State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 January 1928
• Citation: 116 So. 48,95 Fla. 14
• Parties: STATE ex rel. DAVIS, Atty. Gen., et al. v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

116 So. 48

95 Fla. 14

STATE ex rel. DAVIS, Atty. Gen., et al. v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

Florida Supreme Court

January 10, 1928

En Banc.

Original proceeding in mandamus by the State, on the relation of Fred H. Davis, Attorney General, and others, against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. Motion to quash an alternative writ overruled.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

State is not necessary party to mandamus to enforce purely private right, and all proceedings must be in name of actual parties in interest. The rule seems well settled that, where mandamus is invoked for the enforcement of a purely private right, the state is not a necessary party, and all proceedings must be conducted in the name of the actual parties in interest.

Relator seeking mandamus to enforce public duty need not show legal or special interest in result; his interest as citizen being sufficient. Where the question is one of public right, and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result; it being sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the law executed and the duty in question enforced.

Mandamus in which questions of public right are primarily involved should generally be brought in name of people, person instituting proceedings appearing as relator; mandamus cases in which public right is primarily involved should be inaugurated by Attorney General, or with his consent, or his refusal should be shown, but such is not essential. Cases in which questions of public right are primarily involved should as a rule be brought in the name of the people; the person instituting the proceedings appearing as relator. It is also fitting but not essential that such cases be inaugurated by the Attorney General or with his consent, or that the refusal of that officer to act be shown.

State Railroad Commission may be made relator in petition for mandamus to require restoration of tracks and train schedules under proper facts (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 4618, as amended by Acts 1921, c. 8469; Interstate Commerce Act, § 1, par. 20, as amended by Transportation Act 1920 [49 USCA § 1]). Pursuant to section 4618, Revised General Statutes of Florida 1920, as amended by chapter 8469, Acts of 1921, and paragraph 20 of section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920 (49 USCA § 1; U. C. Comp. St. § 8563), the Railroad Commission of Florida may, as representatives of the people, be made parties relators in a petition for mandamus to require the restoration of tracks and train schedules under the facts shown to exist here.

Purpose of Interstate Commerce Act was to secure conformity to prescibed standards. The dominating purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act was to secure conformity to prescribed standards through examination and appreciation of the complex facts of transportation by the body created for the purpose.

Interstate Commerce Commission is vested with extraordinary power in regulating interstate commerce; states may require reasonable intrastate freight and passenger rates, not inconsistent with Interstate Commerce Commission's orders; Interstate Commerce Act should not be construed so as to prevent state from requiring adequate local facilities for intrastate passenger traffic reasonably necessary (Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by Transportation Act 1920 [49 USCA § 1 et seq.]). This court is committed to the doctrine that under the terms of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920 (49 USCA § 1 et seq.; U.S. Comp St. § 8563 et seq.), the Interstate Commerce Commission is vested with extraordinary power in the matter of regulating interstate commerce, but that there is left a clear field of operation for the states in the matter of requiring just and reasonable freight and passenger service for intrastate business so long as such requirements are not inconsistent with lawful orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the interest of interstate commerce, and that said act should not be construed so as to prevent the state from exercising its police power to require adequate local facilities for intrastate passenger traffic reasonably necessary for the protection of the health, comfort, and convenience of passengers.

Congress may prescribe dominant rule when interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that government of one controls other. Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that the government of the one involves the control of the other, it is Congress and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule.

Commerce Act shows intent not to encroach on state's police power relating to depots, joint use of terminals, and reasonable intrastate freight and passenger service (Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by Transportation Act of 1920 [49 USCA § 1 et seq.]). The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920 (49 USCA § 1 et seq.; U.S. Comp St. § 8563 et seq.), imposes extraordinary power in the Interstate Commerce Commission to preserve uniformity and prevent discrimination in rates in interstate commerce, but along with this power is the equally evident purpose not to encroach on such matters as lie within the police power of the state to regulate, such as depots, joint use of terminals, and reasonable freight and passenger service in intrastate commerce.

Acquirement of certificate of convenience and necessity is prerequisite to abandonment of any portion of railroad line (Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by Transportation Act of 1920 [49 USCA § 1 et seq.]). The acquirement of a certificate of convenience and necessity is a prerequisite to the abandonment on the part of a railroad company of any portion of its line of railroad, and the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920 (49 USCA § 1 et seq.; U.S. Comp. St. § 8563 et seq.), imposes the burden on the carrier by railroad to secure such certificate.

Proceedings affecting rate regulation, administration, or discrimination among interstate carriers must be brought before and conducted by Interstate Commerce Commission; question whether railroad can, without interstate Commerce Commission's authority, abandon portion of line wholly within state, is within jurisdiction of state courts (Interstate Commerce Act as amended by Transportation Act of 1920 [49 USCA § 1 et seq.]). Proceedings affecting rate regulation, administration, or discrimination among interstate carriers must be brought before and conducted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, but the question of whether or not a common carrier by railroad, which comes within the purview of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920 (49 USCA § 1 et seq.; U.S. Comp. St. § 8563 et seq.) can, prior to being authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission to do so, abandon a portion of its line of railroad lying wholly within the state, and which it constructed and has operated and maintained for many years, is one within the jurisdiction of the state courts, who may determine whether such facts have been presented as constitute a cause of action.

COUNSEL

Fred H. Davis, Atty. Gen., and Theo. T. Turnbull, of Monticello, for relators.

W. E. Kay and Doggett & Doggett, all of Jacksonville, for respondent.

OPINION

TERRELL J.

This is a proceeding by mandamus, on relation of the Attorney General and the Railroad Commissioners of the state of Florida, seeking to require the respondent, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, to restore its tracks along the line of its railroad extending from Yuste to Monticello in Jefferson county, Fla., a distance of from 5 to 6 miles, and to maintain the same and to restore the schedule and train service over said line of railroad that was in effect prior to the 25th day of August, A. D. 1927. The material allegations of the alternative writ are as follows:

'That the respondent is a common carrier operating a branch line of railroad within the state of Florida known as the Yuste to Monticello branch, being part of a line of railroad formerly known as the Thomasville, Georgia-Monticello, Florida branch; that that portion of this line within the state of Florida was constructed and built under a charter granted by the state of Florida to the Savannah, Florida & Western Railway by chapter 3794, Laws of Florida 1897; that this franchise was purchased by the Atlantic Coast Line in 1902, and that the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company had operated said line up to and until the 25th day of August, 1927, since which date the respondent has failed to operate said line, and did, without notice and without the consent of the Railroad Commission of Florida, abandon and cease operating its trains over that part of its Thomasville, Georgia-Monticello, Florida branch running from Yuste to Monticello; that it took up this line entirely, abolished depots or station agencies, and has, since August 25, 1927, deprived the town of Monticello, Fla., of railroad facilities which it had had; that this action on the part of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company has resulted in confusion, inconvenience, hindrance, delays, and injury to the public generally in the state of Florida; that the people of the state of Florida are without remedy in the premises unless it be afforded by the interposition of this court through a writ of mandamus.'

The alternative writ directs respondent to restore its tracks the train service, schedules, etc., until permission shall have been lawfully obtained from the proper authorities authorizing such discontinuance...