State v. Bailey
| Decision Date | 22 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 55481-1,55481-1 |
| Citation | 114 Wn.2d 340,787 P.2d 1378 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Walter V. BAILEY, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
At issue in this case is whether the defendant's conviction for indecent liberties should be reversed because the Walter V. Bailey, the defendant herein, was charged with first degree statutory rape as the result of events that occurred on a date between December 15, 1985 and January 5, 1986. Defendant was in his mid-thirties at the time of the crime charged.
trial court improperly instructed the jury that indecent liberties was a lesser included offense of statutory rape in the first degree. As we note herein, the Legislature has since changed the terminology of the pertinent statutes
At the time, defendant lived with the 3-year-old victim's family and occasionally babysat the victim and her infant brother. At trial, the mother testified that immediately upon her return home one day during the period in question, the victim appeared very upset and complained to the effect that the defendant had oral sex with her. A Vancouver Police Department social worker testified that shortly afterward the victim repeated the same complaint to him. The victim herself testified at trial, again to this same effect. A Vancouver Police Department detective sergeant testified that when he interviewed the defendant about it, and informed the defendant that the victim reported that he had oral-genital contact with her, the defendant began crying and confessed:
I did it. It just happened. I was on the bed, and she was acting like she thought she was grown up.
Before submitting the case to the jury, the trial court reviewed its proposed jury instructions with counsel. Defense counsel excepted to a single instruction, one not here pertinent. Defense counsel made no exception or objection of any kind whatsoever to the trial court's instructions 8 and 9 informing the jury that indecent liberties was a lesser included offense of the crime of first degree statutory rape that had been charged. 1
A jury found the defendant not guilty of first degree statutory rape but guilty of the lesser offense of indecent liberties. Defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. Bailey, 52 Wash.App. 42, 757 P.2d 541 (1988). Even though the defendant has served his sentence and is no longer incarcerated, this court granted his petition for discretionary review.
One ultimate issue is presented.
Should the defendant's conviction for indecent liberties be reversed because the trial court instructed the jury that indecent liberties was a lesser included offense of statutory rape in the first degree?
CONCLUSION. Reversal is unwarranted because the defendant failed to except to the lesser included offense instructions at trial, and because any error presented by the trial court's instructions to the jury was harmless.
The first degree statutory rape statute under which the defendant was charged was former RCW 9A.44.070. The pertinent portion of this former statute read as follows:
A person over thirteen years of age is guilty of statutory rape in the first degree when the person engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is less than eleven years old.
Former RCW 9A.44.070(1). The indecent liberties statute under which the defendant was convicted was former RCW 9A.44.100 which, so far as here relevant, read:
A person is guilty of indecent liberties when he knowingly causes another person who is not his spouse to have sexual contact with him or another:
. . . . .
(b) When the other person is less than fourteen years of age ...
Former RCW 9A.44.100(1)(b).
In order to constitute a lesser included offense, each element of the lesser offense must be a necessary element of the greater offense charged. 2 The defendant argues that indecent liberties was not a lesser included offense of statutory rape in the first degree because to prove indecent liberties, the State had to prove an element that was not a necessary element of first degree statutory rape, i.e., that the perpetrator was not married to the victim. Since nonmarriage is an element of indecent liberties but not of statutory rape in the first degree, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that indecent liberties was a lesser included offense of the crime charged. 3
We note here the split within the Court of Appeals on this issue. Division One has held that because the first degree statutory rape statute did not expressly require that the perpetrator not be married to the victim, indecent liberties is not a lesser included offense. 4 Division Two, on the other hand, held here that nonmarriage is an implicit element of first degree statutory rape and that indecent liberties is a lesser included offense. 5 The State argues that regardless of which position is correct, the defendant did not preserve this issue for appeal because no exception was taken to the lesser included offense instructions at trial.
It is well-settled law that before error can be claimed on the basis of a jury instruction given by the trial court, an appellant must first show that an exception was taken to that instruction in the trial court. 6 That rule is not a mere technicality. As we have explained clearly and often:
CR 51(f) requires that, when objecting to the giving or refusing of an instruction, "[t]he objector shall state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection". The purpose of this rule is to clarify, at the time when the trial court has before it all the evidence and legal arguments, the exact points of law and reasons upon which counsel argues the court is committing error about a particular instruction. Dravo Corp. v. L.W. Moses Co., 6 Wn.App. 74, 83, 492 P.2d 1058 (1971); see State v. McDonald, 74 Wn.2d 141, 145, 443 P.2d 651 (1968). Therefore, the objection must apprise the trial judge of the precise points of law involved and when itdoes not, those points will not be considered on appeal. Haslund v. Seattle, [86 Wn.2d 607,] 614-15, [547 P.2d 1221 (1976) ]; Powers v. Hastings, 20 Wn.App. 837, 848, 582 P.2d 897 (1978).
Stewart v. State, 92 Wash.2d 285, 298, 597 P.2d 101 (1979). Defense counsel did not comply with this basic rule.
Pertinent is our opinion in State v. Mak, 105 Wash.2d 692, 718 P.2d 407, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986), wherein we affirmed the defendant's conviction of aggravated murder in the first degree. At the trial in Mak, the defendant did not request an included offense instruction on premeditated murder in the first degree (which is an included offense) but did request an included offense instruction on felony murder (which is not an included offense.) 7 ) Since the defendant did not request an included offense instruction on premeditated murder in the first degree, the trial court did not give one. The court did give the requested included offense instruction on felony murder. 8 On appeal to this court, the defendant in Mak reversed his position 180 degrees and argued that the trial court erred by not giving an instruction on the included offense of premeditated murder in the first degree and also erred by giving an instruction on felony murder since it is not an included offense. 9
In Mak, we refused to countenance such tactics, holding that
the defendant's conviction of either premeditated first degree murder or felony murder would have had the same effect, avoidance of the death penalty and preservation of the possibility of parole.
Under these circumstances, we hold that: (1) the lesser included offense instruction that was given, [i.e., felony murder] not having been excepted to at trial, became the law of the case; (2) any error in connection therewith was invited error and cannot be complained of on appeal; and (3) any error in that connection was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. If error at all, it clearly was not reversible error.
The defendant also argues that since felony murder requires proof that the crime was committed "in the course of and in furtherance of" the felony, it was not properly an "included offense" of aggravated first degree murder at all, thus, the trial court also erred on this basis when it gave the felony murder included offense instruction. Even accepting defendant's present premise that it was error to give the felony murder included offense instruction, for each and all of the same three reasons just stated, it was not reversible error.
Mak, 105 Wash.2d at 748-49, 718 P.2d 407.
In short, what we held in Mak was that a defendant cannot fail in his duty to except to lesser included offense instructions that potentially benefit him, and then on appeal claim reversible error based on those instructions. Yet that is precisely what the defendant is attempting here. The present case is even more egregious than Mak, because here the defendant profited from the trial court's giving of the lesser offense instructions to the extent that he was convicted of the lesser offense of indecent liberties rather than the more serious offense of first degree statutory rape with which he was charged. We hold in this case, as we did in Mak, that "the lesser included offense instruction that was given, not having been excepted to at trial, became the law of the case." 10
An exception to the rule that a jury instruction must be excepted to exists in the case of "manifest error affecting a constitutional right." 11 In Mak, we also dealt with the question of alleged constitutional error in the giving of a felony murder instruction as an included offense instruction and concluded that "any error in that connection was...
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