State v. Amyx
| Decision Date | 31 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. COA14–383.,COA14–383. |
| Citation | 768 S.E.2d 201 (Table) |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Christopher David AMYX. |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General L. Michael Dodd, for the State.
George B. Currin and Catherine A. Hofmann for defendant-appellant.
Where the trial court properly excluded testimony about the victim's character as untimely, and properly admitted testimony reflecting the victim's state of mind, and where the evidence showed premeditation and deliberation and a lack of self-defense, the trial court did not err in its rulings. Where the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments were not prejudicial, it was not error for the trial court to fail to intervene ex mero motu.Where the trial court's statements and instructions to the jury were not prejudicial, they did not constitute plain error.
On 3 October 2010, defendant Christopher David Amyx shot and killed Johnathan Schipper (“Johnathan”) in defendant's dorm room at Mid–Atlantic Christian University (“MACU”) in Elizabeth City. Former roommates, both defendant and Johnathan were students at MACU and lived in the same dormitory.
When Officer W.D. Harris of the Elizabeth City Police Department arrived at the scene, he found defendant sitting in the hallway. Four to five feet away lay a disassembled Glock .45 caliber pistol. When Officer Harris asked where and who the shooter was, defendant raised his hand and claimed responsibility.
Defendant told Officer Harris that he had shot Johnathan in self-defense. Defendant stated that he was at his desk playing a video game when Johnathan entered defendant's room. Defendant, who had been sitting with his back to the door, turned and saw Johnathan. Defendant stated that he immediately felt something was wrong. Johnathan, allegedly breathing heavily and with a “thousand-yard stare,” placed his camouflaged Bible on defendant's sink before pulling a knife and saying “it's time.”
Defendant testified that “I knew that if I did not defend myself in the fastest way possible, then he would kill me.” Defendant drew his semi-automatic pistol and shot Johnathan between the eyes.
Immediately after shooting Johnathan, defendant asked another MACU student to call 9–1–1 and to say that Johnathan had tried to stab defendant. Defendant also told the student to tell the police that defendant was a law enforcement officer and that he had rendered his gun safe after the shooting. At the time, defendant worked weekends for the Pinetops Police Department.
On 23 July 2013, a jury convicted defendant of one count of first-degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant appeals.
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On appeal, defendant questions whether the trial court erred: (I) in the admission and exclusion of evidence; (II) in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence; (III) in failing to intervene ex mero motuduring the prosecutor's closing argument; and (IV) in its jury instructions.
I.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in the admission and exclusion of certain evidence. We disagree.
When a trial court admits or excludes evidence based on relevancy, its rulings are technically not discretionary. State v.. Wallace,104 N.C.App. 498, 502, 410 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1991). Nevertheless, on appeal, relevancy decisions are given great deference. Id.Such deference recognizes that “the trial court is better situated to evaluate whether a particular piece of evidence tends to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable.” Dunn v. Custer,162 N.C.App. 259, 266, 591 S.E.2d 11, 17 (2004).
Victim Character Evidence
Defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding Johnathan's character. Pursuant to our North Carolina Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is that which has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 401 (2013). When the proffered evidence concerns a victim's violent character, “[t]he relevancy of such evidence stems from the fact that in order to sustain a plea of self-defense, it must be made to appear to the jury that the accused was not the aggressor.” State v. Watson,338 N.C. 168, 188, 449 S.E.2d 694, 706 (1994), overruled on other grounds by State v. Richardson,341 N.C. 585, 597, 461 S.E.2d 724, 732 (1995). Such evidence may be used to prove a defendant's state of mind, and is relevant only to the extent of showing that the defendant had knowledge of the victim's violent character. Id.at 187, 449 S.E.2d at 706.
“A victim's reputation for violence is relevant [only] after the self-defense issue has been raised [by defendant].” State v. Hammonds,61 N.C.App. 615, 615–16, 301 S.E.2d 457, 458 (1983) (citation omitted). As long as it does not “preclude questioning regarding the subject at a later time,” it is well within the court's discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination until the defense presents evidence of self-defense. State v. Tann,57 N.C.App. 527, 531–32, 291 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1982).
