State v. Anthony DB, 98-0576.

• Citation: 614 N.W.2d 435,2000 WI 94,237 Wis.2d 1
• Decision Date: 12 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-0576.,98-0576.
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTHONY D.B., Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

237 Wis.2d 1

2000 WI 94

614 N.W.2d 435

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTHONY D.B., Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

No. 98-0576.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral argument April 7, 2000.

Decided July 12, 2000.

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs and oral argument by Ellen Henak, assistant state public defender.

For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Karen E. Timberlake, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.

¶ 1. WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.

Petitioner Anthony D.B. requests review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of the circuit court. The circuit court found Anthony D.B., who had been committed as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (1995-96),¹ not competent to refuse medication, and issued an order authorizing involuntary medication. The question presented is whether the circuit court had authority to issue such an order to an individual committed under ch. 980. Because those individuals committed under ch. 980 are defined as "patients" in Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1), we hold that the statutory provision in § 51.61(1)(g), authorizing a court to order medication regardless of the patient's consent, along with the relevant provisions of Wis. Stat. § 51.20, apply. The circuit court had statutory authority to issue its order and, accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

¶ 2. The facts in this case are not in dispute. In 1997 Anthony D.B. was committed as a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980. Anthony D.B. previously had been convicted of second-degree sexual assault and sentenced to six years in prison. After the conviction for sexual assault, and before his ch. 980 commitment, Anthony D.B. was committed under Wis. Stat. § 971.17, as a person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, to a non-sexual offense. As part of the § 971.17 commitment, an order was issued finding that Anthony D.B. was not competent to refuse medication.

¶ 3. Anthony D.B.'s Wis. Stat. ch. 980 placement was scheduled to occur after the expiration of his Wis. Stat. § 971.17 commitment, and the order for involuntary medication. In anticipation of the termination of the order for involuntary medication, the State filed a motion for a new involuntary medication order pursuant to Anthony D.B.'s ch. 980 commitment.

¶ 4. Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Timothy G. Dugan presided at a hearing on the State's motion. Doctor Martha Rolli testified that involuntary medication was necessary to protect Anthony D.B. from himself, and to protect others from him. According to Dr. Rolli, Anthony D.B. suffered from a mental disease and was dangerous when not medicated. She stated that if not on medication, Anthony D.B. became psychotic, aggressive, sexually focused, bites his own lip and refuses to eat or drink. Dr. Rolli further testified that Anthony D.B. would not take his medication unless ordered to do so. Dr. Rolli stated that Anthony D.B. did not understand the advantages and disadvantages of the medication, although she had attempted to explain these matters to him on numerous occasions. In Dr. Rolli's opinion, Anthony D.B. would appropriately be committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 51.

¶ 5. Anthony D.B. conceded that if the circuit court had the authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 to order him involuntarily medicated, then Dr. Rolli's testimony established that he should be involuntarily medicated. However, Anthony D.B. argued that ch. 980 provides no independent authority for ordering involuntary medication. According to Anthony D.B., the State was required to initiate commitment proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 51 before seeking an order for involuntary medication.

¶ 6. In a written order issued in January 1998 Judge Dugan stated that the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 51.61 applied to individuals committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980. Section 51.61(1)(g) provides a procedure for ordering involuntary medication of a patient under certain circumstances. Judge Dugan concluded that if the procedures in § 51.61(1)(g) are complied with, then the court that commits an individual pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980 has the authority to order involuntary medication.

¶ 7. Anthony D.B. appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. Subsequently, Anthony D.B petitioned this court for review pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 808.10, which we granted.

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¶ 8. The issue presented in this case is whether a court may issue an involuntary medication order for an individual committed pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980. Resolution of this issue requires that we interpret ch. 980 and Wis. Stat. § 51.61 and the interaction of these provisions. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 404, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999). The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature. Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996).

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¶ 9. As a preliminary matter, we note that it is undisputed by the parties that Anthony D.B. is mentally ill. The record indicates that Dr. Rolli testified to the circuit court that Anthony D.B. has schizophrenia. Other individuals committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 may not suffer from this type of disabling condition. Our conclusions in this case are limited to individuals committed pursuant to ch. 980 and who also suffer from a chronic mental illness such as schizophrenia.

¶ 10. Anthony D.B. asserts that neither Wis. Stat. ch. 980 nor Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g) authorizes a court to issue an involuntary medication order for an individual committed under ch. 980. He contends that because ch. 980 does not include statutory provisions explicitly authorizing involuntary medication orders, the legislature unambiguously intended that such orders cannot be issued to individuals committed only under ch. 980. Anthony D.B. does not challenge here the propriety of his ch. 980 commitment. Instead, he contends that to obtain such an involuntary medication order, a Wis. Stat. ch. 51 commitment must be pursued in addition to the ch. 980 commitment. We disagree.

¶ 11. Our decision is guided by well-established rules of statutory interpretation. Wisconsin Stat. chs. 980 and 51 both govern individuals committed as sexually violent persons. When construing several statutes that deal with the same subject, it is our duty to give each provision full force and effect. State v. Aaron D., 214 Wis. 2d 56, 66, 571 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1997). If two statutes that apply to the same subject are in conflict, the more specific controls. Jones v. State, 226 Wis. 2d 565, 576, 594 N.W.2d 738 (1999). Conflicts between statutes are not favored and will not be held to exist if the statute may be reasonably interpreted otherwise. Id.

¶ 12. The underlying purpose for civil commitment, including commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, "`is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness.'" State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 308, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983)). Chapter 980 is a civil commitment procedure enacted "to protect the public and to provide concentrated treatment to convicted sexually violent persons, not to punish the sexual offender." State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 258, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995). This court has found treatment to be a "bona fide goal" of ch. 980. Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 308. Those who are determined to be sexually violent persons are committed for "control, care and treatment" from the state. Wis. Stat. § 980.06(1).

¶ 13. In upholding the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 in Post, we specifically concluded that individuals committed pursuant to ch. 980 are entitled to the patients' rights set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 51. Id. at 309. Chapter 51 is the Mental Health Act and Wis. Stat. § 51.61 is Wisconsin's Patients' Rights Statute. Section 51.61(1) defines "patient" to include individuals committed under ch. 980. In Post we found that persons committed pursuant to ch. 980 are entitled to the rights set forth in Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(f). Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 309. Section 51.61(1)(f) provides that committed individuals "[h]ave a right to receive prompt and adequate treatment. . .appropriate for his or her condition. . . ." In ch. 51, "treatment" is defined as "psychological, educational, social, chemical, medical or somatic techniques designed to bring about rehabilitation of a mentally ill. . .person." Wis. Stat. § 51.01(17).

¶ 14. Although Anthony D.B. correctly points out that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 does not set forth specific procedures for involuntary medication, Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3 provides in relevant part:

Following a final commitment order,. . .[each patient shall] have the right to exercise informed consent with regard to all medication and treatment unless the committing court or the court in the county in which the individual is located. . .makes a determination, following a hearing, that the individual is not competent to refuse medication or treatment or unless a situation exists in which the medication or treatment is necessary to prevent serious physical harm to the individual or others.

¶ 15. We conclude that the legislative intent in these statutes is to provide a statutory mechanism for the treatment of sexually violent persons. The legislature has provided that these individuals are to have the statutory rights under Wis. Stat. § 51.61, pursuant to the inclusion of individuals committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 in § 51.61(1). Section 51.61 provides patients with the right to make informed decisions regarding medication, except in those circumstances where, following a constitutionally sufficient procedure, the patient is determined to be not competent to refuse medication. Under these circumstances, § 51.61(1)(g) authorizes orders for...