State v. Alter

• Decision Date: 14 October 1965
• Docket Number: No. 37652,37652
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. LeRoy ALTER, Appellant.

Page 111

67 Wn.2d 111

406 P.2d 765

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. LeRoy ALTER, Appellant.

No. 37652.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 1.

Oct. 14, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1965.

Gordon L. Walgren, Bremerton, for appellant.

James Munro, Pros. Atty., Bremerton, for respondent.

BARNETT, Judge. ^*

On May 7, 1964, Pauline Kathirine Jensen Dahl, an elderly woman, was found at her home in Bremerton brutally beaten to death. There was no evidence of rape or robbery.

May 9, 1964, the defendant made a written statement in which he asserted his age to be 22 years and listed his occupation as laborer, PSNY public works. He stated, 'I punched out of the yard at 12:30 and I hit a few taverns. * * * I had quite a bit to drink * * *.' When he left the yard, he went to the dentist, then to the taverns and then home. In answer to a question, 'How long did you stay in your room do you remember * * *?' he responded, 'It was half an hour or an hour. * * * I got the time all mixed up. * * *' He said that he went to Mrs. Dahl's home and,

I knocked on the door and she opened the door--she had a paring knife in her hand and I grabbed her and started chocking her--then I sort of blanked out for a few minutes and I don't know what happened. The next thing I knew I was back in my room at the house--I got in my house alright--I was in there I guess 10 or 15 minutes and Mrs. Dahl came back out on the porch again--then I went back and grabbed her and I beat her with the flashlight * * *. Q. Did Mrs. Dahl still have the knife in her hand or had you taken it away from her? A. She had it in her hand and I had taken it away from her. * * * Q. What happened after you took the knife out of her hand? A. It seems like I went crazy and I struck her with the knife a few times. * * * Q. What gave you the idea to go over to this woman's house? A. I was drinking and got to thinking about hate and madness--it seemed like I was mad at the whole world--I didn't have any cause at all for killing the woman. I just went out of my mind I guess. Q. There was no motive, such as robbery or sex? A. No--there wasn't either one of them--I just went crazy--I didn't have any reason. Q. When she came out on the porch after you had first accosted her, did she holler or make any noise? A. No, she didn't make any noise--she was trying to speak and I couldn't understand her--she talked with a broken accent.

May 17, 1954, an information charging murder in the first degree was filed. On the same day the prosecuting attorney filed a petition for transportation of defendant to Western State Hospital at Fort Steilacoom for psychiatric examination based upon an affidavit of defendant's father reciting, Inter alia, defendant's past confinement for a year in a mental institution in Arkansas. The defendant signed a consent to psychiatric examination. The order granting the petition was signed in open court, although no notes are available as to all that transpired in the courtroom on May 17, 1954. In the transcript of the proceedings on June 1, 1954, the statement reads in part that 'the defendant was again brought before the court on June 1, 1954 * * *.' It is not unreasonable to assume, therefore, that the court had an opportunity to observe the defendant during the proceedings on May 17, 1954, or sometime prior to June 1, 1954. At the June 1, 1954, proceeding, the court stated:

I got the letter, in which the staff at the hospital found this man mentally incompetent--insane for the purpose of the law under which he is charged--doesn't know the difference between right and wrong. Of course, we can't try him. The only thing you can do is to prepare an order based on their findings, committing him there to the Western State Hospital, with the proviso that if he is discharged or found cured and ever discharged, he can be returned to this county for action under the criminal charge.

On June 4, 1954, in an order of commitment, the court found that LeRoy Alter was mentally ill as defined by law and was in need of hospitalization. The court incorporated a portion of the findings of the staff of Western State Hospital in the commitment order, as follows:

'(I)t is felt by the Staff that he was mentally ill on the 7th day of May, 1954, that he (sic) unable to comprehend because of this mental illness the difference between right and wrong.' And it appearing therefore that because the man is mentally ill, it is impossible to try him for the offense with which he is charged, to-wit, murder in the first degree, the Court does now find in accordance with the report of the medical staff of the Western State Hospital that the said defendant, LeRoy Alter, is now mentally ill and should be confined in a state hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he recovers his mental stability and sanity. * * *

(U)pon release, the said defendant, LeRoy Alter, be returned to the Superior Court * * * for such other and further proceedings as may be proper.

