State v. Alston
Decision Date | 02 April 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 33244.,33244. |
Citation | 141 Conn.App. 719,62 A.3d 586 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Ira ALSTON. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
David J. Reich, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Sarah Hanna, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Matthew C. Gedansky, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
BEACH, BEAR and ESPINOSA, Js.*
The defendant, Ira Alston, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered following his guilty plea to the crime of possessing a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution in violation of General Statutes § 53a–174a.1 The defendant claims that the court (1) improperly accepted his plea because it was not made voluntarily and (2) lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the information failed to state all of the essential elements of the crime with which he stood charged. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
By substitute information dated November 20, 2008, the state charged the defendant with possessing a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution. On October 1, 2009, the defendant's attorney, public defender Douglas Ovian, informed the court that the defendant wished to plead guilty in accordance with a plea bargain reached with the state. After the defendant entered a guilty plea, the prosecutor set forth the factual basis for the plea. The prosecutor stated that on June 30, 2008, while the defendant was an incarcerated prisoner at Northern Correctional Institution, he was found to possess an instrument consisting of a pen with a razor blade attached to it. The instrument was found on the defendant's person, concealed in his boxer shorts. Days prior to this discovery, the defendant and his cellmate were given razors for shaving purposes, but later told prison staff that they had disposed of the razors by flushing them down the toilet. Following a canvass of the defendant, the court found that the plea was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered with the effective assistance of counsel, and accepted the plea. Thereafter, the court imposed the agreed upon sentence of one year incarceration, consecutive to the defendant's existing term of incarceration. This appeal followed.
First, the defendant claims that the court improperly accepted his plea because it was not made voluntarily. We disagree.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reid, 277 Conn. 764, 780, 894 A.2d 963 (2006).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caez v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn.App. 617, 619–20, 946 A.2d 279, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 903, 957 A.2d 868 (2008).
The defendant argues that his statements during the plea canvass reflect that his plea was coerced, rather than voluntary. The plea was coerced, he asserts, because it resulted from the denial of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. He states that “[the] plea was the result of force because it was based on his belief that his attorney failed to represent him.” He argues that his statements at the time of his plea did not reflect that the plea was voluntary, the court did not make a record to demonstrate the voluntariness of the plea and that this court cannot presume that the plea was voluntary. The defendant did not raise the present issue before the trial court, either by moving to withdraw the plea or otherwise. He affirmatively seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). The record is adequate for review and the claim implicates the defendant's right to due process and, thus, is reviewable under Golding. See, e.g., State v. Gordon, 69 Conn.App. 691, 694, 796 A.2d 1238 (2002).
The following additional facts are relevant to our analysis.2 On October 1, 2010, before the court, Hon. Terence A. Sullivan, judge trial referee, the defendant withdrew his prior pleas and elections, and pleaded guilty to the crime of possessing a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution. The prosecutor set forth the factual basis for the plea and indicated that the plea agreement was for one year to serve, consecutive to any sentence imposed previously.
The court proceeded to canvass the defendant concerning his plea. The court asked the defendant if he had discussed with Ovian the decision to change his plea. The defendant replied affirmatively. The court asked the defendant if Ovian had explained the essential elements of the crime to him. The defendant replied that he did not understand the elements of the crime. After a colloquy between the court, Ovian and the defendant, the defendant stated:
The court then asked if the defendant intended to make an Alford plea, 3 at which time Ovian stated that he was unsure. The following colloquy occurred:
“The Court: So, tell me what you want to do?
Additional discussion between the court and the defendant occurred. Once more, the court discussed with the defendant the elements of the crime. The defendant questioned whether the state had to prove that he used a dangerous instrument. The court informed the defendant that this was not the case. The defendant represented that he understood that, by pleading guilty, he was forgoing his right to a trial, his right to remain silent, his right to confront adverse witnesses and present evidence on his behalf and his right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant stated that he understood the state's burden of proof with regard to the crime with which he stood charged. The following colloquy then occurred:
“[The Defendant]: Forced by?
“The Court: I'm talking about any kind of coercion, threats—
“[The Defendant]: I feel pressured, yes.
“[The Defendant]: Not in that context, no.”
The court questioned the defendant about the plea agreement with the state, the sentence to which he was exposed if he did not plead guilty and other consequences of his plea. The defendant stated that he understood these facts and consequences. The following colloquy ensued:
“[The Defendant]: In light of the circumstances, yes, I did decide.
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Reynolds v. Comm'r of Corr.
...reference the crime with which the defendant was charged, was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court”); State v. Alston, 141 Conn.App. 719, 732, 62 A.3d 586 (“an information that states the exact section and subsection of the statute under which a defendant is charged, as well a......
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Reynolds v. Comm'r of Corr.
...reference the crime with which the defendant was charged, was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court"); State v. Alston, 141 Conn. App. 719, 732, 62 A.3d 586 ("an information that states the exact section and subsection of the statute under which a defendant is charged, as well ......
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Alston v. Warden
...at all relevant times by attorney Douglas Ovian. The petitioner's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Alston, 141 Conn.App. 719, 62 A.3d 586, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 943, 66 A.3d 884 (2013). In the judgment below and finding that the petitioner's guilty plea was entered vol......
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Alston v. Corr. Daniels
...pen with an attached razor blade. The instrument was found on Alston's person, concealed in his boxer shorts. See State of Connecticut v. Alston, 141 Conn.App. 719, 721 (2013). 9. See http://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv.asp?id_inmt_num=275666 (Conn. Dep't of Corr. Info.). 10. Wit......