State v. Satti

• Decision Date: 31 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 1267,1267
• Citation: 38 Conn.Supp. 552,454 A.2d 280
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. William L. SATTI.

Page 280

454 A.2d 280

38 Conn.Supp. 552

STATE of Connecticut v. William L. SATTI.

No. 1267.

Superior Court of Connecticut Appellate Session.

Argued April 19, 1982.

Decided Dec. 31, 1982.

Hyman Wilensky, New London, for appellant (defendant).

Carl Schuman, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

SPADA, Judge.

The issue raised in the state's motion is whether the denial of an application for accelerated rehabilitation constitutes a final judgment from which a defendant may appeal. The defendant, who is charged with assault in the third degree and with breach of the peace, appeals from the trial court's denial of his application for accelerated rehabilitation pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56e. A motion to dismiss the appeal was filed by the state alleging that this court lacks jurisdiction since no final judgment has been entered. ¹ The same issue was presented in State v. Whitney, 37 Conn.Sup. 864, 440 A.2d 987 (1981), wherein we held that a denial of an application for accelerated rehabilitation was final for appeal purposes. Upon a further review of the standards established by our Supreme Court for determining the finality of a judgment, we are constrained to repudiate our decision in Whitney. We conclude, therefore, that the denial of an application for accelerated rehabilitation is not a final judgment from which a right of appeal lies.

We are not unmindful that "a court should overrule its own precedents for only the most compelling reasons." Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn 563, 570, 409 A.2d 1020 (1979). Where it is plain, however, that the judgment was the result of a mistaken view of the condition of the law applicable to the question, or where it can be shown that the law has been misunderstood or misapplied or is contrary to reason, we are charged with the responsibility for making the necessary changes. See State v. Powell, 186 Conn. 547, 551-55, 442 A.2d 939 (1982).

The holding in Whitney was based upon an unpublished ruling by our Supreme Court on a motion in the case of State v. Spendolini, Docket No. 10384 (November 5, 1980). That court denied the state's motion to dismiss an appeal from the denial of an application for accelerated rehabilitation. Spendolini was a summary order unaccompanied by a written decision. Because we can only speculate as to the Supreme Court's reasons for the denial, its precedential value is severely impaired. Accordingly, we hold today that we are not bound by that decision.

The general rule is that an appellate court has no jurisdiction until the trial court renders a final judgment. General Statutes §§ 51-197d, 52-263 and 54-95(b); Practice Book § 3000; Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 164 Conn. 287, 293, 320 A.2d 797 (1973). The finality requirement underlying appellate review represents a clear and firm policy against multiple appeals in a single action. See State v. Kemp, 124 Conn. 639, 646-47, 1 A.2d 761 (1938). "Adherence to this rule of finality has been particularly stringent in criminal prosecutions because 'the delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal,' which the rule is designed to avoid, 'are especially inimical to the effective and fair administration of the criminal law.' " State v. Powell, supra, 186 Conn. 551, 442 A.2d 939, quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2039, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977).

In general, there is no final judgment in a criminal case until the imposition of a sentence. State v. Lloyd, 185 Conn. --- (43 CLJ 5, pp. 10, 12) 440 A.2d 867 (1981). Several exceptions to this rule have been carved out, however, for interlocutory rulings which, if erroneous, could not be remedied on appeal. Those exceptions are: (1) denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground that the state's prosecution places the defendant in double jeopardy; State v. Moeller, 178 Conn. 67, 420 A.2d 1153, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950, 100 S.Ct. 423, 62 L.Ed.2d 320 (1979); (2) denial of an application to be adjudicated as a youthful offender; State v. Bell, 179 Conn. 98, 425 A.2d 574 (1979); or to extend the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings to criminal proceedings; State v. Anonymous, 173 Conn. 414, 378 A.2d 528 (1977); (3) denial of a claim to have nolled charges dismissed on speedy trial grounds; State v. Lloyd, supra, 13, 185 Conn. ---, 440 A.2d 867; and (4) denial of bail or of a motion for reduction of bail; State v. Olds, 171 Conn. 395, 370 A.2d 969 (1976).

