State v. Bakula
| Docket Number | A-1206-19 |
| Decision Date | 15 December 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff- Respondent, v. LUKE V. BAKULA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff- Respondent,
v.
LUKE V. BAKULA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. A-1206-19
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division
December 15, 2023
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Argued October 2, 2023
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 15-12-0942.
Susan Lee Romeo, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Susan Lee Romeo, of counsel and on the brief).
Ali Y. Ozbek, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney; Ali Y. Ozbek, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges DeAlmeida, Berdote Byrne, and Bishop-Thompson.
PER CURIAM
Following a ten-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1) (count one and four); two counts of sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) (counts two and five); and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-4(a)(1) (counts three and six). The offenses arose from A.S. and defendant's inappropriate relationship that developed while they were members in a dojo, also known as a karate academy.
Defendant was sentenced to twelve years under count one and six years under count two, to run consecutively and subject to an eighty-five percent parole bar under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
I.
On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments.
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THIS TRIAL WAS REPLETE WITH INADMISSIBLE LAY OPINION AND HEARSAY TESTIMONY REGARDING DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER, CONDUCT[,] AND GUILT, ELICITED FROM THE STATE'S WITNESSES IN VIOLATION OF MULTIPLE COURT RULINGS.
1. Inflammatory, Inadmissible Lay Opinion Testimony Regarding Defendant's Character. 2. Inadmissible Lay Opinion Testimony [a]nd Hearsay Regarding Defendant's Conduct [a]nd Guilt.
3. Testimony [b]y [t]he State's Witnesses Regarding Defendant's Character, Conduct [a]nd Guilt [w]as Inadmissible Lay Opinion [a]nd Hearsay That Was Highly Prejudicial.
4. The Prejudice [f]rom This Inadmissible Opinion [a] nd Hearsay Evidence Was Overwhelming Where [t]he State's Case Rested Almost Exclusively [o]n [t]he Victim's Testimony.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ADMITTED HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL ALLEGATIONS OF UNCHARGED CONDUCT, BECAUSE IT FAILED TO MAKE THE REQUIRED FINDINGS UNDER STATE V. COFIELD, 127 N.J. 328 (1992), APPLIED THE WRONG BURDEN OF PROOF, AND PERMITTED THE JURY TO USE THE EVIDENCE FOR PLAN, MOTIVE, OPPORTUNITY, KNOWLEDGE, BACKGROUND, AND DELAYED DISCLOSURE, NONE OF WHICH WERE PROPER BASES FOR ADMISSION.
1. The State's Motion [t]o Admit Uncharged Conduct Evidence.
2. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Evidence [o]f [t]he Uncharged Conduct Because It Applied [t]he Wrong Burden [o]f Proof, It Failed [t]o Identify [t]he Specific Purpose [o]r Disputed
Material Issue, [a]nd It Failed [t]o Conduct [t]he Required Balancing Test.
3. None [o]f The Purposes [f]or Which These Highly Prejudicial, Unsupported Allegations Were Admitted Were Permissible Under These Circumstances.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ADMITTED, AS "FRESH COMPLAINT, "EVIDENCE OF A.S.'S VAGUE ALLEGATIONS TO HER FRIEND IN 2013, SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE ABUSE ALLEGEDLY ENDED IN 2006.
1. The State's Motion [t]o Admit Evidence [o]f A.S's 2013 Statement To [M.G.]
2. The Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted These Vague Allegations Under [t]he Fresh Complaint Doctrine: The Seven-Year Delay Rendered [t]he Complaint Not "Fresh," [a]nd [t]he Court's Decision Was Based [o]n Its Mistaken Understanding [o]f [t]he Facts [a] nd [a] Mistaken Belief That [t]he Lengthy Delay Solely Presented [a] Credibility Issue [f]or [t]he Jury.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS DEPRIVED HIM OF DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. (Not raised below).
We have considered the arguments in view of the record and applicable legal principles. We hold the evidence against defendant was of sufficient
weight to lead us to conclude there was no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court and reasonably viewed, did not produce an unjust result. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
II.
