Williams v. City of Kinloch
| Decision Date | 13 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | ED 110298 |
| Citation | 657 S.W.3d 236 |
| Parties | Darryl L. WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. CITY OF KINLOCH, and the Board of Aldermen of the City of Kinloch, Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
FOR APPELLANTS: Christopher B. Bent, 111 West Port Plaza Drive, Suite 1025, St. Louis, MO 63146.
FOR RESPONDENT: Donnell Smith, 6101 Delmar Blvd., Suite A, St. Louis, MO 63112.
Appellants City of Kinloch and the Board of Aldermen of the City of Kinloch (collectively, Kinloch) impeached and removed Respondent Darryl L. Williams from the office of Mayor. Williams filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. The circuit court entered judgment reversing Kinloch's decision to impeach and remove Williams. In four points on appeal, including that Williams untimely filed his petition for judicial review, Kinloch urges us to reverse the circuit court's judgment. We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss Williams's petition.
On March 11, 2019, Williams filed his Declaration of Intent to Be a Write-In Candidate for the Office of Mayor for the City of Kinloch with the St. Louis County Election Board (County Election Board). Along with the Declaration, Williams signed a Missouri Department of Revenue Form 5120, or a Candidate's Affidavit of Tax Payments and Bonding Requirements. Pursuant to Section 115.306.2(2),1 by signing and submitting the form, Williams "declare[d] under penalties of perjury that [he was] not currently aware of any delinquency in the filing or payment of any ... personal property taxes ..., as stated on [his] declaration of candidacy."
The same day, the County Election Board notified the City of Kinloch's City Clerk and Election Official (Clerk) of Williams's Declaration. On March 24, 2019, the Clerk informed the County Election Board that Williams was ineligible for candidacy under Sections 115.306 and 561.021 and City of Kinloch Ordinances 2122 and 20159. The Clerk alleged Williams owed personal property taxes for tax years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 and, therefore, perjured himself when he knowingly signed the Affidavit of Tax Payments and Bonding Requirements to the contrary.
The County Election Board took no action regarding Williams's eligibility, and Williams was elected Kinloch's mayor on April 2, 2019. On April 16, 2019, Kinloch informed Williams he was suspended pursuant to the authority vested in the Board of Aldermen by Section 79.240, pending investigation by the Board. Three days later, Kinloch served Williams with three articles of impeachment based on his failure to pay taxes, his affidavit that he paid taxes, and an outstanding traffic warrant. Kinloch informed Williams his impeachment hearing was scheduled for May 17, 2019.
Prior to the impeachment hearing, Williams, through counsel, filed a verified petition in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County against Kinloch for injunctive relief from his suspension and a declaratory judgment that his suspension was void.
On May 17, 2019, the Board of Aldermen held Williams's impeachment hearing. Williams appeared pro se. He offered no evidence, made no objections, and cross-examined no witnesses. The Board unanimously found Williams guilty on all three articles of impeachment. On May 24, 2019, Kinloch issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On the same day, new counsel for Williams entered his appearance in Williams's declaratory judgment action and voluntarily dismissed the petition. In a later deposition, Williams testified that he retained new counsel to look into the impeachment situation, explain the impeachment, represent him on the impeachment, and, if it went further, to continue to represent him and be his attorney regarding the impeachment hearing. Williams responded affirmatively when asked if he wanted this counsel "to handle the entire matter, meaning you wanted him to help you with the impeachment matters as well; do I understand that correctly?" Williams testified that counsel continued to represent him after May 24, 2019 and denied that he fired counsel at any time.
Also on May 24, 2019, Williams's counsel and Kinloch's counsel discussed the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Four days later, on May 28, 2019, Kinloch sent the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law to the business email address of Williams's counsel, reminding him of their prior discussion regarding the Board's decision. This email address was the same email address used in counsel's correspondence with the circuit court.2 The email from Kinloch to Williams's counsel stated: "Please find attached, as discussed briefly in the Court hearing this past May 24th, the Findings Of Fact and Conclusions of Law as it pertains to your client Mr[.] Darryl L. Williams[.]" The email was not returned as undeliverable, nor was there any other indication that Williams's counsel did not receive notice of the Board's decision.
