State v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 22 July 1969
• Docket Number: No. 18944,18944
• Citation: 253 S.C. 168,169 S.E.2d 706
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. John Paul ANDERSON, Appellant.

Page 706

169 S.E.2d 706

253 S.C. 168

The STATE, Respondent, v. John Paul ANDERSON, Appellant.

No. 18944.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 22, 1969.

Certiorari Denied Nov. 24, 1969. See 90 S.Ct. 386.

John W. Williams, Jr., John W. McIntosh (on appeal only), Columbia, for appellant.

Solicitors Arthur G. Howe, Robert B. Wallace, Asst. Solicitor A. Arthur Rosenblum, Charleston, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice.

By a verdict of the jury the defendant, John Paul Anderson, was found guilty with recommendation to mercy of the murder of his wife, Brenda Minton Anderson, by drowning in the ocean at Folly Beach on June 19, 1965. After sentence of life imprisonment was imposed as required by statute, he appealed from the conviction and sentence by thirty-eight exceptions alleging trial errors on the part of the lower court. In appellant's brief the actual questions involved for determination by this court are reduced to seven.

There is no direct evidence that the defendant drowned his wife. Most of the circumstantial evidence on which the state relies to establish its case is uncontroverted. The prosecution presented over thirty witnesses in developing the facts which are extremely involved. The transcript covers more than 1500 pages.

The dead body of Mrs. Anderson was found late in the day of June 19 in shallow water on the beach approximately one mile from the place where she and the defendant had entered the ocean to swim and dive several hours previously.

It is the contention of The State that she and the defendant went under the water with air tank and other scuba diving equipment and that the defendant removed the equipment from her and held her under water until she was drowned. The theory of The State is that he drowned her to collect $100,000 from a double indemnity life insurance policy on her life, of which he was beneficiary.

Accordingly, a most important factual issue for determination by the jury was whether the wife was on a small plastic raft when the defendant left the ocean, as contended by him, or whether the raft had floated out to sea without her, as contended by The State.

In summarizing the evidence we follow largely that produced by the prosecution since conflicts have presumably been resolved by the jury in The State's favor.

Defendant on this appeal does not submit that jury issues were lacking. Objections are made to the admissibility of evidence, to alleged prejudicial argument by the solicitor to the jury, to the submission to the jury of the issue of voluntary manslaughter, and to the judge's failure to dismiss the jury before a guilty verdict was rendered.

The defendant, a native of Massachusetts, was twenty-five years of age at the time of the trial and was a seaman in the Navy assigned to a submarine based at Charleston. He was a high school graduate and had served four years in the Navy before entering the University of North Carolina in September 1963, where he remained for one semester. After one semester he left the university and reenlisted in the Navy in February 1964. On April 1, 1965, approximately ten weeks prior to the drowning, he married Brenda Minton Anderson, with whom he resided at a home on Folly Beach.

As indicated, much of the evidence is not in dispute. On the morning of June 19, 1965, between 9:30 and 10 o'clock, the defendant and his wife drove their car to the strand area, unloaded the scuba diving equipment, and went out into the ocean in order that the defendant, who was skilled at scuba diving, could teach his wife the use of the equipment. After testing the equipment the defendant placed it on his wife and the two proceeded well out into deep water with a small inflatable plastic raft described as being about three feet by five feet. It is referred to throughout the trial as a raft. Actually it was more of an inflatable float. The defendant, not wearing any diving equipment, dove under the water two or more times with his wife, who with the use of the equipment was able to breathe. The testimony is conflicting on the question of the whereabouts of the raft after the couple had dived once or twice and after the scuba diving lesson was completed. Three witnesses, who were watching the scuba divers from the beach at the time, testified for the prosecution that the raft had drifted out to sea well beyond the reach of the Anderson couple after their first dive. They stated that the last time the couple dived together only one head came up which proved to be that of the defendant, and stated that nothing further was seen of his wife. The defendant denies this and avers that the raft was with them and that he left his wife in safety on the raft. One of the witnesses reported the disappearance to the police about noon.

After two or more dives the defendant came back to the beach and brought the diving equipment with him. The equipment was left on blankets which he and his wife had placed on the beach.

The defendant left the beach area and drove several miles to a garage in an effort to have his brakes repaired. Later he drove to the Isle of Palms and drank beer with friends. About four o'clock in the afternoon, he returned to the beach and carried the blankets and diving equipment and other personal items, left on the strand by him and his wife, home and began inquiring of his neighbors concerning the whereabouts of his wife.

When the drowned body of Brenda Minton Anderson was recovered from shallow water at about 5:40 p.m. approximately one mile away from the point where she had entered the ocean, there were fingerprint marks on the back of both arms, and she had obviously been dead for some time.

Within an hour after the recovery of her body the defendant went to the police station at Folly Beach to report her disappearance. He was informed that a body had been discovered and shortly thereafter he identified that body as being that of his wife.

To fortify its circumstantial evidence case The State undertook to show an intelligently conceived design by the defendant to find a young girl, insure her life for a large sum of money, marry her, murder her, and collect the insurance proceeds. In so doing, The State sought to show the defendant's repeated pattern of intimate relations with girls, promises of marriage and attempts to procure insurance on their lives.

Timely objections were made by counsel for the defendant to voluminous evidence submitted by The State relative to his conduct several months prior to and up until the death of Mrs. Anderson.

It is the contention of the appellant that the trial judge erred in allowing in evidence testimony: that the defendant failed to support his illegitimate child; that his conduct was adulterous; that he attempted to extort money from E. J. McGuire; that he was connected with a heroin ring; that he planned to murder; and that he participated in 'the great train robbery', these being of a criminal nature. It is also the contention of the appellant that the trial judge erred in allowing in evidence testimony of conduct categorized as noncriminal but which reflected on the character of the defendant. These included such things as false statements made by the defendant relative to his background, financial worth, station in life, naval rank, educational background and affiliation with the CIA and illicit affairs other than adultery.

The first two questions raised by the defendant on this appeal allege error on the part of the trial judge in allowing The State in its case in chief to introduce evidence tending to show the defendant's involvement in separate and independent criminal activities, such as adultery and extortion, and to introduce evidence directly affecting the character and credibility of the defendant, such as the fact that he lied to several girls and insurance agents about his education and financial standing.

Normally evidence of prior crimes is not admissible but The State contends that the evidence submitted comes within certain established exceptions to the general rule.

"Generally speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish, (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. Wharton on Crim. Ev. (9th Ed.) 48; Underhill on Ev. § 58; Abbott's Trial Brief, Crim. Trials, sec. 598." State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803, 807 (1923).

Defense contends that evidence of many criminal and noncriminal activities of the defendant is not relevant and highly prejudicial and constitutes an attack on the defendant's character without his having put it in issue.

It is not denied that the defendant, in December 1964, paid insurance agent Sam Springer of the John Hancock Company an initial premium of $348 on a $50,000 policy of double indemnity insurance on the life of Miss Brenda Minton, to whom he was engaged. The policy was issued on December 17, 1964; her parents were named beneficiaries but they were not aware that the policy was being issued or that they were beneficiaries until they received it in the mail from the John Hancock Insurance Company. A few days after the defendant and Brenda Minton were married the policy was changed so as to make the defendant sole beneficiary. This change of beneficiary took place approximately sixty days before the drowning.

Objection was raised to the introduction of evidence relative to the association of the defendant with Ellen Ketcham and with Janice Hill during several months prior to the issuance of the insurance policy.

As relates to Ellen Ketcham the evidence shows that the defendant met her in early 1964 while she was a student nurse in New York. He told Ellen that he had a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of North...