State v. Arndt
| Decision Date | 25 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 50118-0-II,50118-0-II |
| Citation | 426 P.3d 804 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Shelly Margaret ARNDT, Appellant. |
Jodi R. Backlund, Backlund & Mistry, Po Box 6490, Olympia, WA, 98507-6490, for Appellant.
Randall Avery Sutton, Kitsap Co. Prosecutor's Office, 614 Division St., Port Orchard, WA, 98366-4614, for Respondent.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶ 1 A jury convicted Shelly Arndt of numerous crimes, including premeditated murder in the first degree and arson in the first degree. She appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct and requests reversal of her murder conviction. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, we affirm.
¶ 2 On February 23, 2014, Arndt and her boyfriend, Darcy Veeder Jr., spent the night at their friends’ home. State v. Arndt , No. 48525-7-II, slip op. at 2, 2017 WL 6337458 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017) (unpublished) (http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/). Late that night, the house caught fire. Arndt , No. 48525-7-II, slip op. at 2. Everyone in the home escaped except Veeder, who died. Arndt , No. 48525-7-II, slip op. at 2-3.
¶ 3 After an investigation, the State charged Arndt with murder in the first degree with an aggravating circumstance of arson in the first degree,1 felony murder in the first degree with aggravating circumstances,2 arson in the first degree, and six counts of assault in the second degree. Arndt , No. 48525-7-II, slip op. at 3.
¶ 4 The trial court instructed the jury that "[a] person commits the crime of murder in the first degree ... when, with a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person." Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 169 (Instr. 9). It further instructed:
Premeditated means thought over beforehand. When a person, after any deliberation, forms an intent to take human life, the killing may follow immediately after the formation of the settled purpose and it will still be premeditated. Premeditation must involve more than a moment in point of time. The law requires some time, however long or short, in which a design to kill is deliberately formed.
CP at 182 (Instr. 22). The jury found Arndt guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Arndt to life in prison without the possibility of release or parole.
¶ 5 Arndt appealed her convictions.3
¶ 6 Months after the verdict, Juror 2 approached a woman whom she did not know was the sister of Arndt’s trial attorney. Juror 2 related that in Arndt’s trial, she struggled with the term "premeditation." She further related that to better understand the term, she looked it up on the internet. The attorney’s sister told her brother what she had learned.
¶ 7 Defense investigator James Harris then met with Juror 2, explained that he worked for Arndt’s trial attorney, and asked to speak with her about her experience as a juror. Juror 2 spoke with Harris and told him that during deliberations she did internet research on the word "premeditation." Juror 2 provided Harris with additional information, including sites she may have viewed. The State’s investigator also interviewed Juror 2.
¶ 8 Arndt moved for a new trial on grounds of juror misconduct. At a hearing on the motion, the court heard testimony from Juror 2 and Harris. Juror 2 testified that she had researched the term "premeditation" and had found different sites, but did not remember whether she had viewed any of the specific sites she had showed Harris when he earlier interviewed her. She said "I believe it was from Wedipedia [verbatim], whatever that does when you Google, and that’s the definition." Report of Proceedings (RP) (Feb. 6, 2017) at 21. She stated that the "key thing" that stuck out to her in the definitions she viewed was that "[o]ne of the definitions was about premeditation being short." RP (Feb. 6, 2017) at 24. She said that she looked at a couple different definitions, but it was the word "short" that made her understand. Juror 2 also testified that she had not shared her research with other jurors.
¶ 9 The trial court entered a written memorandum opinion with findings of fact4 and conclusions of law. The court made explicit credibility determinations. It found that during deliberations, Juror 2 performed an internet search for the definition of "premeditation" from her home. The trial court found it could not determine the exact websites and content Juror 2 had viewed. Juror 2 consistently said that the definitions she viewed included the word "short" or the phrase "however short." CP at 136. The court found that Juror 2’s sworn statements in court were more reliable than her out-of-court statements to the two investigators which were used in an attempt to impeach her in-court testimony. The court also found that Juror 2 had not shared her research with the other jurors.
¶ 10 The court concluded that Juror 2 had committed misconduct which created a presumption that Arndt was entitled to a new trial. It determined that it must grant a new trial unless it was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence Juror 2 found in her research did not contribute to the verdict.
¶ 11 The court ruled:
Here, the facts show that Juror #2 conducted outside research on the definition of "premeditation," and that the definitions she viewed included the word "short" or the phrase "however short." In substance, the Court finds that the definitions viewed by Juror #2 were indistinguishable to the jury instruction and were consistent with the law. Because the known research results, as presented to the Court, were consistent with the jury instruction on premeditation and the law, the Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Juror #2’s research could not have affected the verdict. Therefore, the motion for a new trial is denied.
