State v. Anderson
Decision Date | 28 January 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 21322.,21322. |
Citation | 813 A.2d 1039,74 Conn.App. 633 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Fred John ANDERSON. |
Kent Drager, senior assistant public defender, with whom were Raymond Durelli, certified legal intern, and, on the brief, Mary Boehlert, certified legal intern, for the appellant (defendant).
Paul E. Murray, state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Kevin T. Kane, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant, Fred John Anderson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial to the jury, of unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95, assault in the first degree with intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a)(2), and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a. The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (a) he had the requisite intent to disfigure the victim seriously and permanently, and (b) the victim in fact was seriously and permanently disfigured, and (2) admitted into evidence (a) the victim's statement pursuant to the Whelan doctrine1 and (b) the victim's hospital records. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The charges against the defendant arose out of a physical altercation between the defendant and the victim, who had a romantic relationship. The altercation occurred during the early morning hours of January 9, 1999. The defendant, an admitted alcoholic, had been drinking and became physically abusive toward the victim. Officer James Kiako of the Groton police department responded to a 911 telephone call from the defendant's apartment. When he arrived, Kiako could see through a window a disheveled woman with blood around her mouth and nose. Kiako and another officer gained entry into the apartment after the defendant unlocked the interior deadbolt lock. After talking to the victim and the defendant separately, the officers arrested the defendant. The victim was hospitalized for several days for treatment of her injuries. Additional facts will be provided when they are needed to address the defendant's specific claims.
The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to the charge of assault in the first degree.2 At trial, the defendant claimed that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could find that the victim had suffered serious and permanent disfigurement. On appeal, the defendant also claims that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could find that he intended to cause the victim serious and permanent disfigurement. We will review the defendant's claim as to intent, although it was not raised at trial, because claims of insufficient evidence are of a constitutional nature and the record is adequate for our review. See State v. Adams, 225 Conn. 270, 275-76 n. 3, 623 A.2d 42 (1993); State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989); State v. Jefferson, 67 Conn.App. 249, 254-55, 786 A.2d 1189 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 918, 791 A.2d 566 (2002). The defendant, however, cannot prevail on either claim of insufficient evidence.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Meehan, 260 Conn. 372, 377-78, 796 A.2d 1191 (2002).
"Our review is a fact based inquiry limited to determining whether the inferences drawn by the jury are so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ford, 230 Conn. 686, 692, 646 A.2d 147 (1994). "Moreover, [i]n reviewing the jury verdict, it is well to remember that [j]urors are not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observation and experience of the affairs of life, but, on the contrary, to apply them to the evidence or facts in hand, to the end that their action may be intelligent and their conclusions correct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 693, 646 A.2d 147.
The defendant's first claim of insufficient evidence is that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to disfigure the victim seriously and permanently. Specifically, the defendant claims that the state failed to prove that he had the conscious objective, as defined by General Statutes § 53a-3 (11),3 to cause the victim's face to be scarred because her scars are a long-term, secondary result of his action.4 In other words, a scar results only after a wound has healed completely. We disagree.
(Emphasis in original.) State v. Smith, 35 Conn. App. 51, 63, 644 A.2d 923 (1994); see also State v. Austin, 244 Conn. 226, 235, 710 A.2d 732 (1998) ().
(Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, supra, 35 Conn.App. 63-64, 644 A.2d 923.
The victim's testimony conflicted with other evidence presented about the events that occurred during the early morning hours of January 9, 1999, including some of the defendant's testimony. Credibility, however, is a matter solely within the province of the trier of fact. See State v. Jimenez, 73 Conn.App. 664, 668, 808 A.2d 1190 (2002). The victim's statement, given several days after the incident, contained her initial account of what occurred during the night of January 8 and the early morning of January 9, 1999. The victim's redacted statement was admitted into evidence; see part II A; and presented to the jury. The following portions of the victim's statement are relevant to the issue of the defendant's intent:
grabbed me and butted me in the head and face with his forehead. He said nothing when he did this. I immediately felt extreme pain, started bleeding and could feel that my nose was pushed to the side of my face. I started crying and yelling at him to look [at] what he had done. I knew my nose was broken, and I just wanted to get out of the apartment to get help. [The defendant] started taunting me, telling me I was fine and there was nothing wrong with me. He was saying Connecticut people are so weak. He told me to stay at the apartment and in the morning he would let me go. He said in the morning everything would be fine, and I should stop crying and making such a fuss over nothing.
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