State v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 14 September 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 14289,14289 |
| Citation | 651 P.2d 556,103 Idaho 622 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sterling William ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Gaylen Box, McDermott Law Offices, Pocatello, for defendant-appellant.
David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Myrna A. I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent. WALTERS, Chief Judge.
Sterling William Anderson appeals from the imposition of a ten-year indeterminate sentence, following his plea of guilty to first degree burglary. He raises two issues. First, did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence? Second, did the district court improperly impose the sentence by not requiring professional mental or psychological evaluations of Anderson as part of a presentence investigation? We affirm the sentence.
The following facts appear in the record. After the commission of two burglaries and the theft of an automobile, Anderson, age 20, evaded police in the stolen automobile on a high speed chase. A police officer was injured when Anderson rammed his vehicle into the side of the patrolman's vehicle. Anderson was finally stopped and arrested after colliding with both civilian and police vehicles in the chase. When stopped, Anderson possessed a stolen, loaded firearm, which he carried across his lap, pointed in the direction of the officer who opened the car door to apprehend him.
Anderson was arrested upon a number of charges. He initially pled not guilty to all counts of the criminal complaint, but later pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain to first degree burglary, resisting arrest, and depriving an owner of his vehicle. Other charges against him were dismissed or reduced by the prosecutor. Following the pleas of guilty, a presentence investigation was conducted and a report was filed with the court.
The presentence investigation disclosed that Anderson had recently been placed on probation in the state of Utah, after serving in that state's correctional facility on a court-retained jurisdiction program. Anderson had a lengthy adult criminal record. It included conviction for auto theft, possession of stolen property, armed burglary, second degree theft, and third degree theft. His past record also included charges for attempted escape from jail, assaulting a police officer, assault with a deadly weapon, auto theft, and destruction of property.
At the sentencing hearing below, the court reviewed the presentence report with Anderson. The judge inquired of Anderson whether he had any comments regarding the report, and Anderson replied that he had none. Anderson's counsel advised the court that, when reviewing the report with Anderson, Anderson had indicated that it was well-written and factually correct.
In sentencing Anderson, the court observed that Anderson's past record indicated that he was an escape risk. The court noted that Anderson's probation from Utah had not been successful. The court concluded that Anderson would probably not benefit from a retained jurisdiction program in Idaho and imposed the sentence here at issue along with two other concurrent sentences, for resisting arrest and depriving an owner of his vehicle.
The ten-year indeterminate sentence imposed upon Anderson was within the statutory limits for first degree burglary. The trial court could have sentenced Anderson to a determinate period of fifteen years. I.C. §§ 18-1403; 19-2513A. Our Supreme Court has held that if a sentence is within the statutory maximum, it will not be disturbed on appeal unless the appellant affirmatively shows a "clear abuse of discretion." E.g., State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 602 P.2d 71 (1979). A sentence may represent a "clear abuse of discretion" if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. E.g., State v. Nice, --- Idaho ---, 645 P.2d 323 (1982); State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723, 604 P.2d 737 (1979). We have held that a term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it appears necessary, at the time of sentencing, to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given...
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