State v. Anonymous
| Decision Date | 23 August 1977 |
| Citation | 173 Conn. 414,378 A.2d 528 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. ANONYMOUS. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
James A. Wade, Hartford, with whom was Holly B. Fitzsimmons, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).
Harry S. Gaucher, Jr., State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and SPEZIALE, JJ.
On March 26, 1976, Dawn Peterson died as a result of injuries received when struck on the head by a rock. Her body was discovered in an abandoned cellar in her hometown of North Windham. The defendant was subsequently taken into custody and referred to the Juvenile Court. A petition was then filed alleging the defendant to be delinquent on the ground that he caused the death of Dawn Peterson. On the date of Dawn Peterson's death, the defendant was fifteen years of age. The defendant was released on bail and the case continued for a hearing pursuant to § 17-60a of the General Statutes for a determination of whether his case should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.
On May 21, 1976, the defendant became sixteen years of age. After the hearing pursuant to § 17-60a, the Juvenile Court ordered the case transferred to the Superior Court for disposition. On July 7, 1976, the defendant appeared before the Superior Court, was advised of his rights, and released in the custody of his father. The court (Dannehy, J.) then ordered the file sealed and the case captioned "State v. Anonymous" until a grand jury had convened and considered the evidence.
On September 2, 1976, the grand jury returned a true bill of indictment charging the defendant with the crime of murder in violation of § 53a-54a of the General Statutes. On motion of the state, the court (Rubinow, J.) ordered the file unsealed, but issued a stay of its decree to permit the defendant to file an appeal to this court.
Upon those facts, the trial court concluded that: (1) the defendant has no statutory right to have the file remain sealed; (2) the order of July 7, 1976, sealing the file, was based on the premise that the defendant was entitled to the protection of confidentiality until such time as an indictment was returned against him; and (3) the defendant is no longer entitled to the protection of confidentiality.
The defendant raises the following claims: (a) a juvenile charged with a criminal offense is entitled to protection from stigmatizing publicity; (b) the policy of this state is to rehabilitate, not punish, juvenile offenders; (c) the defendant is entitled to the same confidentiality in the Superior Court that he was accorded in the Juvenile Court; and (d) the failure to reverse the Superior Court order unsealing the file will violate the presumption of innocence and right to privacy guaranteed to the defendant by the United States and Connecticut constitutions.
The basic issue raised by those claims is whether the anonymity associated with juvenile offender status survives a transfer of jurisdiction from Juvenile Court to Superior Court pursuant to § 17-60a of the General Statutes.
At the outset, it should be noted that no statute or practice book rule permits or requires the Superior Court to seal or keep sealed the file of an individual transferred to it pursuant to § 17-60a of the General Statutes. 1
In 1971, the legislature enacted Public Act No. 170, which became § 17-60a of the General Statutes. 2 That statute provides for the Juvenile Court, after investigation hearing and certain findings, to transfer any child charged with murder to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, provided any such murder was committed after the child attained fourteen years of age. That statute, as initially passed, 3 was silent as to whether such a child was to be treated in a manner different from that of any other criminal offender in Superior Court.
Section 17-60a was applicable to the defendant who was fifteen years of age on March 26, 1976. The transfer of the defendant was not based upon the fact that he turned sixteen on May 21, 1976, but rather was based solely upon the provisions and requirements of § 17-60a. See, generally, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.
Any privacy accorded to a juvenile because of his age with respect to proceedings relative to a criminal offense results from statutory authority, rather than from any inherent or constitutional right. Such statutory right to privacy reflects a legislative policy to the effect that juveniles should be treated in a manner different from that of other criminal offenders. Because the right to anonymity emanates from the legislature and does not involve any fundamental right, that right can be withdrawn or limited to certain classes of juvenile offenders by the legislature provided the classifications are founded upon a rational basis. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359. "In exercising (the state's) police power the legislature has a broad discretion, both in determining what the public welfare requires, and in fashioning legislation to meet that need." C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 167 Conn. 304, 307, 355 A.2d 247, 249-250.
Murder is the most serious of criminal charges. The enactment of § 17-60a of the General Statutes manifests the legislature's recognition of the special problems which arise in the processing and disposition of juveniles charged with murder. Because of such problems, the legislature in enacting § 17-60a carved out an exception to the Juvenile Court statutory scheme with respect to juveniles charged with murder. That statute, when viewed in the context of the crime charged, the required investigation, hearing and court findings, clearly demonstrates that it was rationally based.
Once transferred from the Juvenile Court to the Superior Court, the Superior Court has exclusive jurisdiction, with the offender subject to trial and sentencing just as any other accused. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,...
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...meet that need." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 755, 694 A.2d 775; State v. Anonymous, 173 Conn. 414, 417-18, 378 A.2d 528 (1977). The basis of the defendants' argument is their assertion that the Juvenile Justice Act itself has created and ves......
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