Here, during cross-examination of the State's first witness, Ryan Puterbaugh, defendant sought to question him regarding Johnathan's fascination with the comic book character Wolverine. After a voir direexamination, the trial court found that “[Puterbaugh's testimony] is not relevant when considering the testimony up to this point.” In making its ruling, the trial court specifically stated that “I am not saying [defendant] that you may not be able to come back” to the Wolverine testimony. The trial court, therefore, left open the possibility that Puterbaugh could be recalled to testify to Johnathan's character when the evidence became otherwise relevant or when defendant put on evidence.
Jacob Smith also testified for the State. During cross-examination, defendant sought to question Smith about whether Johnathan had ever exhibited anger issues. Again, the trial court excluded testimony about Johnathan's character, holding that such evidence was not relevant unless and until defendant put on evidence of self-defense. The trial court, therefore, properly excluded evidence of Johnathan's character at that point of the trial. See Tann,57 N.C.App. at 531–32, 291 S.E.2d at 827. We, therefore, overrule this portion of defendant's argument.
Hearsay Statements
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony from Puterbaugh and Betty Schipper, Johnathan's mother. Specifically, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony concerning statements Johnathan made prior to his death.
On appeal, a trial court's determination concerning whether an out-of-court statement qualifies as hearsay is reviewed de novo. State v. Castaneda,215 N.C.App. 144, 147, 715 S.E.2d 290, 293 (2011). Hearsay is any out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 801(c) (2013).
A court may admit a hearsay statement if it is “[a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition ... but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.” Id.§ 8C–1, Rule 803(3). A statement that “indicate[s] the victim's mental condition by showing the victim's fears, feelings, impressions, or experiences” also falls within the state of mind exception. State v. Lathan,138 N.C.App. 234, 236, 530 S.E.2d 615, 618 (2000).
“The victim's state of mind is relevant if it bears directly on the victim's relationship with the defendant at the time the victim was killed.” State v. Bishop,346 N.C. 365, 379, 488 S.E.2d 769, 776 (1997) ; see generally State v. Stager,329 N.C. 278, 315, 406 S.E.2d 876, 897 (1991) (). A victim's state of mind is also relevant if it “relates directly to circumstances giving rise to a potential confrontation with the defendant.” State v. McLemore,343 N.C. 240, 246, 470 S.E.2d 2, 5 (1996).
Puterbaugh testified that defendant teased and bullied Johnathan about his views on abortion and on perverted jokes so much that “the[ir] discussions would get a little heated.” Puterbaugh maintained that “[Johnathan] felt he was kind of being picked on for what he believed....” Such testimony fits the technical definition of hearsay. However, Puterbaugh's testimony falls within the exception for state of mind statements because the testimony speaks to the relationship between Johnathan and defendant. This testimony conveyed the victim's emotions in relation to defendant's actions and, therefore, was admissible evidence of Johnathan's state of mind. State v. Marecek,130 N.C.App. 303, 306, 502 S.E.2d 634, 636 (1998).
Betty Schipper's testimony recounted that her son was upset about two separate instances in which defendant attempted to bully Johnathan into a fight. Ms. Schipper said that “[my son] just told me rather in a bit of frustration,not angerthat [defendant] would often bully him into trying to fight either [defendant] or somebody else.” (emphasis added). By describing Johnathan's statements as expressing frustration, Ms. Schipper's testimony, like that of Puterbaugh, contained statements of emotion which showed her son's state of mind. Ms. Schipper's testimony was also relevant as it depicted the hostile relationship between Johnathan and defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence based on the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.
II.
Defendant next argues the trial court erred by failing to grant defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.
“This Court reviews the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith,186 N.C.App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007) (citation omitted). Review of a motion to...
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