State v. Back, No. A08-0017 (Minn. App. 4/7/2009), A08-0017.
| Decision Date | 07 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A08-0017.,A08-0017. |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Danna Rochelle Back, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. CR-07-5374.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN (for respondent).
Lawrence Hammerling, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN (for appellant).
Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Schellhas, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Danna Rochelle Back challenges her second-degree manslaughter conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt. Appellant also challenges the denial of her motion for a new trial. We affirm.
A jury convicted appellant of second-degree manslaughter after a three-day trial and four days of deliberations. Appellant argues that the evidence offered by the state was insufficient to prove that she was culpably negligent in the death of the victim, D.H., or that she was the proximate cause of D.H.'s death.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court's review is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict that they did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court must assume "the jury believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary." State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). And the reviewing court will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
A person who causes the death of another is guilty of second-degree manslaughter "by the person's culpable negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable risk, and consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to another." Minn. Stat. § 609.205(1) (2006). Culpable negligence is "intentional conduct which the actor may not intend to be harmful but which an ordinary and reasonably prudent man would recognize as involving a strong probability of injury to others." State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 478 (Minn. 1999) (quoting State v. Beilke, 267 Minn. 526, 534, 127 N.W.2d 516, 521 (1964)). A conviction of second-degree manslaughter requires proof of both an objective element of negligence and subjective element of recklessness. State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Minn. 1989). And the defendant's negligence must be the proximate cause of the victim's death. State v. Crace, 289 N.W.2d 54, 60 (Minn. 1979) (citing State v. Schaub, 231 Minn. 512, 520, 44 N.W.2d 61, 66 (1950)).
On January 1, 2007, appellant called D.H.'s house around 3 a.m. While talking with D.H., appellant heard female voices in the background and became angry. Appellant subsequently called her friend Nicholas Super and asked him for a ride to D.H.'s house. Super agreed to take her to D.H.'s residence. Before dropping her off in the alley behind D.H.'s house, Super told appellant that she and D.H. "better not start arguing." After appellant entered D.H.'s home, she and D.H. began arguing in the kitchen. D.H. left through the back door to take his dog outside and saw Super's car in the alley behind his house. D.H. and Super began to argue, then D.H. came back inside and continued arguing with appellant. D.H. became upset that Super gave appellant a ride to his house and pushed appellant out onto the back deck into the deck railing, telling her to leave. As appellant was standing up after being pushed, she saw D.H. and Super standing near each other on the deck stairs. Appellant heard a shot and saw D.H. fall to the ground. Super ran to his car and drove away and D.H. died of a gunshot wound that morning.
The record indicates that appellant and victim D.H. had had an on-again, off-again relationship for several years prior to his death and were not dating at the time of D.H.'s death on January 1, 2007. The record further indicates that during the summer of 2006, appellant dated Super but that they were also not dating at the time of D.H.'s death. Prior to January 1, 2007, Super and D.H. had previous conflicts due to their relationships with appellant. During her police interview, appellant stated that she knew: Super was still interested in dating her, Super owned a gun, Super had shot his gun in the air outside of D.H.'s residence, Super had shot two bullets into D.H.'s garage door, D.H. had called the police after Super threatened him, and Super had been "known to pull his gun out on . . . anybody."
Gross negligence
To establish the objective element of negligence for culpable negligence, the state must prove "a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation." State v. Zupetz, 322 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1982) (quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that the state failed to prove that she was grossly negligent because the act of asking Super for a ride to D.H.'s house cannot amount to gross negligence. Appellant contends that under Minnesota caselaw a more overt act is required for the element of gross negligence to be met, such as the personal handling of the weapon that caused the death of another. Appellant cites three applicable cases for this proposition. In State v. King, this court concluded the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction of second-degree manslaughter in the stabbing death of her husband because the appellant's conscious actions allowed the jury to infer an unreasonable risk of serious harm "when she thrust[ ] a butcher knife in close proximity to [the victim's] chest." 367 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Minn. App. 1985). In State v. Gibbons, the supreme court held that the appellant was guilty of second-degree manslaughter because it concluded that he was culpably negligent in playing with loaded weapons after smoking marijuana. 305 N.W.2d 331, 336-37 (Minn. 1981). And in State v. Spann, the factual basis of appellant's guilty plea was sufficient to uphold his conviction of second-degree manslaughter because the appellant used a knife, understanding that "someone could get hurt" by his actions. 289 Minn. 497, 499, 182 N.W.2d 873, 875 (1970).
Although three of the cases cited by appellant involve direct evidence of a defendant wielding a weapon, Minn. Stat. § 609.205(1) contains no such requirement. Moreover, not all second-degree manslaughter cases involve defendants wielding weapons. See State v. Cantrell, 220 Minn. 13, 17-18, 18 N.W.2d 681, 683 (1945) (); Schaub, 231 Minn. at 520-21, 44 N.W.2d at 65-66 ().
To support its case for second-degree manslaughter here, the state introduced evidence of: (1) the prior intimate relationship between appellant and Super; (2) appellant's knowledge that Super previously fired a gun into the victim's garage; (3) appellant's knowledge of the past conflicts between Super and the victim; and (4) appellant's knowledge that Super carried a gun. On this record, although appellant did not shoot D.H., we cannot say that in light of the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could not infer that appellant was grossly negligent in getting Super to drive her to the victim's house.
We also reject appellant's argument that this case is controlled by State v. Beilke, where the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a second-degree manslaughter conviction, concluding that the death was not a result of culpable negligence. 267 Minn. 526, 533-34, 127 N.W.2d 516, 521-22 (1964). In Beilke the court determined that the appellant's actions—carrying a rifle in close proximity to his son's crib without checking to see if the gun was loaded, and then bumping into the crib and causing the rifle to discharge, thereby killing his son—could not "be said to have been such that a reasonable or ordinarily prudent man would consider likely to result in injury to another." Id. at 534, 127 N.W.2d at 522. But in Beilke, the court reversed appellant's conviction because the appellant did not know or have reason to know that the rifle was loaded, and therefore the appellant's negligence, if any, was insufficient for second-degree manslaughter. Id. Appellant called Super to ask him for a ride to D.H.'s house, knowing about Super and the victim's past conflicts and knowing that Super was known to carry and use a gun.
Although the facts of this case are unusual, we are required to assume that "the jury believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary." Moore, 438 N.W.2d at 108. Additionally, we are required to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction. Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430. On this record we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support a jury determination that the element of gross negligence was met.
To establish the subjective element of recklessness for culpable negligence, the state must show "an actual conscious disregard of the risk created by the conduct." State v. Frost, 342 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. 1983).
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