State v. Lathan, No. COA99-411.
| Decision Date | 06 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. COA99-411. |
| Citation | 530 S.E.2d 615,138 NC App. 234 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Terry Franklin LATHAN. |
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by James C. Gulick, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant Terry Franklin Lathan appeals his conviction of second-degree murder. We find no error.
At approximately 12:15 a.m. on 13 July 1996, the Hoffman Fire and Rescue unit received a call reporting a shooting. When volunteers arrived at the scene, defendant was standing beside his truck; his girlfriend, Lisa Barber, was dead inside the truck. When asked what happened, defendant stated: The body was slumped over in the passenger side of the truck cab; it was wrapped in a quilt and had a single gunshot wound to the left breast area. Bruises consistent with attempted strangulation were found on her neck although other signs of strangulation were absent. The victim also was bruised about other parts of her body.
Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder. A jury returned a verdict of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced defendant to 141 to 179 months imprisonment.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence. Several witnesses testified as to statements the victim made prior to her death. After conducting a voir dire hearing and considering arguments of counsel, the trial court admitted the statements pursuant to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 803(3) (1999). Defendant contends that the admission of these hearsay statements violated his Confrontation Clause rights as set forth in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Under Rule 803(3), hearsay evidence may be admitted to show the declarant's "then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health)." This exception permits the introduction of hearsay evidence that tends to "indicate the victim's mental condition by showing the victim's fears, feelings, impressions or experiences," so long as any prejudicial effect of such evidence is not outweighed by its probative value under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (1999). State v. Walker, 332 N.C. 520, 535, 422 S.E.2d 716, 725 (1992) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has stated that the underlying policy supporting Rule 803(3) is the "`fair necessity, for lack of other better evidence, for resorting to a person's own contemporary statements of his mental or physical condition.'" State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 229, 451 S.E.2d 600, 612 (1994) (quoting 6 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1714 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1976)).
To be admissible under Rule 803(3), the testimony also must be relevant. See State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 379, 488 S.E.2d 769, 776 (1997)
. "It is well established in North Carolina that a murder victim's statements falling within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule are highly relevant to show the status of the victim's relationship to the defendant." State v. Scott, 343 N.C. 313, 335, 471 S.E.2d 605, 618 (1996) (citations omitted). A victim's state of mind also is relevant "if it relates directly to circumstances giving rise to a potential confrontation with the defendant." State v. McLemore, 343 N.C. 240, 246, 470 S.E.2d 2, 5 (1996) (citation omitted).
However, North Carolina courts have recognized limits to the reach of this hearsay exception. "Statements merely relating factual events do not fall within Rule 803(3) because, in contrast to statements of mental or physical condition, factual circumstances are provable by better evidence, such as the testimony of those who witnessed the events." State v. Exum, 128 N.C.App. 647, 654, 497 S.E.2d 98, 103 (1998) (citation omitted). Defendant contends that the challenged testimony provided by the following witnesses consists of inadmissible "recitation of fact" by the victim, rather than expression by the victim of her state of mind.
Nellie Stubbs, the victim's mother, testified that the victim had told her: (1) that the victim had to be home by a certain time, and if she was late, defendant "would be standing in the door waiting on her"; (2) that defendant opposed the victim's use of the Stubbs' vehicle; (3) that defendant opposed people coming to his house to visit the victim; and (4) that the victim had prepared to leave defendant, but that she had stayed with him after he apologized.
Ms. Webb worked with the victim and had known the victim most of her adult life. Ms. Webb testified that the victim told her that defendant was "very, very jealous" of the victim.
Ms. Rainwater was the wife of the victim's former stepfather. Ms. Rainwater offered testimony that three weeks prior to the victim's death, the victim visited the witness but had to hurry home. The victim told Ms. Rainwater that she had to be home when defendant arrived "or he'd whip her ass." The witness stated: "I could see the fear there that if she didn't go she was going to be in trouble." Ms. Rainwater also testified that defendant "was jealous."
Ms. Green was a co-worker of the victim. She testified that one day the victim arrived at work with a mark on her face. When she inquired as to how it happened, the victim told her that defendant and the victim had argued and that defendant had touched to her face a hot gun barrel.
While school was in session, Ms. Beachum regularly babysat for the victim's son. Shortly after she began working for the victim, Ms. Beachum noticed bruises on the victim's face. When asked what caused the bruising, the victim responded that she and defendant "got into it." Later, Ms. Beachum noticed that the victim had a "busted lip." The victim explained this by saying, "that fool is at it again." At some point, Ms. Beachum asked the victim why she stayed with defendant. The victim responded: "He's not like that when he's not drinking." Additionally, Ms. Beachum testified that during one of her last visits with the victim, the victim spoke of leaving defendant and going to live with her brother.
Ms. Presley, another former co-worker of the victim, testified that the victim told her that defendant did not permit her to wear shorts to work. She also testified that although she never saw the victim come to work in shorts, the victim occasionally changed into shorts after she arrived at work and then changed back into pants prior to going home. Ms. Presley testified that the victim told her that "if she left him he would kill her." Additionally, when asked about bruises and a burn mark on her cheek, the victim told Ms. Presley that defendant caused them after becoming jealous of a man who made a pass at the victim.
Mr. Stubbs was the victim's stepfather. While driving the victim to Fayetteville, he asked the victim if defendant beat her. She responded that defendant had slapped her and that when her son was out of school for the summer, she was going to leave defendant.
Mr. Goins was the victim's supervisor at work. He testified to his conversation with the victim about her relationship with defendant. The victim mentioned being beaten by defendant. Mr. Goins also testified to the victim's demeanor during the conversation, saying that she was "[v]ery quiet, to herself," and she was "more introverted."
Statements that relate factual events, where those events tend to show the victim's state of mind at the time the statement is made, "are not excluded from the coverage of Rule 803(3) where the facts related `serve ... to demonstrate the basis for the [victim's] emotions.'" Exum, 128 N.C.App. at 654, 497 S.E.2d at 103 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Gray, 347 N.C. 143, 173, 491 S.E.2d 538, 550 (1997)). As this Court has stated:
Id. at 655, 497 S.E.2d at 103 (alterations in original) (quoting 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 438, at 417-18 (2d ed.1994) ()).
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