Williams filed a petition in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County for judicial review of his impeachment and removal on July 15, 2019, 48 days after Kinloch sent notice of the Board's decision to Williams's counsel on May 28, 2019. In the petition, Williams nonetheless averred the petition was timely filed within the 30-day filing period in Section 536.110 because: the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law were never served on him; only after a telephone inquiry, the Board emailed the findings of fact and conclusions of law to Williams's counsel on or about June 18, 2019; and on or about June 21, 2019 Williams's counsel received a copy of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, along with exhibits and a partial transcript, via U.S. Mail. With his petition, Williams filed an incomplete transcript of the proceedings before the Board.3
On August 14, 2019, Kinloch filed a motion to dismiss Williams's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Williams failed to timely file the petition. Attached to Kinloch's motion was a copy of the email disclosing the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law to Williams's counsel on May 28, 2019. Williams did not respond to Kinloch's motion. Kinloch later renewed its motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court denied Kinloch's motion to dismiss the petition.
Kinloch also moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 74.04. In its attached statement of uncontroverted material facts, Kinloch stated: counsel represented Williams on May 24, 2019; on that date, Kinloch informed Williams's counsel that it would send notice via email of the Board's decision to impeach Williams; Kinloch sent such notice to the business email address of Williams's counsel on May 28, 2019; counsel continued representing Williams without interruption after May 24, 2019; and Williams untimely filed his petition for judicial review of the Board's decision on July 15, 2019. Kinloch supported its statement of uncontroverted material facts with citations to Williams's deposition, the May 28, 2019 email from Kinloch to Williams's counsel, and other exhibits. There is no indication in the record that Williams responded to Kinloch's motion for summary judgment as required by Rule 74.04(c)(2).4 Despite Williams's apparent failure to respond, the circuit court denied Kinloch's motion for summary judgment.
After a brief hearing at which the parties stipulated to the contents of the record, the circuit court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment reversing the Board's impeachment and removal of Williams.
Kinloch appeals. Williams has not filed a brief or otherwise responded on appeal.5
In its four points on appeal, Kinloch argues the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because Williams untimely filed his petition for judicial review, Williams failed to file the transcript of the impeachment proceedings, the circuit court erred in failing to deem admitted Kinloch's statement of uncontroverted material facts, and the circuit court erred in concluding Williams's impeachment and removal were not supported by competent and substantial evidence.
Kinloch's first point is dispositive. Williams failed to file his petition for judicial review within the 30-day filing period in Section 536.110, and the circuit court lacked authority to consider the petition. We need not address the merits of Kinloch's other three points on appeal.
Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not considered a final judgment and therefore is not appealable. State ex rel. Hawley v. Robinson , 577 S.W.3d 823, 829 n.5 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (citing In re O.J.B. , 436 S.W.3d 726, 728 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) ). That said, the denial of a motion to dismiss can be considered on appeal from a final judgment. Robinson , 577 S.W.3d at 829 n.5.
When a circuit court grants a motion to dismiss, we review de novo. Giudicy v. Mercy Hosps. E. Communities , 645 S.W.3d 492, 496 (Mo. banc 2022). But when the court denies a motion to dismiss, our standard of review depends upon the grounds for dismissal raised in the motion. See Forbes v. Allison , 646 S.W.3d 733, 738 n.5 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022) (). Here, we apply de novo review because Kinloch's motion was grounded in a question of law: whether the circuit court lacked jurisdiction or authority to review Williams's petition. Karrenbrock Constr., Inc. v. Saab Auto Sales & Leasing, Inc. , 540 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).
Chapter 536 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri governs Administrative Procedure and Review. Section 536.090 of that chapter requires, "Immediately upon deciding any contested case the agency shall give written notice of its decision by delivering or mailing such...
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City of Kan. City v. Troyer
...Commerce Clause. The denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final judgment and 5 is thus not appealable. Williams v. City of Kinloch, 657 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022). However, a party may challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss on an appeal from a final judgment. Id. Our review......