Sometime in November of 1963, the present Prosecuting Attorney of Kitsap County was advised by the Superintendent of Eastern State Hospital, to which defendant had been transferred from Western State Hospital, that the defendant was now considered sane. Defendant was transferred to Kitsap County jail in March of 1964, and it was for the first time about the middle of March that he was almost 10 years after the crime was committed.

On March 9, 1964, the defendant appeared with counsel at an arraignment to the charge of murder in the first degree. Oral pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity were entered. Jury trial was set for April 1st. On March 17, 1964, a written plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was filed.

Defendant's motions for dismissal made prior to and during trial were denied.

The jury found defendant not guilty of murder in the first degree, but did make special findings to the effect that (1) the defendant did commit the crime charged; (2) acquitted the defendant because of his insanity or mental irresponsibility at the time of the commission of the crime; (3) that the insanity or mental irresponsibility did not continue and exist at the time of trial; and (4) there is a likelihood of relapse or recurrence of the insane or mental irresponsibility condition and that the defendant is not a safe person to be at large.

A judgment committing defendant as criminally insane was signed by the trial judge on April 13, 1964, after defendant's motion for a new trial was denied.

Defendant's three assignments of error relate to the denial of his motions of dismissal and for a new trial. Included in the defendant's argument are the contentions that the defendant was denied both a speedy trial and the benefit of counsel in violation of the Federal and Washington State Constitutions.

We have read the briefs and made a thorough search of the record in an effort to discover if there is any merit in defendant's contentions or if any error may have existed in the trial court which would warrant a reversal in this case. We are satisfied that the answer to our inquiry in both instances is negative.

In his motion for a dismissal at trial, defendant argued to the court:

The purpose of introducing what is apparently one confession and not another confession or even all of the confessions at that time has been admitted by the Prosecuting Attorney, to show how he was acting at that particular time. Then they will try to relate it to how he acts now. Now, the defendant did not have an opportunity, did not have counsel at that time to assist him in obtaining evidence of how he looked which might have had an impression on this jury now, if that is the way they are going to base their opinion as to how he acted at that time.

However, I believe that the State would concede there were a number of statements that were taken from witnesses concerning this particular crime as to where Mr. Alter was prior to the time of the crime, of persons who lived in the near proximity of him, statements he made with reference to his dental problems at that time, the pain that he was in, and the additional difficulties that he was going through, prior to the time of the commission of this murder. * * * the defendant at this date, although he may have the opportunity of getting statements that were given at that time, had no further opportunity due to his incarceration, due to the fact that he was without counsel to assist him, to obtain other evidence that might be of some persuasive effect to the jury at this time, arguing along the way Mr. Munro is, persuasive to the jury at this time in assisting the jury to make a determination as to whether or not he is safe to be at large. It is for that reason that I feel the defendant has been severely prejudiced even though he need not have the fear of being convicted of first degree murder, but that he has been severely prejudiced by the fact that he was not given counsel and that the State is asking this jury to find he is criminally insane, and which would effectively return him to the State Hospital, which might be for the rest of his life.

On appeal, defendant contends in his brief:

The appellant here was effectively robbed of his right to a determination of whether he could, during May of 1954, stand trial. In the absence of such a determination he must be presumed to be competent and the State can have no excuse for not proceeding with a trial at that time. Appellant did not have the advice of counsel and could not assist the court in following the proper procedure or intelligently protest the procedure that was followed.

It might be suggested by the State that there can be no possible prejudice to the appellant by not trying him for First Degree Murder in 1954. After all, says the State, had he been tried then, he might have hanged. On the other hand, how are we now to say that diligent counsel, had he been appointed, might not have established a defense for the...