State v. Robinson
Decision Date | 19 March 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-338.,98-338. |
Citation | 740 So.2d 9 |
Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Maurice ROBINSON, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Nancy Daniels, Public Defender; Glen Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
The State of Florida appeals an order granting Maurice Robinson's motion to suppress crack cocaine found in Robinson's pocket during a search by the police.1 The State contends that the trial court (1) misapprehended the law under the United States Constitution and Florida Constitution governing the permissible scope of a police officer's questioning of a citizen, (2) erred in failing to assess the credibility of the two witnesses at the suppression hearing, who gave conflicting accounts of the facts that led to Robinson's arrest; and (3) erred in failing to make a determination as to the material issue of consent. We agree with the State's position that the trial court's application of the wrong test for determining the permissible scope of the deputy's investigation of Robinson, and the court's failure to decide whether Robinson gave consent, constitute reversible error. We reverse the suppression order and remand for further proceedings in light of the standards set forth in this opinion. State v. Luckay, 697 So.2d 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) ( ); State v. Carr, 642 So.2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ( ).
At the suppression hearing, Deputy Custer testified that around 10:45 P.M. on September 11, 1997, he had been in uniform and on routine patrol in a marked cruiser in the neighborhood that he patrolled for approximately one year. A student was assigned to him from the naval photography school and accompanied him in civilian clothes. With the car windows down, the deputy heard a lot of dogs barking and observed Robinson standing outside a fenced yard about ten feet from the road. The dogs were inside the fenced area. Robinson was partially facing the residence, but the deputy did not know whether he was a friend of anyone living there. Being a dog owner himself, the deputy considered the barking to be unusual at that hour of the night. He believed the barking was the dogs' way of defending their own property, and he testified that his dogs do not bark when he returns home. The house appeared to be unlit, and no one seemed to be up. Without activating the blue light or the siren, the deputy pulled off the road, and he and the student exited the vehicle.
Deputy Custer testified further that, while on patrol, he customarily identifies himself and asks an individual how and what he is doing. Custer said that he approached Robinson with his police weapon still holstered. When he asked what Robinson was doing, Robinson replied that he was there to visit a friend. At the hearing, the deputy could not remember whether he had asked for the name of the person whom Robinson purportedly was visiting. The deputy asked for identification, whereupon Robinson produced a Florida driver's license that came back negative for outstanding local warrants. At some point, a man in a wheelchair came out to the front porch. When the deputy asked whether he had anything illegal on him such as a weapon or narcotics, Robinson mentioned that he had a common pocket knife. What happened subsequently was disputed at the suppression hearing.
As to the initial contact with Deputy Custer, Robinson testified that on the night in question, he had been there to see Bobby Knowles, who lived at the residence. Robinson had called out for Bobby to come outside because the dog would not let anyone enter the yard. According to Robinson, only one dog, a chow, was in the Knowles' yard, and the noise was coming from a bunch of Rottweilers located across the street in Mr. Talley's yard. Robinson said that Knowles' brother, who is an invalid, is the man who came out to the front porch. Robinson said that when the deputy asked for identification, Robinson retrieved a driver's license from his billfold but was shaking because of a nervous condition. When the deputy asked why he was nervous, Robinson mentioned the guy who was taking flash photographs of him and Robinson asked what was going on. When the deputy asked about a weapon, Robinson told him about the pocket knife in his pocket. This much of Robinson's testimony is consistent with that of Deputy Custer. The subsequent events are in dispute.
At least up to this point, the contact between Deputy Custer and Robinson was "only minimal." Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized "essentially three levels of police-citizen encounters." Id.
Popple, 626 So.2d at 186. "So long as a reasonable person would feel free `to disregard the police and go about his business,' [citation omitted] the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991)
.2 "An officer may initiate contact with an individual without creating a search and seizure situation." Luckay, 697 So.2d at 222 ( ). Given the body of case law holding that an officer may approach an individual on the street or in another public place and inquire as to his or her reason for being there, and may request to see identification, without triggering constitutional safeguards regarding "seizures," we conclude that under any view of the aforementioned evidence, Deputy Custer's initial contact with Robinson constituted nothing more than a routine and proper police-citizen consensual encounter. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); State v. Baldwin, 686 So.2d 682, 685 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
The trial court made the following remarks during argument of counsel after the witnesses testified at the suppression hearing:
As the State has pointed out, these comments indicate the lower tribunal's misapprehension of the federal and state law governing the circumstances surrounding Deputy Custer's initial contact with Robinson.3 Custer and Robinson offered substantially the same...
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