State v. Amos

• Decision Date: 22 June 1918
• Citation: 79 So. 433,76 Fla. 26
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. FINLAYSON v. AMOS, State Comptroller.

79 So. 433

76 Fla. 26

STATE ex rel. FINLAYSON v. AMOS, State Comptroller.

Florida Supreme Court

June 22, 1918

Rehearing Denied Aug. 8, 1918.

Original proceedings in mandamus by the State, on the relation of Daniel A. Finlayson, against Ernest Amos, as State Comptroller. Peremptory writ awarded.

Whitfield and West, JJ., dissenting.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

When the language of a statute is capable of two constructions the courts may resort to the history of its passage through the Legislature, to ascertain the legislative intent.

Where the legislative journals show that, in the passage of an act through the Legislature, language which gave to the act the construction placed on it by the comptroller was stricken from the bill by amendment, and a clause substituted therefor that conflicts with the departmental construction, the legislative intent, as shown by its act in changing the language of the act, will be adopted by the court.

COUNSEL D. A. Finlayson and J. H. Shuman, both of Monticello, for relator.

Van C Swearingen, Atty. Gen., and C. O. Andrews, Asst. Atty. Gen for respondent.

OPINION

BROWNE C.J.

The petitioner, who is the owner of an automobile of 32 horse power with a seating capacity of one and not more than five persons, made application to the comptroller under the provisions of chapter 7275, Acts of the Legislature of 1917 to have his automobile registered in accordance with law.

He sent $5 with his application, but the comptroller refused to register his car, or to assign him a number, or to furnish him with metal number plates so that he might operate his car upon the public highways of the state. An alternative writ of mandamus was issued, and in his return the comptroller states that the registration fee for the petitioner's car is $12, and not $5, and demands $7 more from the petitioner before registering his car and otherwise complying with the law.

The issue made by the pleadings presents for determination by this court the construction to be placed on series B and C of section 6 of the automobile license act of 1917, that reads in part as follows:

The following fee shall be paid to the comptroller upon the registration or re-registration of motor vehicles in accordance with the provisions of this act.

Passenger Vehicles.

Series A--Motorcycles..................... $ 2.00

Series B--For any automobile and other

motor driven vehicle with a

seating capacity of one and not

more than five persons........... 5.00

Series C--Automobiles of more than 25

h. p., and not more than 40 h. p. 12.00

Series D--Automobiles of more than 40

h. p., and not more than 60 h. p. 15.00

Series E--Automobiles of more than 60

h. p............................. 30.00

Any type of automobile seating ten or

more passengers.................. 100.00

The petitioner contends that, as his automobile has a seating capacity of not more than five persons, he should pay a fee of $5 as provided for in series B. The comptroller holds that, as the automobile is of more than 25 horse power and not more than 40, he must pay a fee of $12.

In construing a statute it is the duty of the court to give force and effect to every part of it to carry out the intent of the Legislature, if possible. Where the language is clear the intent is ascertained from the language of the act itself, and it is the duty of the court to give to the language used its plain and natural meaning, for the Legislature is presumed to mean what it has plainly expressed, and there is no field for construction. If the act contains contradictory provisions, the courts will endeavor to so construe it as to give force and effect to the entire act and harmonize it, if possible, and, failing in this, they seek light from other sources. Where the language is plain and unequivocal, the courts must follow it implicitly, but, where it is doubtful or ambiguous, 'it is the duty of the court to remove the doubt by deciding it, and, when the court has given its decision, the point can no longer be considered doubtful.' Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 363. They should not, however, adopt an arbitrary conclusion as to what was the intention of the Legislature, if there is any way in which that may be ascertained. Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 363, says:

'If a statute is valid, it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. * * * A legislative intention to be efficient as law must be set forth in a statute; it is therefore a written law. How the intention is to be ascertained is only answered by the principles and rules of exposition. If a statute is plain, certain, and unambiguous, so that no doubt arises from its own terms as to its scope and meaning, a bare reading suffices; then interpretation is needless. And where the intention of a statute has been ascertained by the application of the rules of interpretation, they have served their purpose, for all such rules are intended to reach that intent. The sole authority of the Legislature to make laws is the foundation of the principle that courts of justice are bound to give effect to its intention. When that is plain and palpable they must follow it implicitly. The rules of construction with which the books abound apply only where the words used are of doubtful import; they are only so many lights to assist the courts in arriving with more accuracy at the true interpretation of the intention.'

It is contended by the comptroller that, because series C fixed the amount of the license to be paid for automobiles of more than 25 and not more than 40 horse power, series B should be construed as including only automobiles that have 25 horse power or less. On the other hand, it is contended that as all automobiles, without regard to their horse power, with a seating capacity of one and not more than five persons, have been provided for in series B, that series C must be construed in connection with series B, and that series C, D, and E. were intended to apply only to automobiles of a seating capacity of more than five and less than ten persons. There seems to be more reason for the latter construction than for the former, because series B uses the most comprehensive and inclusive woud 'any,' when creating a class that is to be governed solely by seating capacity. It makes an all-embracing class, and includes in it 'any automobile' of a seating capacity of one and not more than five persons, without regard to horse power, weight, speed, capacity, or any other quality. Series C, D, and E therefore provide for other automobiles than those included in series B, that have a seating capacity of more than five persons and not more than ten.

The act makes six classifications of motordriven passenger vehicles, and, in two, seating capacity is made the sole test of the amount of license tax to be paid. Neither of these classifications refers in any way to horse power.

It was admitted by the Attorney General in the argument before this court that, in deciding which class of automobiles should pay a license tax of $100, the comptroller made seating capacity and not horse power the test; that an automobile of a seating capacity of ten or more passengers is required to pay $100 license, without regard to its horse power, but that, in determining which class of automobiles should pay only $5, the horse power was made the test. No reason is given for this distinction, nor can it be justified under any construction of the law.

Owing to the conflicting provisions of the law under consideration, it would be difficult to reach a perfectly satisfactory conclusion, if we had no light to guide us except the language of the law itself. In such a dilemma we may seek for light in the history of the passage of the act through the Legislature.

In the case of McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 593, the court said:

'It is beyond question the duty of courts in construing statutes, to give effect to the intent of the lawmaking power, and seek for that intent in every legitimate way. But in the construction both of statutes and contracts, the intent of the framers and parties is to be sought first of all, in the words and language employed, and if the words are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the framers of the instrument, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation, and, when the words have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere in search of conjucture in order to restrict or extend the meaning.'

Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 470, says:

'The proceedings of the Legislature in reference to the passage of an act may be taken into consideration in construing the act. Thus the reports of committees made to the Legislature have been held to be proper sources of information in ascertaining the intent or meaning of the act. Amendments made, or proposed and defeated, may also throw light on the construction of the act as finally passed, and may properly be taken into consideration.'

In Edger v. Randolph County, 70 Ind. 331, the court said:

'But it has never been held by this court that for the purpose of construction or interpretation, and with the view of ascertaining the legislative will and intention in the enactment of a law, the courts may not properly resort to the journals of the two legislative bodies, to learn therefrom the history of the law in question, from its first introduction as a bill until its final...