1176,339 Conn. 385
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Victor M. ALICEA
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

339 Conn. 385

260 A.3d 1176

STATE of Connecticut

v.Victor M. ALICEA

SC 20399

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 23, 2020

Officially released June 23, 2021^*

Jonathan R. Formichella, with whom was James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Anne F. Mahoney, state's attorney, and Mark A. Stabile, former senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Robinson, C.J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

McDONALD, J.

In State v. Nash , 316 Conn. 651, 666, 114 A.3d 128 (2015), we held that convictions of intentional assault in the first degree and reckless assault in the first degree¹ may be legally consistent when each mutually exclusive mental state pertains to a different result. Thereafter, in State v. King , 321 Conn. 135, 145, 136 A.3d 1210 (2016) ( King 2016 ), we applied this rationale to again conclude that convictions of intentional and reckless assault were legally consistent. This certified appeal requires us to determine whether this precedent governs the outcome of the present case. We conclude that it does.

The defendant, Victor M. Alicea, was convicted of one count of intentional assault and one count of reckless assault. On appeal, he contends that his convictions of intentional and reckless assault are legally inconsistent, notwithstanding Nash and King 2016 , because the requisite mental states are mutually exclusive under the particular circumstances of his case, which involved only one act, one victim, and one injury. The defendant claims that his case is instead governed by State v. King , 216 Conn. 585, 592–94, 583 A.2d 896 (1990) ( King 1990 ), and State v. Chyung , 325 Conn. 236, 247–48, 157 A.3d 628 (2017). Accordingly, we must survey our jurisprudence regarding the legal consistency of multiple verdicts to resolve seemingly disparate language from our cases and to identify a uniform rule. In addition, this appeal requires us to examine the different circumstances under which a claim of legally inconsistent verdicts implicates our "theory of the case" doctrine. We address these issues in turn.

The Appellate Court's decision sets forth the facts and procedural history; State v. Alicea , 191 Conn. App. 421, 424–26, 436–37, 215 A.3d 184 (2019) ; which we summarize in relevant part. The defendant and the victim, Tyrone Holmes, were employees at a Burger King restaurant. In July, 2015, the defendant was working an overnight shift when Holmes, who was not working that night, arrived and entered through the back door of the restaurant. Holmes intended to drop off supplies and "to speak with the defendant, who, he had heard, had been talking about him." Id., at 424, 215 A.3d 184. At Holmes’ request, the defendant stepped outside for a "brief discussion" with Holmes, during which the defendant "denied having talked negatively about Holmes." Id., at 424–25, 215 A.3d 184. During the conversation, "[e]verything appeared fine to Holmes." Id., at 425, 215 A.3d 184.

After both men went back inside the restaurant, Holmes overheard the defendant speaking on his cell phone, saying that "the defendant had a problem." Id. "Holmes told the defendant that they did not have a problem, and the defendant walked away ...." Id. Holmes followed, at which point they began arguing. "The defendant then pulled Holmes’ head toward him and cut his throat with a razor blade." Id. Holmes initially assumed a fighting stance, thinking the defendant had punched him. After noticing that he was bleeding, however, Holmes left the restaurant. Holmes was subsequently taken to a local hospital, where an emergency medicine physician determined that he had "sustained a neck laceration that was approximately seven inches long ...." Id. Given the severity of his injury, Holmes was then transferred to another hospital, where he underwent surgery to repair his lacerated neck muscle and left external jugular vein.

The defendant was arrested and charged with both intentional assault and reckless assault. At trial, after the close of the state's case, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. He argued, in part, that the charges were legally inconsistent because each charge required a mutually exclusive mental state. The trial court denied the motion, explaining that this court had held, in State v. Nash , supra, 316 Conn. 651, 114 A.3d 128, that intentional and reckless assault charges are legally consistent. See id., at 666–69, 114 A.3d 128. Subsequently, the jury found the defendant guilty of both charges. The defendant filed a renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial, asserting that the verdicts were legally inconsistent. The trial court denied both motions and rendered a judgment of conviction on both counts. The court then merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant to an enhanced mandatory minimum term of ten years incarceration, followed by twelve years of special parole on the count of intentional assault as a persistent dangerous felony offender.²

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming, among other things, that the trial court incorrectly had concluded that the verdicts were legally consistent. The Appellate Court subsequently affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Alicea , supra, 191 Conn. App. at 450, 215 A.3d 184. Relevant to this appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that the verdicts of guilty for both intentional assault and reckless assault were legally consistent. Id., at 434, 215 A.3d 184. Relying on State v. Nash , supra, 316 Conn. at 666–69, 114 A.3d 128, the court reasoned that, in order to find the defendant guilty of reckless assault, "the jury was required to find that the defendant engaged in conduct that ... created a grave risk of death to Holmes, ultimately resulting in Holmes’ serious physical injury. Such a conclusion is not inconsistent with the [jury's] finding that the defendant also intended to seriously injure Holmes," as it was required to find in order to find the defendant guilty of intentional assault. (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Alicea , supra, at 434, 215 A.3d 184.

Thereafter, the defendant filed a petition for certification to appeal, which we granted, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the jury's verdicts of guilty of intentional assault and reckless assault were not legally inconsistent?" State v. Alicea , 333 Conn. 937, 219 A.3d 373 (2019).

On appeal, the defendant contends that the verdicts finding him guilty of intentional assault and reckless assault are legally inconsistent because their requisite mental states—intentional and reckless—are mutually exclusive. Specifically, he argues that the verdicts are inconsistent in this case because it was impossible for the jury to find both mutually exclusive mental states with respect to only one act, one victim, and one injury. In addition, he asserts that his legal inconsistency claim must be viewed in light of the state's theory of the case as presented to the jury at trial—namely, that the charges were brought in the alternative. The state contends that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the convictions are consistent because each mental state pertains to a different result —in other words, the statutory objectives of each mental state are different. The state also asserts that we should not review the defendant's claim about the state's theory of the case because it is outside the scope of the certified question. In the alternative, the state strongly disputes the defendant's characterization of its theory of the case at trial.

The following legal principles guide our analysis of this claim. "A claim of legally inconsistent convictions, also referred to as mutually exclusive convictions, arises when a conviction of one offense requires a finding that negates an essential element of another offense of which the defendant also has been convicted. ... In response to such a claim, we look carefully to determine whether the existence of the essential elements for one offense negates the existence of [one or more] essential elements for another offense of which the defendant also stands convicted. If that is the case, the [convictions] are legally inconsistent and cannot withstand challenge. ... Whether two convictions are mutually exclusive presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Chyung , supra, 325 Conn. at 245–46, 157 A.3d 628. "When a jury has returned legally inconsistent verdicts, there is no way for the reviewing court to know which charge the jury found to be supported by the evidence. ... Accordingly, the court must vacate both convictions and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., at 247, 157 A.3d 628.

In this case, the defendant was convicted of one count each of intentional assault in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1) and reckless assault in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (3). Section 53a-59 (a) (1) provides that an individual commits intentional assault when, "[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person ... by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument ...." (Emphasis added.) Section 53a-59 (a) (3) provides that an individual commits reckless assault when, "under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person ...." (Emphasis added.)

We have previously recognized that "the statutory definitions of ‘intentionally’ and ‘recklessly’ are mutually exclusive and inconsistent." State v. King , supra, 216 Conn. at 593–94, 583 A.2d 896. Intentional conduct requires the...