State v. Azpitarte
| Decision Date | 09 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 68418-9.,68418-9. |
| Citation | 140 Wash.2d 138,995 P.2d 31 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Richard AZPITARTE, Petitioner. |
Nielsen, Broman & Assoc., Christopher Gibson, Seattle, for Petitioner.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Lisa N. O'Toole, Dennis McCurdy, Deputies, Seattle, for Respondent.
Richard Azpitarte seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming his conviction for felony violation of a no-contact order. He contends that a second degree assault cannot serve as the predicate assault to enhance violation of a no-contact order from a gross misdemeanor to a felony under RCW 10.99.040(4). We agree.
D.L. had a no-contact order against Azpitarte since April 1996. Despite the order, D.L. went to Azpitarte's home and stayed with him a few days in December 1996. When she wanted to leave on December 30, the two had an altercation. Each one alleged the other got violent. D.L. claimed that Azpitarte would not let her get dressed or leave the house. While still naked, she escaped to the snowy street, where she asked the driver of a delivery truck to call 911. Azpitarte followed and tried to get D.L. to return to the house. D.L. and the driver testified that Azpitarte grabbed her by the arm and tried to pull her out of the vehicle. Azpitarte went inside his house but soon returned. He tried to pull D.L. from the vehicle by her hair, but she resisted and he pulled a handful of hair from her head.
The State charged Azpitarte with one count of second degree assault based on the hair pulling, one count of unlawful imprisonment, and one count of felony violation of a court order. The felony violation of a court order was based on Azpitarte's two assaults of D.L.: the second degree hair pulling and the fourth degree arm pulling. There was no separate assault charge based on the arm pulling. During pretrial motions the State maintained it would rely solely on the arm pulling to prosecute the felony violation, but during closing arguments the State invited the jury to rely on either assault to enhance the violation to a felony. The jury instructions left the jury to decide whether Azpitarte was guilty of felony violation of a no-contact order, but also did not specify which assault or what degree of assault was necessary for enhancement. The instructions only stated that felony violation required an intentional assault and jury unanimity in regards to a particular assault. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the unlawful imprisonment count, but found Azpitarte guilty of the two other counts. The trial court entered judgment and sentence accordingly.
Azpitarte appealed the felony violation conviction, challenging for the first time the "to convict" instruction and the trial court's failure to give the jury a special verdict form. He premised both challenges on his contention that second degree assault cannot be the predicate for felony violation of a court order. The Court of Appeals held that second degree assault may serve as the predicate for the felony violation of such an order and affirmed the judgment. We grant review and reverse the Court of Appeals.
Whether a second degree assault can serve as the predicate assault that enhances violation of a no-contact order from a gross misdemeanor to a felony under RCW 10.99.040(4).
We review the trial court's decision de novo since it turns on statutory construction. State v. Ammons, 136 Wash.2d 453, 456, 963 P.2d 812 (1998). RCW 10.99.040(4)(a) states that a willful violation of a no-contact order is a gross misdemeanor "except as provided in (b) and (c)" of the subsection.1 Subsection (b) provides that any assault that is a violation of a no-contact order and "that does not amount to assault in the first or second degree" is a class C felony. The statute clearly excludes the use of first and second degree assaults to elevate violation of a no-contact order from a gross misdemeanor to a felony. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is to be derived from the language of the statute alone and it is not subject to judicial construction. Washington State Coalition for the Homeless v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 133 Wash.2d 894, 904, 949 P.2d 1291 (1997). An ambiguity exists if the language at issue is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. State ex rel. Royal v. Board of Yakima County Comm'rs, 123 Wash.2d 451, 459, 869 P.2d 56 (1994). RCW 10.99.040(4) is unambiguous with respect to the issue in this case. The statute clearly states that second degree assault cannot serve as the predicate to make the violation a felony.
The Court of Appeals rejected this reading of RCW 10.99.040(4) because it violates two rules of statutory construction: avoiding constructions that yield unlikely, strange or absurd results, and giving...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Melland
...cannot serve as the predicate to make the violation a felony.’ " Ward, 148 Wash.2d at 812, 64 P.3d 64013 (quoting State v. Azpitarte, 140 Wash.2d 138, 141, 995 P.2d 31 (2000) ). The court held that an information alleging felony violation of a no-contact order must state an assault that is ......
-
Amalgamated Transit v. State
...sufficiently resolves the meaning of the term, there is no ambiguity to resolve and this rule does not apply. State v. Azpitarte, 140 Wash.2d 138, 142, 995 P.2d 31 (2000). The State also argues that by giving the term tax a broad construction the trial court failed to apply the principle th......
-
Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24119-6-II.
...(1996). An ambiguity exists if the language at issue is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. State v. Azpitarte, 140 Wash.2d 138, 141, 995 P.2d 31 (2000) (citing State ex rel. Royal v. Board of Yakima County Comm'rs, 123 Wash.2d 451, 459, 869 P.2d 56 (1994)). Nonetheless,......
-
State v. Coria
...is to be derived from the language of the statute alone and it is not subject to judicial construction." State v. Azpitarte, 140 Wash.2d 138, 141, 995 P.2d 31 (2000) (per curiam). "An ambiguity exists if the language at issue is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." Id. A......