State v. Barela

• Decision Date: 16 November 2020
• Docket Number: NO. S-1-SC-37301,S-1-SC-37301
• Citation: 478 P.3d 875
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James Edward BARELA, Defendant-Petitioner.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

478 P.3d 875

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.James Edward BARELA, Defendant-Petitioner.

NO. S-1-SC-37301

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: November 16, 2020

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, William A. O'Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Charles J. Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent

OPINION

BACON, Justice.

{1} This case asks us to decide whether a sentence can be enhanced under the Habitual Offender Act,¹ NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-17 (2003) ("Habitual offenders; alteration of basic sentence"), when a defendant is convicted of felony battery against a household member, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-17(A) (2008). Concluding that the Habitual Offender Act can be applied when a defendant is convicted of felony battery against a household member, we affirm Defendant James Barela's sentence. This conclusion is premised on two factors. First, the plain language of Sections 30-3-17(A) and 31-18-17 is unambiguous and does not preclude both statutes from operating simultaneously. Second, because felony battery against a household member and felony driving while intoxicated (DWI) are distinguishable, we decline to apply the reasoning of State v. Anaya , 1997-NMSC-010, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant was convicted of felony battery against a household member after battering the mother of his child and other crimes. Prior to trial, Defendant pleaded guilty to battery against a household member and proceeded to sentencing. As this was Defendant's third conviction of battery against a household member, the district court enhanced his conviction to a fourth-degree felony under Section 30-3-17(A). Section 30-3-17(A) states, in pertinent part, that "[w]hoever commits three offenses of battery against a household member ... when the household member is ... a co-parent of a child ... is guilty of a fourth-degree felony." Additionally, as Defendant had previously been convicted of a separate felony, the district court enhanced his sentence by one year under the Habitual Offender Act. The Habitual Offender Act generally provides that upon conviction of a noncapital felony, a defendant's sentence shall be increased by one year when that defendant has one prior felony conviction. Section 31-18-17(A). Defendant appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeals, arguing that because felony battery against a household member is a felony only by virtue of multiple convictions—in other words, a self-enhancing felony—it is not subject to further enhancement under the Habitual Offender Act. State v. Barela , 2019-NMCA-005, ¶ 1, 458 P.3d 501, cert. granted (S-1-SC-37301, Nov. 5, 2018). His appeal was premised on this Court's reasoning in Anaya , 1997-NMSC-010, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223. In Anaya , we held that defendants convicted of felony DWI under NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(G) (1993, amended 2016), also a self-enhancing felony, are not subject to the Habitual Offender Act. Anaya , 1997-NMSC-010, ¶ 33, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223.

{3} Recognizing this holding in Anaya , the Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, distinguished felony battery against a household member from felony DWI and held that the enhanced conviction of felony battery against a household member under Section 30-3-17(A) could serve as an underlying felony under the Habitual Offender Act. Barela , 2019-NMCA-005, ¶¶ 9-11, 458 P.3d 501. In response, Defendant petitioned this Court for certiorari, which we granted pursuant to Rule 12-502 NMRA.

{4} Agreeing with the result, but not necessarily the reasoning, we affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that felony battery against a household member can serve as an underlying felony for purposes of applying the Habitual Offender Act. This conclusion is premised on (1) the plain language of the statutes at issue and (2) our rejection of Defendant's argument that Anaya ’s holding precludes application of the Habitual Offender Act when one of the underlying convictions is felony battery against a household member.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Plain Language of Sections 30-3-17(A) and 31-18-17 Does Not Preclude Their Simultaneous Application

1. Standard of review

{5} This case presents an issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo. See State v. Tafoya , 2010-NMSC-019, ¶ 9, 148 N.M. 391, 237 P.3d 693 ("When an appeal presents an issue of statutory construction, our review is de novo."). Through such construction, our duty is to facilitate the intent and purpose of the Legislature. State v. Smith , 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 8, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022.

