State v. Baldwin

• Decision Date: 20 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-110,96-110
• Citation: 686 So.2d 682
• Parties: 22 Fla. L. Weekly D16 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Ronald Maurice BALDWIN, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 682

686 So.2d 682

22 Fla. L. Weekly D16

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Ronald Maurice BALDWIN, Appellee.

No. 96-110.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

Dec. 20, 1996.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1997.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Trisha E. Meggs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

MICKLE, Judge.

In this appeal, the state contends that the trial court erred in granting Ronald M. Baldwin's motion to suppress based on a misapplication of the law to the facts. We reverse the suppression order and remand for the trial court to clarify its findings and conclusions.

Baldwin was charged with one count each of possession of cocaine, possession of fewer than 20 grams of cannabis, and possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia. The defense filed a motion to suppress "a small brown wrapper containing three pieces of suspected crack-cocaine, one small ball of copper wire and one partially burned suspected marijuana cigarette along with any residue found therein." Baldwin claimed that the officers' discovery of the contraband arose from an illegal stop, detention, and search. The order granting the motion to suppress states in pertinent part:

A hearing on a Motion to Suppress was conducted on December 14, 1995. Three Pensacola police officers testified during the course of the hearing. The facts established at the hearing are specifically set forth hereafter. The Grand Hotel and apartments adjoining the hotel are located on North Guillemard in the city of Pensacola. The area of the Grand Hotel is known as a high crime area to include drug activity, robberies, auto burglaries and auto thefts. The owner of the Grand Hotel property and apartments has specifically requested the Pensacola Police Department to check the area for loiterers in an effort to suppress criminal activity in and around his property.

On March 19, 1995, two Pensacola police officers were walking through the area of the Grand Hotel at approximately 9:30 P.M. to facilitate the request of the owner of the property. Both officers were in uniform and armed. The officers noted the Defendant sitting on a cement stoop in front of the apartments. Another man was standing next to the Defendant. Neither of these gentlemen was involved in any suspicious activity. The officers merely approached them for the purpose of determining their reason for being in that location. The Defendant and the other gentleman responded to a request for identification. Pensacola Police Officer Bobe asked if either of them had anything on their person that they should not have. Both gentlemen responded negatively. Officer Bobe asked if he could search the gentlemen. The man standing next to the Defendant agreed to be searched.

While [the officer was] conducting the search of the other gentleman, the Defendant placed his hands in his pockets. The Defendant was asked to remove his hands from his pockets for reasons of officer safety. The officers were curious about the Defendant because of his refusal to be searched. Their focus, however, was directed toward the other individual until the Defendant, once again, placed his hand[s] in his pockets. The officer again asked the Defendant to remove his hands from his pockets. The Defendant complied. The officers did nothing more directed toward the Defendant and returned their focus to the other gentleman.

On a third occasion the Defendant returned his hands to his pockets. The officers asked the Defendant to remove his hands from his pockets. On this occasion, the Defendant pulled his hands out of his pockets and, while [verbally] denying the possession of any contraband, threw the contents of his pockets on the ground. The officers observed a brown piece of paper dropping to the ground with the Defendant's money and change. The paper was inspected and found to contain rocks which subsequently tested positive for the presence of cocaine.

The time during which this encounter between the officers, the Defendant, and the third [sic] person was a minimal amount of time to facilitate identification and conduct a search agreed upon by the third person [the other gentleman]. At no time was the Defendant detained. He was free to leave at any time. The officers['] focus was substantially directed toward the other gentleman. Due to the two prior instances of the officers' failing to react to the Defendant's removal of his hands from his pockets, the Court concludes that the Defendant voluntarily removed the contents of his pockets without direction, suggestion, or coercion from the officers.

The Defendant was arrested for the possession of cocaine. After his arrest he requested that his automobile (legally parked in front of the apartments) be secured. Within fifteen minutes a canine officer and his dog came to the area and alerted to two locations on the Defendant's vehicle. Following the alert by the drug dog, the officers searched the Defendant's vehicle and retrieved a marijuana roach, a wire commonly used as a filter for smoking cocaine, and a small quantity of cocaine.

(Emphasis added). As to the trial court's findings of fact, the standard of review is whether competent substantial evidence supports those findings. Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla.1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). Factual findings are clothed with a presumption of correctness, so that all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom will be construed in a light most favorable to sustaining the ruling. Brandin v. State, 669 So.2d 280, 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Having reviewed the suppression-hearing testimony of the two foot patrolmen (Officers Bobe and Stone), as well as that of the officer who later arrived at the scene with the drug dog (Officer Wilkinson), we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the factual findings made by the lower court. Accordingly, we may not disturb those findings.

A ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of fact and law, each subject to a different standard of review. United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1115-16 (11th Cir.1991). In the final portion of its order, the trial court addressed questions of law as applied to the facts, the application of which is subject to de novo appellate review. Id. The order states:

The line of cases cited by the parties appear to indicate that a citizen's response to an officer's direction constitutes a submission to authority. The request for the Defendant to remove his hands from his pockets was solely for officer protection without the officer having any articulable suspicion that the Defendant possessed any weapons or contraband or was acting in any threatening manner toward the officers.

The Court reluctantly concludes that the authority cited by counsel is controlling. The parties are encouraged to appeal this decision because the facts in this case may justify a modification of the basic holdings of the appellate authority controlling the decision in this case. It is, therefore,

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Suppress Evidence in this cause is granted with regard to all evidence seized from the ground in front of the Defendant and from his motor vehicle.

(Emphasis in original).

On appeal, the parties disagree over whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the instant facts. The state argues that the lower tribunal misconstrued the law governing the facts, and that the findings in the suppression order are internally inconsistent. Baldwin contends that the Florida cases discussed at the suppression hearing are dispositive and require suppression. Because we agree with the state's position that the conclusions of law are inconsistent with the findings of fact, the order must be reversed.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures." Florida courts are constitutionally required to interpret search and seizure issues in conformity with the federal Fourth Amendment, as construed by the United States Supreme Court. Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.; State v. Butler, 655 So.2d 1123, 1125 (Fla.1995). The High Court has characterized the Fourth Amendment limits of search-and-seizure power as intended "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals," United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3081, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1126 (1976), but "not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry...." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980). In Mendenhall, the Court held that "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d at 509 (emphasis added); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 239 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (seizure occurs where one's freedom of movement has been restrained, either by physical force or show of authority, so that surrounding circumstances demonstrate reasonable person would not have felt free to leave). Thus, the test to determine whether a person has been "seized" by force or a show of authority is an objective test, "not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1551, 113 L.Ed.2d 690, 698 (1991). The "reasonable person" test presupposes an innocent person. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2388, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 400 (1991); Jones v. State, 658 So.2d 178, 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). The Court in Mendenhall stated that factors...