State v. Alvarez

Decision Date23 May 2006
Docket NumberNo. 26478.,26478.
Citation95 Conn.App. 539,897 A.2d 669
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Eric ALVAREZ.

Katherine C. Essington, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Jessica Probolus, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Scott J. Murphy, state's attorney, and Brian Preleski, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

FLYNN, C.J., and SCHALLER and GRUENDEL, Js.

FLYNN, C.J.

The defendant, Eric Alvarez, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of robbery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-136 and larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124(a)(2). After a jury trial on a part B information that same day, the defendant also was found guilty of committing an offense while on release in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40b. He received a total effective sentence of thirty years incarceration, execution suspended after sixteen years, and five years probation. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court failed to question him adequately concerning his dissatisfaction with his attorney, which led to the court's failure to appoint substitute counsel, and (2) the prosecutor committed several instances of misconduct, depriving the defendant of due process and a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On September 5, 2003, the defendant entered J. Roberts Jewelers in Bristol and informed Clayton Roberts, one of the owners of the store, that he was interested in purchasing something for his girlfriend. After being shown several rings, the defendant grabbed a five diamond wedding ring, worth $1400, and ran out of the store.1 Roberts chased him for several blocks, but gave up the chase when he thought he saw the defendant remove a knife from his pocket. Later that day, the defendant sold the ring for some heroin. On September 12, 2003, Roberts picked out the defendant's photograph from an array shown to him by a detective from the Bristol police department. The defendant was arrested and brought to trial. He testified on his own behalf, admitting that he had stolen the ring to support his heroin addiction. He denied possessing a knife, however. Following his conviction, the defendant filed the present appeal. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

On appeal, the defendant first claims that the court abused its discretion in the manner in which it responded to his complaints concerning his attorney. The defendant argues that the court should have questioned him further when he displayed some dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel. Additionally, he argues that the court should have appointed substitute counsel. We disagree.

Our standard of review concerning the court's obligation to conduct an inquiry into the defendant's request for new counsel is the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hansen, 39 Conn.App. 384, 399, 666 A.2d 421, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 928, 667 A.2d 554 (1995). "Where a defendant voices a seemingly substantial complaint about counsel, the court should inquire into the reasons for dissatisfaction.... When the defendant's concerns fall short of a `seemingly substantial complaint,' however, our Supreme Court has instructed that the trial court does not act improperly in failing to inquire into the reasons underlying the defendant's dissatisfaction with his attorney." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Binnette, 86 Conn.App. 491 503-504, 861 A.2d 1197 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 902, 868 A.2d 745 (2005). Additionally, "[a] trial court does not abuse its discretion by failing to make further inquiry where the defendant has already had an adequate opportunity to inform the trial court of his complaints." State v. Hansen, supra, at 399, 666 A.2d 421.

On August 6, 2004, just prior to beginning jury selection, the defendant requested to address the court. The following colloquy occurred:

"The Defendant: Can I speak?

"The Court: Yes, sir.

"The Defendant: Okay. There's going to be a problem if he's going to represent me because, listen, the guy has—he has pending cases in the habeas corpus courts, too. They're investigating this guy. I don't feel safe being here with him on my side. I mean, he's talking about I got to take the ten years or do pro se. If I do pro se, I won't understand what's going on.

"The Court: Well, you don't have to go pro se. [Your defense attorney] is ready, willing and able to represent you.

"The Defendant: Yeah, I know he's ready, willing and able. He's ready, willing and able to take my life away from me. I'm in twenty years, come on.

"The Court: Well, the charges—

"The Defendant: I feel threatened—I feel threatened because he's right here by me anyways.

"The Court: How do you mean you feel threatened, sir?

"The Defendant: I feel threatened. The guy—I mean, he's not going to do nothing for me.

"The Court: Well, [your defense attorney] has represented a lot of defendants in front of me—

"The Defendant: And he has also—

"The Court:—including people charged with—

"The Defendant:—he has also lost.

"The Court: Well, let me—I let you speak, sir, and I'll let you speak again, just let me say something for a minute. [Your defense attorney] has represented a lot of defendants in front of me, including defendants in murder cases. He has always done a fine job, as far as I could tell. Some of them have been convicted; some of them have been acquitted. That's the way it goes. I mean, I don't know anything about your case. But I know that if there are some problems with the state's case, [your defense attorney] is fully capable of exposing those problems to the jury and making sure that you get a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be found not guilty if that's what the evidence persuades the jury to do. So, based on my experience with [your defense attorney]—you've never had a case with [your defense attorney] before, have you?

"The Defendant: No.

"The Court: He hasn't represented you before?

"The Defendant: No.