We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings "'under the abuse of discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion.'" State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018) (quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. &Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)). "Under [the] deferential standard, we review a trial court's evidentiary ruling only for a 'clear error in judgment.'" State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020) (quoting State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017)). A reviewing court will not substitute its "judgment for the trial court's unless," the trial court's determination "was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted." Ibid. (quoting State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)).
Where a defendant challenges the admission of evidence for the first time on appeal, the plain error standard applies. "Plain error is a high bar and constitutes 'error not properly preserved for appeal but of a magnitude dictating appellate consideration.'" State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019) (quoting State v. Bueso, 225 N.J. 193, 202 (2016)). Stated differently, we must
determine whether the alleged error was "of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. To warrant a reversal under this standard, the "error [at trial]must be sufficient to raise 'reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'" State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004)). "To determine whether an alleged error rises to the level of plain error, it 'must be evaluated "in light of the overall strength of the State's case...... State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266, 287 (2022) (quoting State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 468 (2018)).
A. Lay Opinion and Hearsay Testimony
Defendant contends on appeal that the State elicited improper hearsay and opinion testimony from S.N., G.M., and A.S. about his character traits, conduct, and guilt that was "highly prejudicial," usurped the jury's fact-finding function, improperly bolstered the State's claim that defendant committed the sexual assaults, and clearly produced an unjust result. Thus, he argues, reversal is warranted. Defendant's contentions lack merit.
Testimony of S.N. and G.M.
Defendant argues the "extensive" lay opinion and hearsay testimony from S.N. and G.M. that defendant was "weird "and "awkward" was offered for no
reason other than to cast defendant as a "strange person - a weird, long-haired communist," "likely to prey on young girls," and to make an emotional appeal to the jury. Since there was no objection to this testimony at trial, our review is under the plain error standard. R. 2:10-2.
S.N., a former dojo member, began attending the dojo in 2004. In response to the prosecutor's question to describe "the kind of person" defendant was when they initially met, S.N. described defendant as "unusual," having an "odd personality," and that he "seemed really lost." The witness said defendant also had "a little unusual appearance," with "big, long hair. "The court sustained defense counsel's objection to S.N.'s testimony that defendant was a "staunch communist."
G.M., a Methodist pastor and former dojo member, was also asked to describe defendant when they initially met. Initially, G.M. testified defendant was "kind of an awkward weird kid." When asked to describe "what kind of person" defendant was based on her interactions, G.M. restated he was a "weird kid." The judge then asked: "[W]hat does that mean?" Upon further questioning by the prosecutor, G.M. explained defendant "seemed like a nice kid" and there was "some awkward social things." Defense counsel objected to any further exploration by the prosecutor of the meaning of "weird" and
"awkward," and the prosecutor moved on to another line of questioning. G.M. also recalled defendant as "overweight," "withdrawn," a "little quiet," and with "kind of long hair."
Defense counsel did not object to either witnesses' description of defendant's physical appearance and personality nor did he request a limiting instruction. Both witnesses testified they did not see defendant engage in any inappropriate behavior with A.S. or any other child.
Defendant next challenges testimony from S.N. and G.M. concerning defendant's conduct and guilt. The trial court conducted a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing in accordance with State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 573, 574 (1999). At the 104 hearing, S.N. testified that in 2006 or 2007, defendant told her that he was "in love" with and had a "crush" on A.S. S.N. said she felt as if she was "punched in the stomach because [she] couldn't breathe" and it was a "shocking statement." At the time, defendant was eighteen or nineteen years old and A.S. was ten; physically he was a "young man," and she was a "prepubescent girl." Later, S.N. called defendant and told him that his feelings for A.S. were "completely wrong," "totally inappropriate," and "totally out of line." She also relayed defendant's statement to her husband and G.M. S.N. left the dojo in 2009.
G.M. also testified defendant told her that he had a "crush" on A.S. She thought defendant's...
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