State v. Clark
| Decision Date | 29 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | A-67 September Term 2020,A-37 September Term 2021,085271 |
| Citation | 251 N.J. 266,276 A.3d 1126 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. Quinnizel J. CLARK, Defendant-Respondent/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Valeria Dominguez, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Valeria Dominguez, of counsel and on the briefs).
Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Daniel S. Rockoff, of counsel and on the briefs).
Fifty-six years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that individuals subject to police interrogation must be advised of certain rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present, to safeguard the right against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Accordingly, it is well-established in federal and state jurisprudence that when a suspect invokes the right to counsel, law enforcement must cease the interrogation. Id. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 63, 695 A.2d 1301 (1997). This appeal presents a case in which law enforcement officers failed to uphold that basic principle by not scrupulously honoring invocations of the right to counsel.
Defendant Quinnizel Clark was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. At trial, the State played for the jury Clark's videotaped statement to police prior to his arrest. At one point during the statement, police pressed defendant about his alibi and confronted him with their theory that defendant killed James Dewyer. In response, defendant told officers, "charge me, call my attorney Mr. Keisler over here, charge me and let's go." Even though defendant twice advised officers to call his attorney, the interrogation continued. The officers continued to urge defendant to tell them who he had been with during the time of the murder and to suggest that he did not want to tell them because he was lying, and therefore guilty. Defendant asked officers to call his attorney a third time, and the interrogation ended. When the statement was played for the jury at trial, the jury heard defendant's invocation of his right to counsel as well as the officer's continued questioning and their insinuations of his guilt. During summation, the State argued that the detective "practically begged" defendant to provide information regarding his alibi, but defendant refused, which again suggested his guilt.
On appeal, in a split decision, the Appellate Division vacated defendant's conviction and remanded the matter for further proceedings based on cumulative error. The court held that certain witness testimony was impermissibly suggestive of identification and prejudicial to defendant. The Appellate Division therefore ordered the trial court to conduct an N.J.R.E. 104(a) hearing as to the admissibility of that testimony. The majority also appeared to take issue with several comments made by the prosecutor during summation. The court concluded that the cumulative effect of the errors rendered the trial unfair. The majority noted, but took no issue with, the fact that the jury heard defendant's invocation of his right to counsel during the statement he gave to the police.
The dissenting judge found no reversible error regarding the witness testimony or any of the prosecutor's comments.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm as modified the Appellate Division's decision vacating defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial based on a violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. Once defendant invoked his right to counsel, the interrogation should have stopped. Not only did the interrogation continue, but during the questioning, the detective strongly suggested that defendant would give them the information they sought if he were truly innocent. Allowing that entire exchange to be played for the jury was harmful error. In addition, the error was compounded when the prosecutor commented on that portion of the statement that should have never been before the jury in the first place. Unlike the Appellate Division majority, we discern no error regarding the witness testimony or any of the prosecutor's other comments during summation.
We rely on the testimony at trial for the following factual summary. On January 3, 2016, at 4:17 p.m., Sergeant Daniel Pachuta responded to a report about an unresponsive man in a car on the side of Kinkora Road in Mansfield. At the scene, Sergeant Pachuta found James Dewyer without a pulse in the passenger's seat of his silver Dodge Avenger. Dewyer was still warm to the touch at the time. Paramedics arrived shortly thereafter and, in attempting to remove him from the car, observed that Dewyer had entry wounds from five close-range gunshots in his left abdomen. Dewyer was later pronounced dead at a local hospital.
In searching Dewyer's vehicle, officers found in the glove compartment a receipt that showed Dewyer paid $1,050 in October 2015 to bail defendant out of jail. In Dewyer's wallet, law enforcement found, among other things, a receipt timestamped 9:52 a.m. on the morning of his death from Delaware Park Casino. The investigation revealed that at 7:00 a.m. on January 3, 2016, Dewyer picked up defendant at the Riverfront Motel on Route 130 in Mansfield and the men drove to the Delaware Park Casino in Wilmington, Delaware. Dewyer met defendant at the motel. Defendant stayed there at times and Dewyer frequented the motel, giving many of the residents there rides.
Surveillance cameras at the Delaware Park Casino showed defendant and Dewyer arrive at the casino at approximately 8:34 a.m. and depart at approximately 11:00 a.m. Cameras in front of the Riverfront Motel showed defendant and Dewyer return to the motel at approximately 12:21 p.m. Defendant went inside the motel and exited sometime later with a red and black backpack. When defendant and Dewyer reentered the car, defendant was driving and Dewyer was in the passenger seat. The men departed the motel at approximately 1:34 p.m. At 3:28 p.m., surveillance video showed defendant return to the motel with his backpack on his back, alone and on foot.
Office and another officer interviewed defendant about Dewyer's death.1 Detective Raynor told defendant that he was not under arrest but read defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant waived his rights and agreed to provide a recorded statement.
After obtaining background information on defendant, officers asked defendant what he knew about Dewyer. Defendant told officers that he called Dewyer "Jimmy Dean" and explained his friendship with Dewyer, referring to Dewyer as his "gambling buddy." Defendant stated that he and Dewyer were close because they both enjoyed horse racing. Defendant stated that he and Dewyer went to a casino in Delaware every Sunday morning, including the day Dewyer was killed.
Defendant stated that after he and Dewyer returned from the casino that morning, defendant went into the motel and then left with Dewyer about an hour later. According to defendant, Dewyer dropped him off in Roebling and defendant believed Dewyer then proceeded to pick up a friend's daughter. Defendant claimed that was the last time he saw Dewyer.
When the officers asked defendant what he was doing in Roebling, defendant hesitated. After some initial back and forth about defendant not wanting to talk about why he was in Roebling, defendant asked the officers whether he could get in trouble for stating what he was doing there. Ultimately, defendant told police that he went to Roebling, met up with someone, and "traded something for something." That entire conversation, wherein defendant insinuated he was in Roebling doing something illegal, was redacted from the videotaped statement played for the jury.2
After approximately 40 minutes of an arguably congenial interview with defendant, Detective Raynor began to confront defendant with his belief that defendant was involved in Dewyer's murder. Raynor accused defendant of knowing more about Dewyer's pension money than he had revealed. Detective Raynor also told defendant that it was obvious from their investigation that defendant and Dewyer were together all day and that defendant walked back to the motel from the area where Dewyer's body was found. Raynor told defendant "it's game over." Defendant responded, Detective Raynor then pressed defendant for information on his alibi and the following exchange occurred, which we reproduce at length for context:3
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