State v. Atwood
Decision Date | 17 November 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-1387.,98-1387. |
Citation | 602 N.W.2d 775 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Jeremy ATWOOD, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Alfredo Parrish and Andrew Dunn of Parrish, Kruidenier, Moss, Dunn & Montgomery, L.L.P., for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney General, Denver D. Dillard, County Attorney, and Harold L. Denton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, CARTER, CADY, and ANDREASEN,1 JJ.
Jeremy Atwood was convicted of two counts of vehicular homicide under Iowa Code section 707.6A(1)(b) (1997). He appealed, challenging the district court's refusal to change venue and several rulings made during trial. His main challenge, however, arises out of the trial court's handling of an anonymous telephone threat during the trial. We treat this last issue first.
This case, which involved the deaths of two young children who were struck by the defendant's car, evoked strong emotions in the local community. During the trial, on the morning scheduled for final arguments, a receptionist in the public defender's office heard from an anonymous caller that the trial participants, including the prosecutor, defense counsel, and jurors, would all be killed unless a certain verdict was returned. The receptionist, understandably shaken, could not remember whether a conviction or acquittal was demanded. The judge delayed closing arguments, originally scheduled for morning, until 1 p.m. However, at 1:15 p.m., without the jury present, the judge announced to the parties and the spectators present in the courtroom that closing arguments would be delayed because of the threatening phone call. The court met with the attorneys and Atwood. The court related the gist of the telephone call and outlined the precautions being taken. The court invited discussion and suggestions from the parties as to what to tell the jury. The court proposed it go to the jury room and tell the jury on the record, in very general terms, that the proceedings were delayed due to the receipt of a threatening phone call. Defense counsel objected to this procedure and moved for a mistrial or a total sequestration of the jurors. Counsel for the defendant, however, did not request to be present in the jury room when the judge spoke to the jurors, and this is the basis for Atwood's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issue discussed later.
The court overruled the defendant's motions and went to the jury room, with his court reporter. He explained the situation to the jurors, and we set out the full text of the court's remarks later in this division. Immediately after the court's discussion, the court reporter read to the defendant and the attorneys the record of the conversation with the jury. Defense counsel renewed, unsuccessfully, their objection to the procedure. The trial went forward. The parties made their closing arguments the next day, and the case was submitted to the jury, which found Atwood guilty on both counts.
On appeal Atwood renews his complaint about the way the court handled the threat. He argues the court (1) exposed the jury to extrajudicial material, which affected their ability to render an impartial verdict—a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections IX and X of the Iowa Constitution; and (2) improperly denied the defendant his right to be present during all trial proceedings, thus violating the same federal and state constitutional provisions.
A. The extraneous material. In the context of alleged juror misconduct based on consideration of evidence outside the record, we have said "when there is proof that extraneous material has reached the jury room, the party seeking to overturn the verdict must show `that the misconduct was calculated to, and with reasonable probability did, influence the verdict.'" State v. Henning, 545 N.W.2d 322, 324-25 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Doe v. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Iowa 1991)).
This defendant asks that we adopt a per se rule that would make any communication between a judge and jury, outside the presence of the defendant, reversible error. We decline to adopt such a rule. We believe that, for a claim of error to prevail in such a case, the party making such a claim must show a reasonable likelihood that the extraneous evidence influenced the verdict. Cf. Henning, 545 N.W.2d at 324-25.
One resolution of the problem raised in this scenario would have been for the trial court to simply grant the defendant's motion for mistrial. We do not believe this was required under the circumstances of this case, nor would this resolution be advisable on policy grounds; litigants whose trial was proceeding badly could simply arrange for a threatening phone call and thereby start over again under a mistrial order. The court, we believe, acted properly to alert the jurors, without alarming them and without informing them that the threatened action was contingent on a certain jury verdict. We set out now, in more detail, the court's resolution of the problem.
After the threat was reported to the judge, the judge summarized the content of the call to the extent the receptionist could recall it. In proposing its solution to the problem, the court then stated to the defendant and the attorneys:
Counsel for the State had no objection to this proposal, but defense counsel did; they moved for a mistrial, which was denied. As proposed, the judge and the court reporter met with the jurors.
We set out the court's statements to the jury in full because the content of that statement is essential to a resolution of the issue raised in this division as well as the following subdivision concerning Atwood's exclusion from that communication. The court stated to the jury:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Christensen
...357 N.W.2d at 27. We have repeatedly applied the reasonable-probability test in a variety of settings. See, e.g. , State v. Atwood , 602 N.W.2d 775, 778–80 (Iowa 1999) (holding that a judge’s communication of threat made to all participants in the case, including the jury, is subject to a r......
-
Atwood v. Mapes
...the court exposed the jury to extrajudicial material that affected the jury's ability to render an impartial verdict. State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Iowa 1999). Atwood asked the court to adopt a per se rule that any communication between a judge and jury outside the presence of the d......
-
State v. Dudley
...(4) the characteristics of the event being described, and (5) the subject matter of the statement.”Id. (quoting State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Iowa 1999) ). The court must consider all the factors to determine if the statements are admissible. State v. Hy, 458 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Iowa C......
-
State v. Dessinger
...condition of the declarant, (4) the characteristics of the event being described, and (5) the subject matter of the statement. 602 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Iowa 1999).While time-lapse is important, statements made hours and even days after the event have been admissible. See, e.g. , Mateer , 383 N.......