State v. Bales
| Decision Date | 31 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 98376,SC 98376 |
| Citation | 630 S.W.3d 754 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. James Christopher BALES, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Bales was represented Erica Mynarich, of Carver Cantin & Mynarich, LLC in Springfield, (417) 831-7373.
The state was represented by Sherrie Hamner and Kevin Hillman of the Pulaski county prosecuting attorney's office in Waynseville, (573) 774-4770.
The state appeals the circuit court's order sustaining James Bales's motion to suppress evidence – a cell phone and electronic data stored on that cell phone – purportedly obtained pursuant to the execution of a search warrant. The circuit court found the search warrant failed to describe with sufficient particularity the thing to be seized and was so facially deficient the executing officers could not reasonably have presumed it to be valid. On appeal, the state claims the circuit court erred in suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant because the search warrant was valid and, even if it was not, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply. Because the search warrant commanded officers to search a black Samsung cell phone in a black case located at a particular address, the seizure of a cell phone at the sheriff's office was outside the scope of the warrant, so the evidence was not validly seized. Additionally, the circuit court did not err in finding that the officer conducting the search did not have a good faith basis when he executed the search warrant at the sheriff's office contrary to the clear directions of the search warrant. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in sustaining Mr. Bales's motion to suppress, and its order is affirmed.
On March 17, 2019, Detective Thomas Fenton of the Pulaski County Sheriff's Department, a social worker, and another law enforcement officer went to Mr. Bales's home to investigate potential abuse or neglect of his 22-month-old son, L.B., who had been admitted to the hospital for a head injury
and diagnosed with shaken baby syndrome. When questioned, Mr. Bales claimed L.B. hit his head on the foot of a bed while playing. He said, although L.B. seemed fine after hitting his head, Mr. Bales was awakened in the middle of the night by L.B. banging his head against the wall in the hallway of the home. After Mr. Bales picked L.B. up, he said he immediately put L.B. back down because L.B. threw his body backwards and was "throwing a fit." Mr. Bales said he then grabbed his cell phone to record L.B.’s behavior.
To support his explanation of L.B.’s injury, Mr. Bales showed Detective Fenton and the social worker the video he recorded the night L.B. was injured. It showed L.B. sitting on the floor, rocking back and forth and crying, until he "face-planted," hitting his head on the wooden floor. After that, L.B. went limp and was breathing heavily. When Detective Fenton interviewed Mr. Bales a couple of days later at the sheriff's office, Mr. Bales again showed him the video on his cell phone.
Because Detective Fenton believed the video incriminated Mr. Bales, he sought a search warrant through the prosecuting attorney. In an affidavit he executed to support the prosecuting attorney's application for a search warrant, Detective Fenton stated:
I Detective Thomas Fenton, through my training and experience dealing with Child Abuse and Neglect cases, know that an alleged perpetrator, will video record the child after an incident, ( I found the child this way), or have recorded past incidents of abuse. Send text messages to family and friends, asking questions about the alleged types of abuse. Google different types of Child Abuses [sic] cases, symptoms, and signs of Abuse.
Detective Fenton further stated he believed a phone, described as a "Samsung Galaxy Black in color and belonging to James Christopher Bales[,] [c]urrently at 13251 Highway O Dixon Missouri 65459," contained data "consisting of but not limited to Phone messages, text messages, social media networks, Instagram photos, Facebook messages, passwords to the device, global positioning system coordinates, emails, phone logs, SIM cards, photo galleries, voicemails, or any other evidence pertaining to the crime." (Bolded in original).
An assistant prosecuting attorney filed an application for a search warrant. The application described electronic data and a SIM card as evidence of the crimes of endangering the welfare of a child and abuse or neglect of a child and alleged the evidence was kept in a cell phone located at 13251 Highway O, Dixon, in Pulaski County, Missouri. The description of the cell phone in the warrant application differed from the description in Detective Fenton's affidavit in that the application included the additional detail of the phone number associated with the cell phone but omitted the model. The circuit court issued a search warrant on March 28, 2019 (the "March search warrant"). It did not incorporate the application or affidavit, include the cell phone model or number, or identify Mr. Bales as the owner of the cell phone.
Before the March search warrant was executed, Mr. Bales returned to the sheriff's office for an interview, accompanied by his attorney. He once again attempted to show Detective Fenton the video on his cell phone. While Mr. Bales was searching his cell phone for the video, Detective Fenton informed Mr. Bales and his attorney that he had a search warrant for the cell phone and seized it.
Detective Fenton filed a return of the search warrant that incorrectly stated he had gone to the premises described in the warrant and seized the cell phone after discovering it there. When a police investigator searched the electronic data stored on the cell phone, he found possible evidence of other crimes and applied for a second search warrant. The investigator's affidavit filed to support issuance of a second search warrant stated the cell phone was obtained when Detective Fenton executed the March search warrant. The circuit court issued a second search warrant on May 28, 2019.1
Mr. Bales filed a motion to quash the March search warrant, seeking return of the phone and any electronic data obtained from it. In his motion, Mr. Bales alleged the March search warrant was fatally defective because it lacked particularity in its description of the cell phone and did not authorize retention of the phone. At the hearing on his motion to quash, Mr. Bales reasserted his particularity challenge.
At a hearing on Mr. Bales's motion, the circuit court determined the motion to quash was essentially a motion to suppress and directed the state to proceed with that understanding. When the state called Detective Fenton as a witness, he testified he obtained the March search warrant, believed it was correctly issued, and seized the phone pursuant to the warrant. During cross-examination, Detective Fenton admitted he seized the phone from Mr. Bales at the sheriff's office and not from the location and premises identified in the warrant, which was contrary to his statement in the return and inventory. During argument, the state conceded the March search warrant was not as particular as it could have been but argued there was no doubt the correct phone was seized. Mr. Bales asserted the search warrant failed to describe the phone in a way that differentiated it from any other black Samsung in a black case.
The circuit court found the March search warrant authorized seizure of a cell phone but failed to describe the phone with sufficient particularity because black Samsung cell phones in black cases are ubiquitous. The court also found, while the cell phone was seized "allegedly pursuant to the ... search warrant," its contents were examined before a warrant to search the phone was issued. The court held the March search warrant "failed to adequately describe the thing to be seized and was so facially deficient the executing officers could not reasonably presume it to be valid." It found the search of the cell phone for electronic data occurred prior to issuance of a search warrant authorizing such search, so the court suppressed all evidence obtained during the search of the cell phone as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
The state appealed pursuant to section 547.200.1(3).2 After an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.
When reviewing a circuit court's order on a motion to suppress evidence, "[t]his Court gives deference to the [circuit] court's factual findings but reviews questions of law de novo. " State v. Gaw , 285 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Mo. banc 2009). The state bears the risk of non-persuasion and the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the seizure of evidence was constitutionally proper. Section 542.296.6; State v. Pike , 162 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Mo. banc 2005). All facts and inferences will be viewed in the light most favorable to the circuit court's ruling, and contrary evidence and inferences will be disregarded. State v. Douglass , 544 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Mo. banc 2018).
The question before the Court is whether the circuit court erred in sustaining Mr. Bales's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the March search warrant. On appeal, the state asserts the circuit court erred when it suppressed the evidence obtained from Mr. Bales's phone because the March search warrant was facially valid and described the cell phone with sufficient particularity. The state claims the circuit court further erred in holding the March search warrant was so facially deficient it was unreasonable for the executing officers to believe it was valid, and the evidence Detective Fenton seized was admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because it was reasonable for him to believe the March search warrant was valid.
In support of the circuit court's order, Mr. Bales claims the...
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