CP at 138. It stated CP at 138 n.49. Arndt appeals.
¶ 12 Arndt urges us to review the trial court’s denial of her motion for a new trial de novo because it infringed her constitutional rights. She acknowledges the existence of inconsistent case law on this issue, but maintains that State v. Jones , 168 Wash.2d 713, 230 P.3d 576 (2010), and State v. Iniguez , 167 Wash.2d 273, 217 P.3d 768 (2009), provide the proper guidance for what standard should apply.
¶ 13 We have expressly stated that we "review a trial court’s investigation of juror misconduct for abuse of discretion." State v. Gaines , 194 Wash. App. 892, 896, 380 P.3d 540, review denied , 186 Wash.2d 1028, 385 P.3d 125 (2016). We also review "a trial court’s decision denying a motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct for an abuse of discretion." Gaines , 194 Wash. App. at 896, 380 P.3d 540. "[W]hile great deference is due to the trial court’s determination that no prejudice occurred, greater deference is owed to a decision to grant a new trial than a decision not to grant a new trial." State v. Johnson , 137 Wash. App. 862, 871, 155 P.3d 183 (2007).
¶ 14 Iniguez , 167 Wash.2d at 281, 217 P.3d 768, and Jones , 168 Wash.2d at 719, 230 P.3d 576, reviewed de novo the denial of the constitutional rights to a speedy trial and to present a defense, respectively. Neither case affects the standard of review that we utilize to review a trial court’s decision on a mistrial motion for juror misconduct. It remains abuse of discretion.6 Gaines , 194 Wash. App. at 896, 380 P.3d 540.
¶ 15 Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. State v. Lohr , 164 Wash. App. 414, 418, 263 P.3d 1287 (2011). "Direct and circumstantial evidence carry the same weight." State v. Hart , 195 Wash. App. 449, 457, 381 P.3d 142 (2016), review denied , 187 Wash.2d 1011, 388 P.3d 480 (2017). "Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and are not subject to review." Hart , 195 Wash. App. at 457, 381 P.3d 142.
¶ 16 A trial court "abuses its discretion when it acts on untenable grounds or its ruling is manifestly unreasonable." Gaines , 194 Wash. App. at 896, 380 P.3d 540. A "decision is based ‘on untenable grounds’ or made ‘for untenable reasons’ if it rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard." State v. Rohrich , 149 Wash.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003) (quoting State v. Rundquist , 79 Wash. App. 786, 793, 905 P.2d 922 (1995) ). A "decision is ‘manifestly unreasonable’ if the court, despite applying the correct legal standard to the supported facts, adopts a view ‘that no reasonable person would take,’ and arrives at a decision ‘outside the range of acceptable choices.’ " Rohrich , 149 Wash.2d at 654, 71 P.3d 638 (quoting State v. Lewis , 115 Wash.2d 294, 298-99, 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) ; Rundquist , 79 Wash. App. at 793, 905 P.2d 922 ).
¶ 17 Based on the trial court’s unchallenged finding of misconduct, both parties proceed from the premise that Juror 2 committed misconduct. They disagree on whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding the misconduct did not affect the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 18 Arndt contends that Juror 2’s internet research could have affected the verdict of guilty. She argues that the juror misconduct gives rise to a presumption of prejudice that the State can only overcome by a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct could not have affected the verdict. She contends that the State failed to meet this burden. Because the trial court made unchallenged findings of fact that support its legal conclusions, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the misconduct did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable...
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State v. Arndt
...did not abuse its discretion by concluding that research conducted by a juror did not contribute to the verdict. State v. Arndt, 5 Wash. App. 2d 341, 351, 426 P.3d 804 (2018), review denied, 192 Wash.2d 1013, 432 P.3d 783 (2019).2 Specifically, Arndt had a criminal history involving violati......
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Hart v. Prather
...about the Facebook page, the court could not determine how the misconduct affected the jury. See State v. Arndt, 5 Wn.App. 2d 341, 350, 426 P.3d 804 (2018) (ruling that a juror looking at websites did not warrant a mistrial where the content viewed by the juror was unclear). We conclude the......
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Hart v. Prather
...the Facebook page, the court could not determine how the misconduct affected the jury. See State v. Arndt, 5 Wn. App. 2d 341, 350, 426 P.3d 804 (2018) (ruling that a juror looking at websites did not warrant a mistrial where the content viewed by the juror was unclear). We conclude the cour......
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