State v. Atkinson
| Decision Date | 16 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-0180.,99-0180. |
| Citation | 620 N.W.2d 1 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Karen Marie ATKINSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles A. Stream, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered en banc.
Karen Atkinson was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (1997). She appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. On our further review, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the district court.
On October 4, 1998, Karen Atkinson called her former husband, Scott Atkinson, and asked him for a ride to Oskaloosa. Scott agreed to take her, but he doubted whether his car would make the trip. He contacted a friend and arranged to swap cars for the trip. The defendant accompanied Scott to make this exchange. Scott testified he moved his keys and his "fanny pack" to the friend's car, a station wagon. He testified he placed the fanny pack under the driver's side of the front seat. Karen testified she could not recall specifically whether Scott had his fanny pack with him because "[h]e almost always has his [fanny pack] with him so I wouldn't have taken note of [whether he had] it or not." Scott and Karen drove to Oskaloosa.
In Oskaloosa they were stopped by an officer of the Oskaloosa Police Department who observed their car make an illegal turn. The officer asked Scott to leave the station wagon to go to the patrol car. Karen remained in the front passenger seat. From his patrol car, the officer observed Karen constantly moving in the front seat, "reaching for something." The officer discovered Scott's license was suspended, and he arrested Scott on that charge. The officer then approached the defendant in the station wagon, informed her that Scott was under arrest, and asked her to get out of the car. Another officer noticed a black purse in the middle of the front seat. The officers searched the purse because it had been next to the driver. This search revealed a glass pipe for smoking methamphetamine. The defendant admitted the purse and its contents were hers. She was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia, but that is not the charge involved in this appeal. A search of the vehicle revealed Scott's fanny pack under the driver's seat. That is the subject of this case.
A search of the fanny pack revealed approximately seventeen grams of methamphetamine, a scale, and an organizer. An officer testified the packaging and amount of drugs were consistent with a sale, rather than mere use, of methamphetamine. A search of Scott revealed a pager and $104 in cash. Scott pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, under five grams, with intent to deliver and was sentenced to a prison term not to exceed ten years. The defendant's case went to trial, and the jury found her guilty of possession of methamphetamine, in excess of five grams, with intent to deliver. The court sentenced her to a term not to exceed twenty-five years.
At trial Scott testified on behalf of the defendant. He said the fanny pack and the drugs in it were his and that he intended to deliver them. However, he testified under cross-examination that the defendant knew there were drugs in the fanny pack:
The defendant bolstered Scott's testimony that she knew there was methamphetamine in his fanny pack when she testified:
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. We uphold a finding of guilt if "substantial evidence" supports the verdict. "Substantial evidence" is evidence upon which a rational finder of fact could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the facts in the light most favorable to the State. Furthermore, we consider not only evidence which supports the verdict, but all reasonable inferences which could be derived from the evidence.
State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).
The defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of her possession of the methamphetamine. This is a constructive-possession case: actual possession requires substances to be found on the defendant's person, and that was not the case here. See State v. Rudd, 454 N.W.2d 570, 571 (Iowa 1990)
.
State v. Reeves, 209 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Iowa 1973). Reeves, which involved drugs found in a building, discussed the proof required and the inferences that may be drawn:
If the premises on which such substances are found are in the exclusive possession of the accused, knowledge of their presence on such premises coupled with his ability to maintain control over such substances may be inferred. . . . But where the accused has not been in exclusive possession of the premises but only in joint possession, knowledge of the presence of the substances on the premises and the ability to maintain control over them by the accused will not be inferred but must be established by proof. Such proof may consist either of evidence establishing actual knowledge by the accused, or evidence of incriminating statements or circumstances from which a jury might lawfully infer knowledge by the accused of the presence of the substances on the premises.
When the "premises" in which drugs are found is a motor vehicle, knowledge by the occupants as to the presence and nature of the contraband might erroneously be assumed based simply on their proximity to the drugs. Specific rules have therefore been developed to apply in motor vehicle cases. See, e.g., Emile F. Short, Annotation, Conviction of Possession of Illicit Drugs Found in Automobile of Which Defendant Was Not Sole Occupant, 57 A.L.R.3d 1319 (1974) [hereinafter Short]. While some cases recognize a rebuttable presumption of possession if the defendant is the owner or operator of the vehicle, 25 Am.Jur.2d Drugs and Controlled Substances § 149, at 335 (1996), the defendant in this case was neither an owner nor an operator. The case on which the A.L.R. annotation is based, Payne v. State, 480 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App.1972),overruled on other grounds by Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.Crim.App.1987),
is similar to the present case. In Payne the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle in which drugs were found in a matchbox on the driver's side of the dashboard. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held the state had failed to show the defendant exercised the necessary control over the drugs. Quoting an Oklahoma case, the court said: "`Possession means more than being where the action is; it involves the exercise of dominion and control over the thing allegedly possessed.'" Id. at 734 (quoting Brown v. State, 481 P.2d 475, 477 (Okla.Crim.App. 1971)); see also 25 Am.Jur.2d Drugs and Controlled Substances § 149, at 335 (); Short, § 2(a), at 1323.
In Mitchell v. State, 268 Ga. 592, 492 S.E.2d 204 (1997), a vehicle was operated by a man named Hicks and owned by his girlfriend. Hicks picked up the defendant, Mitchell, and they were arrested in a routine traffic stop. An officer walked a police dog around the car, and the dog alerted to drugs. Officers searched the car and found plastic bags containing cocaine under the front passenger side floor mat. The court held the proximity of the drugs to the defendant was insufficient evidence of possession because (1) there was no presumption of possession because Mitchell did not own or control the car and (2) a finding of constructive possession cannot rest on mere proximity, especially when the contraband is hidden.
In Plotts v. State, 297 Ark. 66, 759 S.W.2d 793 (1988), the defendant was a passenger in a car stopped for a traffic violation. The court reviewed the analytical framework employed by other jurisdictions when contraband is found in a vehicle occupied by more than one person and suggested the facts to be considered are: (1) was the contraband in plain view, (2) was it with defendant's personal effects, (3) was it found on the same side of the car seat as the defendant or immediately next to him, (4) was the defendant the owner of the vehicle, and (5) was there suspicious activity by the defendant. Id. at 795; see also 25 Am.Jur.2d Drugs and Controlled Substances § 149, at 335.
Taking the State's evidence against this defendant in the light most favorable to the verdict, we may assume the defendant knew the fanny pack was under the driver's seat and that she knew it contained methamphetamine. For purposes of resolving the issue of control, we may even assume she knew it contained a "su...
To continue reading
Request your trial