State v. Allgood
| Decision Date | 25 July 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 33672,33672 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Clarence O. ALLGOOD, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Gleeson & Smith, Spokane, for appellant.
Hugh H. Evans and James P. Connelly, Spokane, John J. Lally, Pros. Atty., for Spokane County, Spokane, for respondent.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of first degree forgery and appeals from the judgment and sentence entered thereon. The information charged appellant with both making and uttering a forged check.
Six of a total of eight assignments of error are based upon appellant's claim that the information charges the commission of two separate crimes: that of making the forged instrument, and thereafter uttering it. The argument is that RCW 9.44.020 defines the crime of forgery itself, while RCW 9.44.060 defines the crime of uttering a forged instrument. By a long line of decisions covering a period of fifty-five years, and recently reaffirmed in State v. Morse, 38 Wash.2d 927, 234 P.2d 478, this court has consistently held that the charge of making and uttering a forged check does not charge two separate crimes but merely two acts, either of which constitute the single crime of forgery.
Proof of appellant's handwriting was required, for which purpose the names of his attorney, Clarence P. Smith, and a parole officer, A. J. Murphy, were endorsed on the information and called as witnesses. Timely motions were made to strike both names and were renewed during trial.
With respect to the parole officer, the argument is that the appellant was reporting to him in consequence of his conviction of another crime, and any cross-examination would reveal such fact to the jury; and further, that the documents on which appellant's signature appeared were on the counsel table in the presence of the jury, which might have enabled the jury to identify them. The only other factor is that some juror might know that the witness was a parole officer. Appellant argues that because the witness had a common name, he would be forced to reveal his identity in the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, but that portion of the record is not brought here. However, the certified record is barren of any identification of the witness as a parole officer.
The complete answer to the argument is that Murphy was unable to recognize appellant's handwriting and was thereupon excused. At best, the claim is but a remote...
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State v. Locklear
...We find another case, also from the State of Washington, which is strikingly similar to the case at bar. In State v. Allgood, 50 Wash.2d 618, 313 P.2d 695 (1957), defendant was on trial for forgery and his handwriting was required to be proved. To facilitate this proof, defense counsel, who......
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State v. Sullivan, 36114
...of the prosecuting attorney to call defense counsel as a witness. State v. Cresto, 130 Wash. 436, 227 P. 856 (1924); State v. Allgood, 50 Wash.2d 618, 313 P.2d 695 (1957). In the Cresto case, supra, husband and wife were being tried jointly. The state believed it had not sufficiently identi......
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State v. Stiltner, 36040
...two prior occasions this court recognized the right to do so. State v. Cresto, 130 Wash. 436, 227 P. 856 (1924); State v. Allgood, 50 Wash.2d 618, 313 P.2d 695 (1957). We 'If defense counsel is required to testify under compulsion, it might well be that defendant's right to complete an unha......