{6} We first look to the language contained within the text of the statute. Id. ¶ 9. Consistent with the plain meaning rule, when a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we "give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." State v. Rivera , 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We do, however, hesitate to apply the literal interpretation of a statute if such application would lead to results that are "absurd, unreasonable, or otherwise inappropriate." Id. ¶ 13. "In considering the statute's function in relation to related statutes passed by the Legislature, whenever possible ... we must read different legislative enactments as harmonious instead of as contradicting one another." Id. (omission in original) (brackets omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2. Sections 30-3-17(A) and 31-18-17 are unambiguous and can apply simultaneously

{7} "Battery against a household member," NMSA 1978, § 30-3-15 (2008), is a misdemeanor. Section 30-3-17(A) elevates a third offense of battery against a household member to a fourth-degree felony. Section 30-3-17(A) states, in pertinent part, that "[w]hoever commits three offenses of battery against a household member ... when the household member is a spouse, a former spouse, a co-parent of a child or a person with whom the offender has had a continuing personal relationship is guilty of a fourth-degree felony." Further, any defendant convicted of four or more offenses of battery against such a household member is guilty of a third-degree felony. Section 30-3-17(B). The statute is silent on sentencing and instead simply classifies multiple convictions as two escalated classes of felonies.

{8} The Habitual Offender Act states, in pertinent part, that

[a] person convicted of a noncapital felony in this state whether within the Criminal Code or the Controlled Substances Act or not who has incurred one prior felony conviction that was part of a separate transaction or occurrence is a habitual offender and his basic sentence shall be increased by one year.

Section 31-18-17(A). The statute clarifies that a "prior felony conviction" is "a conviction ... for a prior felony committed within New Mexico whether within the Criminal Code or not, but not including a conviction for a felony pursuant to the provisions of Section 66-8-102 [felony DWI]." Section 31-18-17(D)(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, at sentencing for a felony conviction, the Habitual Offender Act "shall be" applied to a defendant with a prior felony conviction as long as that conviction is not a felony DWI. See § 31-18-17(A), (D)(1).

{9} Defendant argues that the Legislature's silence as to the Habitual Offender Act's applicability to felony battery against a household member is conclusive that the Legislature did not intend for the Habitual Offender Act to apply. Because the Legislature enacted the felony battery against a household member statute in 2008, more than ten years after Anaya was decided, Defendant claims that the Legislature's silence must have been intentional. In support of this argument, Defendant cites Aguilera v. Bd. of Educ. of Hatch Valley Schs. , 2006-NMSC-015, ¶ 24, 139 N.M. 330, 132 P.3d 587, for the proposition that this Court presumes the Legislature is aware of existing law of the appellate courts. Presuming the Legislature was aware of Anaya ’s holding when it enacted the felony battery against a household member statute, Defendant asserts that the Legislature would have explicitly stated its intention for the Habitual Offender Act to apply.

{10} The State responds that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the plain language reading of both statutes at issue unambiguously resolves the question of whether the Habitual Offender Act applies to felony battery against a household member. This resolution, the State asserts, supports application of the Habitual Offender Act to felony battery against a household member.

{11} The Court of Appeals concluded that "[b]ased on the language in these statutes," the district court did not err in enhancing Defendant's sentence. Barela , 2019-NMCA-005, ¶ 5, 458 P.3d 501. We agree with the Court of Appeals and the State, and we conclude that the plain language of the statutes does not prohibit Defendant's sentence enhancement.

{12} We determine, construing the statutes harmoniously, that no conflict exists when applying both statutes simultaneously. The justification for this conclusion is twofold. First, the felony battery against a household member statute includes no indication that the Legislature intended sentencing for felony battery against a household member to be different from any other felony. If the Legislature intended for convictions of felony battery against a household member to be treated as misdemeanors at sentencing, the Legislature would have so specified, in which case enhancing a third conviction of battery against a household member to a felony would carry less weight than a felony conviction ordinarily carries. Presumably, the intent of the Legislature was to deter defendants who continue to commit this same crime by subjecting them to harsher penalties. See State v. Yparrea , 1992-NMCA-128, ¶¶ 9-10, 114 N.M. 805, 845 P.2d 1259 (recognizing that an increased...