"The Court: Based on my experience with him and my observation of him, he does a fine job on behalf of his clients, and he has been successful in representing several of them. So, I don't think you should feel threatened that your die is cast here as far as whether you're going to be found guilty or not guilty. I mean, as I said, I don't know anything about your case. But if there are some problems with the state's case, [your defense attorney] is fully capable of exposing them to the jury. So, I don't want you to feel threatened and you're certainly not—it's certainly not a matter of taking the deal or going pro se. [Your defense attorney] is ready to represent you, and he will.

"So—and as far as I'm concerned, I'm going to be the judge presiding over the jury selection and the trial. If there are legal issues that come up that [your defense attorney] raises, and they're in your favor, then that's the way I'll decide them. If they're in the state's favor, then I'll decide them in favor of the state.

"So—I mean, I think, Mr. Alvarez, you're going to get a fair trial here, and [your defense attorney] is going to represent you effectively. I don't know what the evidence is going to show, but—

"The Defendant: They shouldn't show nothing.

"The Court: Well, maybe that's so, sir. So, what I want to know, Mr. Alvarez, is when I bring these jurors down in the room, you know, they're going to be looking at you, they're going to be—the jurors are going to decide this case guilty or not guilty. Are you going to be on good behavior so that we can—you can give them the best impression that you want them to have of yourself?

"The Defendant: Yes. I said, yeah.

"[Defense Counsel]: He said, yes.

"The Court: All right, sir. We're going to take a recess now. You'll go back into the holding area out there, and then we'll bring the jurors down and then we'll start the jury selection process."

The defendant offered no further comments or concerns regarding any dissatisfaction with his attorney or the desire to have substitute counsel appointed on his behalf.

Relying on United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 108 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1211, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988), the defendant argues that "[i]n evaluating whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for substitution of counsel, an appellate court should consider the following factors: [t]he timeliness of the motion; the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and whether the attorney-client conflict was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication and prevented an adequate defense." Although it is not clear that the defendant requested or truly wanted substitute counsel when he addressed the court, even if we employ the factors requested by the defendant, we arrive at the conclusion that the court did not abuse its discretion when responding to the defendant's concerns regarding his attorney or any purported motion to substitute counsel.

First, the defendant asked to address the court just prior to the start of jury selection, and he stated that he had some reservations concerning appointed counsel. Even if we assume that the defendant was requesting substitute counsel, the timing of this request was the eve of trial. "[C]ourts repeatedly have held that the proper administration of justice requires that . . . last-minute requests for change of counsel, absent some showing of great need, should be refused." State v. Beaulieu, 164 Conn. 620, 627, 325 A.2d 263 (1973).

Second, the record indicates that the court inquired into the defendant's complaint with regard to his counsel and specifically told the defendant that he could speak again after the court...

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6 cases
  • State v. Mark T.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • June 7, 2021
    ...tend to modify any conclusion or inference resulting from the facts so stated." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Alvarez , 95 Conn. App. 539, 552, 897 A.2d 669, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 910, 902 A.2d 1069 (2006). This rule of evidence "recognizes the discretion afforded the trial......
  • State v. Santiago
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • May 28, 2013
    ...it is not his right, to stigmatize a defendant”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985); State v. Alvarez, 95 Conn.App. 539, 551, 897 A.2d 669 (prosecutor's reference to defendant as “ ‘junkie’ ” was improper appeal to emotions of jury because term is pejorative,......
  • State v. Pascal
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • July 8, 2008
    ...trial and, indeed, the version of events advanced by the defendant are consistent with this definition. See generally State v. Alvarez, 95 Conn. App. 539, 553, 897 A.2d 669, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 910, 902 A.2d 1069 (2006). Accordingly, the defendant has failed to demonstrate how the prose......
  • State v. Santiago
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • May 28, 2013
    ...is not his right, to stigmatize a defendant''), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S. Ct. 967, 83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985); State v. Alvarez, 95 Conn. App. 539, 551, 897 A.2d 669 (prosecutor's reference to defendant as '' 'junkie' '' was improper appeal to emotions of jury because term is pejorat......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Witness
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Trial Objections
    • May 5, 2022
    ...because they related to defendant’s Christianity that defendant heavily emphasized in his direct testimony. CONNECTICUT State v. Alvarez , 897 A.2d 669, 677-78 (Conn. App. 2006). Although cross-examination is limited to the subject matter of the direct examination, the cross-examiner may el......
  • Developments in Connecticut Criminal Law: 2006
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 81, 2007
    • Invalid date
    ...to defendant as a "killer" not improper in context; use of audiovisual evidence in rebuttal summation not improper); State v. Alvarez, 95 Conn. App. 539, 550-55, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 910 (2006) (per Williams factors calling defendant "junkie" was improper but not violation of right to fa......

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