State v. Allen

• Decision Date: 20 January 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-1561.,04-1561.
• Citation: 708 N.W.2d 361
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Angela Marie ALLEN, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

708 N.W.2d 361

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Angela Marie ALLEN, Appellant.

No. 04-1561.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

January 20, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Timothy N. Schott, County Attorney, and Sarah J. Livingston and Ricki Osborn, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

WIGGINS, Justice.

Angela Marie Allen contends her trial counsel was ineffective in permitting her to enter a guilty plea to the charge of introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility under Iowa Code section 719.8 (2003) for the reason that the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility was not a "detention facility" for purposes of section 719.8. Because we agree with Allen that the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility was not a "detention facility" under section 719.8, there was no factual basis supporting her plea. Additionally, when no factual basis exists for a plea, we presume prejudice. Therefore, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In March 2004, Allen's husband was incarcerated at the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility. An electronics engineer at the facility monitored a telephone call made between Allen and her husband enabling him to determine Allen and her husband were planning to bring drugs into the facility the following day. The Fort Dodge Correctional Facility officials contacted the Fort Dodge Police Department. The police obtained a search warrant for Allen's person and searched her after she entered the facility for a visitation. During the search, the authorities found marijuana on her person.

Allen was charged by trial information in three separate counts for: (1) possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and/or conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(d); (2) introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility and/or conspiracy to introduce a controlled substance into a detention facility in violation of Iowa Code sections 719.8 and/or 706.1 and 719.8; and (3) possession of contraband in a correctional institution and/or conspiracy to possess contraband in a correctional institution in violation of Iowa Code sections 719.7 and/or 706.1 and 719.7.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the possession with intent to deliver charge and remain silent at sentencing if Allen pled guilty to the two remaining charges. Allen accepted the plea agreement, the State dismissed the possession with intent to deliver charge, and Allen pled guilty to the two remaining charges. At sentencing, Allen received an indeterminate five-year term of imprisonment on each of the two remaining charges and was ordered to pay fines, costs, and attorney fees. The sentencing judge also ordered the prison terms to be served consecutively to each other.

Allen appealed. We transferred her case to our court of appeals. In the court of appeals, she claimed her trial counsel was ineffective in permitting her to plead guilty to the charge of introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility under Iowa Code section 719.8 and in failing to move in arrest of judgment to set aside the plea for lack of a factual basis, arguing the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility was not a "detention facility." Allen also claimed her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the court's acceptance of the guilty plea or failing to move in arrest of judgment to set aside the plea for lack of a knowing and voluntary plea, asserting the sentencing court failed to advise her of the possibility of consecutive sentences.

The court of appeals reversed Allen's conviction as to the charge of introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility in violation of Iowa Code section 719.8, finding her guilty plea lacked a factual basis in view of the fact that the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility was not a "detention facility." The court of appeals affirmed Allen's conviction as to the remaining charge, concluding Allen did not show she would not have pled guilty had the court advised her of the possibility of consecutive sentences. We granted the State's application for further review.

II. Preservation of Error.

The district court advised Allen at the guilty plea hearing that the timely filing of a motion in arrest of judgment was required to challenge the plea. She failed to do so. Although Allen's failure to file such a motion prevents her from directly appealing her conviction, "this failure will not bar a challenge to a guilty plea if the failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Brooks, 555 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1996). Accordingly, "[a]n ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim falls within an exception to the general rule that a party must preserve error in the district court." State v. Doggett, 687 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 2004). Consequently, we will review Allen's claims as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

III. Scope of Review.

The issue presented for further review by the State is whether the court of appeals was correct in holding Allen's trial counsel was ineffective in permitting her to enter a guilty plea to the charge of introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility under Iowa Code section 719.8 without a factual basis for the plea. Claims involving the ineffective assistance of counsel have their basis in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and are reviewed de novo. State v. Wills, 696 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Iowa 2005). Although these claims are typically preserved for postconviction relief actions, "we will address such claims on direct appeal when the record is sufficient to permit a ruling." Id. In addition, to the extent Allen's argument raises issues of statutory interpretation, our review is for correction of errors at law. Id.

The State seeks further review of only that part of the court of appeals decision reversing Allen's conviction for introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility due to a lack of a factual basis for her plea. Allen did not file a resistance to the State's application for further review. In situations such as this, "we have the discretion to review any issue raised on appeal regardless of whether such issue is expressly asserted in an application for further review." In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 2005). Allen also claimed on appeal that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the court's acceptance of the guilty plea or failing to move in arrest of judgment to set the plea aside for lack of a knowing and voluntary plea on the basis the sentencing court failed to advise her of the possibility of consecutive sentences. Although we have the discretion to review this issue, we do not reach it because our holding on the issue raised by the State in its application for further review is dispositive of this appeal.

IV. Analysis.

"In order for a defendant to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove: (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted." Wills, 696 N.W.2d at 22; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). Defense counsel fails to perform an essential duty when counsel allows the defendant to plead guilty to a charge for which there is no factual basis and thereafter does not file a motion in arrest of judgment challenging the plea. Brooks, 555 N.W.2d at 448; see also Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b) (stating a court "shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea . . . has a factual basis").

Allen asserts her guilty plea lacked a factual basis to the charge of introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility under Iowa Code section 719.8 because the Fort Dodge Correctional Facility was not a "detention facility." This assertion requires us to interpret section 719.8. When confronted with the task of statutory interpretation, we have stated:

The goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. We determine legislative intent from the words chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have said. Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law, words in the statute are given their ordinary and common meaning by considering the context within which they are used. Under the guise of construction, an interpreting body may not extend, enlarge or otherwise change the meaning of a statute.

Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted). Legislative intent is derived not only from the language used but also from "the statute's `subject matter, the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of the various interpretations.'" Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted).

In addition, the legislative history of a statute is instructive and we may consider it when ascertaining legislative intent. Richards v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 362 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1985); see also Chelsea Theater Corp. v. City of Burlington, 258 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Iowa 1977) (explaining "[t]he striking of a provision before enactment of a statute is an indication the statute should not be construed to include it"); Iowa Code § 4.6(3) (stating the court may consider the legislative history of an ambiguous statute in determining legislative intent). Also, "[t]he interpreter may look to prior enactments of the statute for guidance." Christenson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 557 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Iowa 19...