State v. Banks

• Decision Date: 05 March 1940
• Docket Number: 45003.
• Citation: 290 N.W. 534,227 Iowa 1208
• Parties: STATE v. BANKS.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

290 N.W. 534

227 Iowa 1208

STATE v. BANKS.

No. 45003.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 5, 1940

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Joseph E. Meyer, Judge.

Defendant was indicted for the crime of rape of a female child under the age of sixteen years. There was a plea of not guilty trial, conviction and sentence. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Carl E. Patterson and Ted E. Hartung, both of Des Moines, for appellant.

Fred D. Everett, Atty. Gen., Jens Grothe, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Francis J. Kuble, Co. Atty., of Des Moines, for appellee.

MILLER, Justice.

Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to an indictment, accusing him of having raped a female child under the age of sixteen years. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Motion for new trial was overruled and defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary at Anamosa for a period of not more than fifteen years. Defendant appeals therefrom.

One of appellant's contentions is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty and that the court erred in overruling his motion for a directed verdict and the motion for a new trial, each being based upon such contention. The prosecutrix testified to the perpetration of the offense, and all the necessary details thereof. The testimony of her parents established her age as fourteen years at the time. The only additional evidence necessary was corroboration of prosecutrix, required by Section 13900 of the Code, 1935, tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.

In the case of State v. Grimm, 212 Iowa 1193, 1195, 237 N.W. 451, 452, we state:

" It is a settled rule in this state that the testimony of the prosecutrix alone is sufficient to prove that a rape had been committed on her. The last expression of the court on this matter is in State v. Speck, 202 Iowa 732 210 N.W. 913.But this does not, in itself, make a case for the state. Her testimony must be corroborated. Section 13900, Code 1927, provides as to the crimes of this character, the defendant ‘ can not be convicted upon the testimony of the person injured, unless she be corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.’

It is to be noted here that the corroboration required is not a corroboration of the testatrix' testimony as to the fact that rape has been committed on her, but when she testifies that the defendant is the man who perpetrated the crime, she must be corroborated in this respect. In other words, the corroboration required is such testimony, as, aside from the testimony of the prosecutrix, points to the defendant as the guilty party. Her saying that he is the party is not sufficient. Aside from her testimony, there must be other and outside testimony which points out the defendant as the guilty party. State v. Robinson, 170 Iowa 267, 152 N.W. 590; State v. Kessler, 189 Iowa 567, 178 N.W. 513; State v. Speck, 202 Iowa 732, 210 N.W. 913, and cases therein cited."

To the same effect, see State v. Diggins, Iowa, 288 N.W. 640, and cases therein cited. Accordingly, our inquiry is limited to that testimony, other than that of prosecutrix, which tends to connect defendant with the commission of the offense. The sheriff testified that defendant admitted having intercourse with prosecutrix on two occasions and that, in the presence of himself and two of his deputies, defendant signed a written confession to that effect. The confession was introduced in evidence. The testimony of the sheriff and the deputies was to the effect that the confession was made voluntarily and without improper promises or threats being made. The defendant did not deny that he made such statements to the sheriff and signed the confession nor did he introduce any evidence disputing that of the sheriff and his deputies concerning the manner in which the confession was obtained. The abstract shows no objection to its introduction in evidence. The evidence was clearly sufficient to meet the requirements of Section 13900 of the Code.

The defendant did deny that he had intercourse with the prosecutrix and her testimony was at times uncertain and conflicting. However, the credibility of the witnesses was for the jury to determine. As we have often said, it is neither our duty nor privilege to determine the facts, but solely to decide what the jury was warranted in finding them to be. There is no merit in the appellant's contentions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.

Appellant urges numerous complaints regarding the court's instructions to the jury. We doubt that any of them are stated in such manner as to merit our consideration. Nevertheless, we have carefully examined all of the court's instructions and have considered all of appellant's...