State v. Barge

• Decision Date: 15 January 1901
• Citation: 82 Minn. 256,84 N.W. 911
• Parties: STATE v. BARGE.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

82 Minn. 256

84 N.W. 911

STATE

v.BARGE.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 15, 1901.

Appeal from municipal court of Minneapolis; W. A. Kerr and Andrew Holt, Judges.

Jacob Barge was convicted of violating a city ordinance. From an order denying a new trial, and from the judgment, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

An ordinance of the city of Minneapolis relating to stalls, booths, or other inclosures in saloons construed, and held:

1. The city council had legislative authority, in its discretion, to enact the ordinance.

2. Courts have no power to declare an ordinance void because it is unreasonable, unless its unreasonableness is so clear as to indicate a mere arbitrary exercise of the power vested in the council.

3. An ordinance, like a statute, may be subject to implied exceptions, founded in the rules of public policy and the maxims of natural justice, so as to avoid absurd and unjust consequences.

4. This ordinance forbids the keeping of any inclosure in, or connected with, any room wherein intoxicating liquors may be sold by a licensed dealer, which is or can, by any ingenuity or pretense, be used as a lounging or drinking place, or for any immoral purpose; that, so construed and limited, the ordinance is not unreasonable, but valid.

5. The evidence sustains the judgment convicting the defendant of a violation of the ordinance. W. E. Dodge, Rome G. Brown, Charles S. Albert, and Henry Gjertsen, for appellant.

H. D. Dickinson, Emanuel Cohen, and Frank Healy, for the State.

START, C. J.

The common council of the city of Minneapolis is given, by the charter of the city, power to ‘license and regulate * * * all persons vending, dealing in or disposing of spirituous, vinous, fermented or malt liquors'; also, ‘full power and authority to make, ordain, publish, enforce, amend or repeal all such ordinances for the government and the general order of the city, for the suppression of vice and intemperance, and for the pervention of crime, as it shall deem expedient.’ City Charter, pp. 47, 48. On April 13, 1900, the common council of the city passed an ordinance, the here material parts of which are these: ‘An ordinance regulating all persons vending, dealing in or disposing of spirituous, vinous, fermented or malt liquor in the city of Minneapolis. The city council of the city of Minneapolis do ordain as follows: Section 1. No licensed liquor dealer shall construct, build or maintain with screens, curtains or partitions of any kind, any stall, booth or other inclosure of any kind in or connected with any room or place in any building wherein and kind of intoxicating liquor is sold or disposed of by such licensed liquor dealer in the city of Minneapolis: provided, that nothing in this ordinance contained shall be construed to mean that a screen or partition cannot be maintained on the inside of the front door or entrance of a saloon or barroom.’ Section 2 provides the punishment for a violation of the ordinance. Section 3 declares that the ordinance shall be in force from and after July 2, 1900. The defendant was on September 7, 1900, by the municipal court of Minneapolis, found guilty of a violation of this ordinance upon a complaint that the defendant did unlawfully ‘maintain, with board partitions, an inclosure commonly called a stall, booth, or wine room, in and connected with a room wherein intoxicating liquor was then and there sold and disposed of by him, he being then and there a licensed liquor dealer under the ordinance of the city, the room being then and there what is commonly called a barroom or saloon.’ The defendant made a motion for a new trial, which was denied, and judgment convicting him of the offense, and imposing upon him a fine of $25, was entered against him, and he appealed from the order and the judgment.

1. The defendant's contention first to be considered is to the effect that the city council was not authorized by the legislature to pass the ordinance in question. It the ordinance is not unreasonable, there can be no serious question as to the power of the council to enact it, and we hold the council was authorized, in its discretion, to enact the ordinance. The express legislative authority to ‘license and regulate * * * all persons vending, dealing in or disposing of spirituous, vinous, fermented or malt liquors' carries with it, by necessary implication, authority to the city council to regulate, by ordinance, the traffic in intoxicating liquors, and to impose upon it, and all persons engaged in it, such reasonable conditions and restrictions as to the time, place, and manner the business may be conducted as the council may deem necessary or expedient to conserve the peace, order, and morals of the city. City of St. Paul v. Troyer, 3 Minn. 295 (Gil. 200); State v. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202;In re Wilson, 32 Minn. 145, 19 N. W. 723. In reaching this conclusion, we have not overlooked Sp. Laws 1887, c. 13, prohibiting the licensing of the traffic in intoxicating liquors within certain specified territory of the city of Minneapolis. This statute in no manner limits the power of the council previously granted to regulate the traffic outside of the prohibited district.

2. The defendant also contended that the ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable; hence it is void. Courts have no power to declare an ordinance void for the reason urged, unless its unreasonableness is so clear, manifest, and undoubted as to amount to a mere arbitrary exercise of the power vested in the legislative body. Knobloch v. Railway Co., 31 Minn. 402, 18 N. W. 106. Now, in order to determine whether the ordinance in question is unreasonable within this rule, it is necessary first to find out what it means; that is, construe it. Ordinances, like statutes, must be construed in a reasonable and common-sense way, so as to give...