State v. Rudd, 88-1497
| Decision Date | 18 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-1497,88-1497 |
| Citation | 454 N.W.2d 570 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Tawniece Kim RUDD, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
John O. Moeller, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Mark Joel Zbieroski, Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. Davis, County Atty., and Mary Howes-Davis, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.
Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and SCHULTZ, CARTER, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.
Defendant Tawniece Kim Rudd was convicted on two counts of simple possession of a controlled substance (heroin and cocaine) in violation of Iowa Code section 204.401(3) (1987). The two questions raised in her appeal concern the State's claim that she had constructive possession of the substances. First, was there sufficient evidence to make out a jury question on the issue? Second, was the jury properly instructed on the question? We think the answer to both questions is yes.
Davenport police executed a search warrant for a residence believed to be a place for drug trafficking. Two officers had begun surveillance there approximately one hour before the warrant was executed. Other officers secured the rear of the house. No one entered the home during that time but three people left it. The officers saw someone in the house but there was no response to their knock. Hence they were compelled to use a battering ram to force the door open. Only two people, defendant Tawniece Kim Rudd and a man, were in the house. Both were in an upstairs bedroom.
Rudd was sitting on the bed while the man was standing near her. Drugs and drug paraphernalia were in plain view resting on the headboard of the bed, in close proximity to Rudd.
The house was rented to a person other than Rudd. The record did not establish whether Rudd lived or stayed at the house or was a casual visitor. The house was not shown to contain any of her clothing or personal effects.
I. We set the parameters of "possession" of controlled substances in State v. Reeves, 209 N.W.2d 18 (Iowa 1973), a case in which the accused's dominion over the substance was indirect. Reeves' control was over the premises on which the substances were found; he was not in immediate possession of the substances themselves. Under these circumstances the case focused on whether Reeves had knowledge that the substances were there.
In drawing that focus, and in placing the question in perspective, we set out eight general legal principles to test whether possession of a substance has been established. Id. at 21-22. There are three elements of possession: (1) dominion and control of the substance; (2) knowledge of its presence; and (3) knowledge of its nature. Id. at 21. The knowledge required for the second and third elements can be, and because of their subjective nature often must be, inferred. Id. at 22.
Possession is actual when the substances are found on the person of the accused. Possession is constructive when the accused maintains dominion and control of the place where the substances are found. The dominion and control can be direct or indirect. It is direct when the accused is in such close proximity to the substances as to claim immediate dominion over them. It is indirect when the accused maintains or closely shares exclusive dominion over the premises where the substances are found.
It is obvious that knowledge can be more readily inferred when the accused's dominion is directly over the substance than when the dominion is merely over the premises on which the substances are found. We said:
(5) Constructive possession is all that is necessary and occurs when the accused maintains control or a right to control the narcotic; possession may be imputed when the contraband is found in a place which is immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to [the accused's] dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the accused and another.
(6) If the premises on which the drugs are found are exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to [the accused's] use, possession or control, knowledge of their presence on such premises ... coupled with [the accused's] ability to maintain dominion and control ... may be inferred.
We applied the Reeves principles in State v. Pierce, 240 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa 1976), a case where the accused exercised no dominion over the premises, but, as in the present case, was in such close proximity to the substances as to be chargeable with control over them. Pierce was a passenger in a car. Marijuana was found on the floor of the vehicle within Pierce's reach. Relying on Reeves we held this was sufficient for constructive possession. Id. at 679.
Under these authorities there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Rudd was in constructive possession of the substances. Rudd's contention to the contrary is without merit.
II. The trial court used instruction 3007 of the uniform jury instructions of the Iowa state bar association to explain the meaning of possession. By instruction twelve the jury was told that:
possession of a controlled substance is established by the following:
a. That the defendant had knowledge of its presence, and
b. That the defendant had actual possession or exercised dominion or control over the...
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State v. Kern
...or shared exclusive dominion over the process.” State v. Spivie, 581 N.W.2d 205, 208 (Iowa Ct.App.1998). However, Spivie was predicated on Rudd, and its progeny, which permitted an inference of dominion and control based on shared, exclusive dominion. See State v. Rudd, 454 N.W.2d 570, 571 ......
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...(1) dominion and control of the illegal substance; (2) knowledge of its presence; and (3) knowledge of its nature. State v. Rudd, 454 N.W.2d 570, 571-72 (Iowa 1990) (citing State v. Reeves, 209 N.W.2d 18, 21-22 (Iowa 1973)). Recently, we addressed this doctrine in an analogous situation. Se......
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...be an incorrect statement of the law. We previously found no error in the submission of this prior uniform instruction. State v. Rudd, 454 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Iowa 1990). It appears the primary challenge to the court's instruction on constructive possession is directed at the instruction upon ......