Conversely, where the interlocutory order involves the denial of a claimed right which may still be redressed after trial, such a denial is not immediately appealable. State v. Powell, supra, 186 Conn. 554, 442 A.2d 939. Thus, the following are held to be appealable only after trial and sentencing: denials of motions for discovery; State v. Grotton, 180 Conn. 290, 429 A.2d 871 (1980); and claims of violation of the right to a speedy trial; State v. Lloyd, supra.

The spectrum of judgments falling in the gray area between those decisions which are obviously final and appealable and those which are interlocutory and clearly non-appealable has caused our Supreme Court to formulate standards by which to determine the finality of a judgment. E.J. Hansen Elevator, Inc. v. Stoll, 167 Conn. 623, 627, 356 A.2d 893 (1975). "One test is whether the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding.... Another test lies in the effect of an order 'as concluding the rights of some or all of the parties' ... and, finally, if the rights of the parties are concluded so that further proceedings cannot affect them, then the judgment is final." Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corporation, supra, 164 Conn. 292, 320 A.2d 797. The application of these standards leads us to conclude that the denial of a petition for accelerated rehabilitation is non-appealable. The application for accelerated rehabilitation is not a separate and distinct proceeding, nor does it conclude the rights of the parties.

In State v. Lavorgna, 37 Conn.Sup. 767, 437 A.2d 131 (1981), a defendant, after denial of his application for accelerated rehabilitation, was found guilty for driving while under the influence. Upon appeal to this court we vacated the judgment with instruction to reconsider only the denial of the application for accelerated rehabilitation and if the court concluded that it was properly denied, to reinstate the conviction. Thus, any harm allegedly incurred by the defendant as a consequence of the denial of an application for accelerated rehabilitation may be rectified after trial.

Accordingly, the state's motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.

In this opinion COVELLO, J., concurred.

BIELUCH, Judge (dissenting).

I disagree with the majority opinion dismissing the defendant's appeal on the motion of the state. The trial court's denial of the defendant's application for accelerated rehabilitation was a final judgment appealable to this court.

The defendant is charged (1) with assault in the third degree and (2) with breach of the peace. At his arraignment on October 9, 1981, he pleaded not guilty and elected a jury trial. Thereafter he applied for accelerated rehabilitation.

The accelerated pretrial rehabilitation statute, General Statutes § 54-56e, sets forth four procedural steps: (1) the application to the court containing a statement of the statutory representations, waivers and agreements; (2) the statutory oath by the accused "in open court under penalties of perjury that (s)he never had this program invoked before on his/her behalf"; ¹ (3) the first order of the court either (a) denying the application or (b) continuing the application to a hearing date "so that the Accused may notify the victim(s) of the opportunity to be heard on this matter" ² by registered or certified mail, and (4) if a hearing has been given, the second order of the court either (a) denying the application or (b) granting accelerated rehabilitation. See State v. Lavorgna, 37 Conn.Sup. 767, 780-81, 437 A.2d 131 (1981) (dissenting opinion).

The defendant in this case did not comply with these statutory requirements, but that issue has not been raised and is not before the court. He and counsel signed the application out of court on October 14, 1981, at which time counsel without a court order sent notice by certified mail to the victims of a court hearing on December 4, 1981. Counsel's appearance was filed in court on October 16, 1981. Thereafter the application with a copy of the victims' notice was filed in court on November 3, 1981. The statutory oath was never taken on the application. After the hearing the application was denied when the defendant refused to accept the court's condition that he reimburse the complainant's alleged medical expenses, which he contended was a civil claim in dispute and subject to a possible counterclaim.

The defendant has appealed to this court from the pretrial denial of his application for accelerated rehabilitation. By its motion now before the court the state seeks "to dismiss the defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, since there has been no final judgment rendered by the trial court." Appeals in criminal cases can be taken only from the "final judgment" by statute and court rule. General Statutes §§ 52-263, 51-197d; Practice Book §§ 3000, 1064.

This threshold appealability question arises from two basic principles of law. First, it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal. The right of appeal is purely a creature of statute; in order to exercise that statutory right of appeal one must come within its terms. Second, since appeals of right have been authorized in criminal cases, there has been a firm legislative policy against interlocutory or "piecemeal" appeals and courts have consistently given effect to that policy by requiring finality of judgment as a predicate for appellate jurisdiction. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2038, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). " ...