State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Citation: 81 So. 498,77 Fla. 366
• Parties: STATE ex rel. RAILROAD COMMISSIONERS v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. et al.
• Decision Date: 08 April 1919
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

81 So. 498

77 Fla. 366

STATE ex rel. RAILROAD COMMISSIONERS v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. et al.

Florida Supreme Court

April 8, 1919

Original mandamus by the State of Florida, on relation of the Railroad Commissioners, against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and the Clyde Steamship Company. Demurrers to return overruled, motions to strike parts of the return and for a peremptory writ denied, and relators permitted to join issue on the return and have appropriate proceedings for taking testimony.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

While Congress has exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce and the state may not, when Congress has exerted that power interfere therewith, even in the otherwise just exercise of its police power, the state may in such a case act until Congress does exert its authority, even though interstate commerce may be incidentally affected.

When in the absence of federal regulations, state supervision of matters that incidentally affect interstate or foreign commerce is permissible the state authority is dominant; but upon the assertion of paramount federal authority, state regulations in the premises are thereby excluded.

Although wharves are related to commerce and navigation as aids and conveniences, yet, being local in their nature and requiring special regulations at particular places, the jurisdiction and control thereof, in the absence of congressional legislation on the subject, properly belong to the states in which they are situated.

Where an act of Congress, relating to a subject on which the state may act also, limits the scope of its regulations to a portion of the subject, it leaves the subject open to state regulation as to the matters not covered by the federal regulations. In determining whether a federal act overrules a state law, the entire scheme must be considered, and that which is implied has no less force than that which is expressed. The intent of Congress to supersede the exercise by the states of their police power will not be inferred unless the act of Congress, fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the state.

While Congress, in the proper exercise of its paramount authority over foreign and interstate commerce, may provide federal regulations of wharves, and while a construction of regulations in derogation of federal power over such commerce is not favored, yet, as wharves are local facilities that do not require uniform regulation by a single authority, they may be regulated by the states in which they are located until deferal authority over them is asserted; and a federal regulation will not be extended to them so as to supersede state authority unless an intent to assert federal supervision or control is clearly manifest from the terms and purpose of the congressional action taken in the premises.

Where state authority is exerted to require the re-establishment of a pre-existing local transportation facility by rebuilding and repairing a wharf adjacent to, and lying immediately between, a depot of a rail carrier and a river point where a water carrier may land, such authority does not conflict with the asserted federal authority under the Canal Act of August 24, 1912 (U. S. Comp. St. s 8569), to require physical connection between the lines ofthe rail and the water carriers by connecting the track of the rail carrier with the dock of the water carrier.

Orders made by the railroad commissioners within their statutory authority are, as a matter of organic law, not conclusive. If such an order is made without a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support it, the order is not enforceable.

Under the Railroad Commission Statute of 1913, if it be made to appear by admissions in the pleadings having the effect of 'clear and satisfactory evidence,' that an order made by the railroad commissioners is not 'reasonable and just,' or that the order is not 'such as ought to have been made in the premises,' or that the order was not 'properly arrived at in due form of procedure,' or that the order is not 'such as can and ought to be executed,' the order should not be enforced by mandamus.

In determining the validity and reasonableness of an order requiring wharf and depot facilities to be furnished, regard should be had for considerations that show whether the facilities may justly be required for the convenience and safety of the public to be served, and whether the expense to the carrier is so out of proportion to the advantage thereby afforded to the public, or so affects its earnings, as to impose an unlawful burden upon the carrier.

When it does not clearly appear that an order of the railroad commissioners is unreasonable as to the nature or extent of the facilities required, or as to the expense involved, and the order is otherwise valid, it will be enforced, and doubts, if any, will be resolved in favor of the order.

It is within the province and duty of the railroad commissioners and the carrier to anticipate and provide for the reasonable requirements by prospective growth of the business done by the carrier.

Where an order requiring depot facilities to be furnished is shown by the admissions of the pleadings to be so unreasonable with reference to the past and present conditions affecting the matter as to unlawfully invade the carrier's property rights the order should not be enforced by mandamus particularly when it appears that the prospective growth of the carrier's business does not clearly warrant the requirements of the order sought to be enforced.

The functions of a demurrer to a return to an alternative writ of mandamus is to raise a question of law as to the right of the relator on the pleadings to the relief sought. All the allegations of fact that are, as a matter of pleading, sufficiently averred in the return, are for the purposes of the demurrer admitted to be true as averred.

On a demurrer to a return or answer in mandamus the law applicable to the facts duly stated and admitted is to be determined by the court; and the essential question, when properly presented, is whether the facts thus alleged and admitted are in law sufficient as a defense to the writ.

Unreasonable regulations are not within the authority conferred by law upon the railroad commissioners, and when it appears from the pleading or the evidence in a case that an order or regulation is unreasonable, or unjust with reference to all the substantial interests affected by it, or violative of constitutional provisions for the protection of private property rights, such regulations will not be enforced by the courts.

Orders of the railroad commissioners, requiring particular depot and transfer facilities to be furnished for the convenience, not for the safety, of patrons, will not be enforced by mandamus when the burden to the carrier would be so out of proportion to the benefits to accrue to the public as to show the orders to be unreasonable and unjust.

Motions to strike portions of a return to an alternative writ of mandamus will be denied when the averments sought to be stricken are not wholly irrelevant or improper.

COUNSEL D. C. McMullen, of Tampa, and Dozier A. De Vane, of Tallahassee, for relator.

Kay, Adams & Ragland, of Jacksonville, for respondents.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

An alternative writ of mandamus was issued commanding the railroad company and the steamship company as common carriers to comply with, observe, and obey an order of the railroad commissioners, set out in the writ.

Among the allegations of the alternative writ are the following:

'That the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company is a railroad corporation, and the said company owns and operates a line of railroad lying partly within the state of Florida, and extending therein from various points to Astor, Lake county, Florida, on the St. Johns river. That the Clyde Steamship Company is a corporation owning and operating steamships engaged in business from various ports within this state, including Astor aforesaid. That both of the said corporations are common carriers engaged in the business of transporting persons and property over their lines for hire, and hold themselves out as such common carriers for hire from various places to Astor, and from Astor to various places within the state of Florida.'

It is also alleged that notice was given to the respondents of a hearing at a meeting--

'to consider and determine whether or not the said railroad commissioners ought to make an order requiring the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and Clyde Steamship Company to provide such reasonable physical connections between their respective transportation lines as might be necessary to properly facilitate the transfer of freight and passengers from one of said carriers to the other, and also to consider and determine such other matters as might arise in the premises.'

That a meeting and hearing were had; that--

'The Clyde Steamship Company did not appear, owing to an accident to one of their steamers, which detained Superintendent W. M. Tupper, who would otherwise have been present.'

There were also present a large number of residents from various parts of Lake county, and, after hearing all who desired to be heard, the said matter was taken under advisement.

'And now on this day the said matter came on for further and final consideration, and the Clyde Steamship Company, subsequent to the hearing, having caused to be filed with the commissioners a statement to the effect that it was desirous of co-operating in the construction and maintenance of such reasonable physical connections between its line and the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company at Astor, aforesaid, as may be necessary to properly facilitate the transfer of freight and...