State v. Barksdale, 1967
| Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
| Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM |
| Citation | 311 S.C. 210,428 S.E.2d 498 |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Timothy BARKSDALE, Stanley B. Montgomery, William Hall, Charles B. McKinney, Antonio Wakefield, and William M. Thomason, Defendants, of whom Stanley B. Montgomery is, Appellant. Appeal of Stanley B. MONTGOMERY. The STATE, Respondent, v. Timothy BARKSDALE, Stanley B. Montgomery, William Hall, Charles B. McKinney, Antonio Wakefield, and William M. Thomason, Defendants, of whom Charles B. McKinney is, Appellant. Appeal of Charles B. McKINNEY. . Heard |
| Docket Number | No. 1967,1967 |
| Decision Date | 18 January 1993 |
Page 498
v.
Timothy BARKSDALE, Stanley B. Montgomery, William Hall,
Charles B. McKinney, Antonio Wakefield, and
William M. Thomason, Defendants,
of whom Stanley B. Montgomery is, Appellant.
Appeal of Stanley B. MONTGOMERY.
The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Timothy BARKSDALE, Stanley B. Montgomery, William Hall,
Charles B. McKinney, Antonio Wakefield, and
William M. Thomason, Defendants,
of whom Charles B. McKinney is, Appellant.
Appeal of Charles B. McKINNEY.
Decided March 15, 1993.
Rehearing Denied April 13, 1993.
Certiorari Denied Oct. 21, 1993.
Page 499
[311 S.C. 211] Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, Asst. Attys. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr. and Alexandria B. Skinner, Columbia, and Sol. Joseph J. Watson, Greenville, for respondent.
Asst. Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, James R. Mann, Greenville, and the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellants.
PER CURIAM:
Stanley B. Montgomery and Charles B. McKinney, the appellants, and four co-defendants were tried jointly for the crimes of lynching in the first degree in the death of James Greggs and lynching in the second degree in the assault on [311 S.C. 212] Fred McAlister. The jury found all defendants innocent of second degree lynching. Montgomery and McKinney were found guilty of first degree lynching. 1 Both were sentenced to a term of 35 years imprisonment. We affirm as to both appellants.
Both appellants argue the trial court erred in (1) not directing verdicts to the charge of lynching in the first degree, (2) its instruction on the requisite intent to prove them guilty as members of a mob, and (3) refusing to recharge the jury on the definition of a mob. Additionally, McKinney argues the court erred in (1) charging self-defense, and (2) associating its charge on mutual combat with its charge on self-defense.
The appellants were involved in an altercation at a club in Greenville named Dazzlers. Fred McAlister, Gary Blassingame, and the victim, James Greggs, drove to the club together around 1:30 A.M. to meet girls. They parked in a lot near the club and walked to the club. Blassingame went inside the club while McAlister and Greggs stood outside. Meanwhile, the appellants and their co-defendants arrived at the club. Co-defendants Wakefield and Hall engaged in a confrontation with McAlister. Greggs and Darrin Davis intervened and stopped the confrontation.
Having averted this confrontation, McAlister and Greggs decided to leave. Because their car would not start, they stood near it, waiting for Blassingame to exit the club. Although the appellants and their co-defendants started to leave, they decided to return and fight with McAlister and Greggs. All of the defendants except Montgomery began fighting Greggs and McAlister. Blassingame pulled Wakefield and Hall off McAlister, who went to the car and tried to start it again. Meanwhile,
Page 500
Greggs was fighting with Thomason, McKinney, and Barksdale. Somehow Greggs broke free and went to the car where he retrieved a car jack, which he began swinging. Although several of the defendants claimed Greggs struck them with the tire jack, the State's forensic expert found no trace of blood, skin, or hair on the jack.As McAlister continued to try to start his car, he heard Thomason say, "[c]ome on, come on, I'm going to get him [311 S.C. 213] [Greggs]." Thomason grabbed Greggs by the legs and threw him to the ground. As Hall and McKinney prevented McAlister from aiding Greggs, the others, except Montgomery, kicked and struck Greggs with objects; Montgomery picked up a small log and hurled it against the back of Greggs' head. Also, Greggs' head struck a car. As Greggs lay on the ground, Wakefield spat on him and cursed him. Because Greggs was still moving, McKinney kicked him again. The appellants and their co-defendants left in their car. McAlister received several bruises and lacerations.
McAlister recovered from his injuries. Greggs died the next day. The pathologist testified Greggs died from multiple injuries caused by blunt trauma to the head. He had two skull fractures and severe brain damage. His face looked like it had been scrubbed with sandpaper.
MONTGOMERY'S AND McKINNEY'S APPEAL
The crime of lynching in the first degree is defined in S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-210 as "[a]ny act of violence inflicted by a mob upon the body of another person which results in the death of the person...." To constitute the crime of lynching, the death must have been inflicted by a mob. A mob is defined in § 16-3-230 as the "assemblage of two or more persons, without color or authority of law, for the premeditated purpose and with the premeditated intent of committing an act of violence upon the person of another." In cases of lynching, a mob has been equated to an "unlawful assemblage of persons." Cantey v. Clarendon County, 101 S.C. 141, 143, 85 S.E. 228, 229 (1915).
Although lynching is a statutory crime, 2 legal scholars analyzing the closely analogous common law crime of riot have fully explored the degree of intent required to prove crimes involving intentional violence by a group toward the person of another. " 'Mob' has been held to be practically synonymous with 'riot' and 'riotous assembly.' " 58 C.J.S. Mob p. 837 (1948); Black's Law Dictionary 905 (5th ed. 1979); see also S.C.Code Ann. §§ 16-5-10 to -140 ("mob" and "riot" are used interchangeably throughout Chapter 5). Our Supreme Court has defined riot as:
[311 S.C. 214] [A] tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons assembled together of their own authority, with the intent mutually to assist each other against anyone who shall oppose them, and putting their design into execution in a terrific and violent manner, whether the object was lawful or not.
State v. Albert, 257 S.C. 131, 134, 184 S.E.2d 605, 607 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966, 93 S.Ct. 278, 34 L.Ed.2d 231 (1972).
In riot cases, the state must show...
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State v. Watts, 2454
...conjecture or speculate Page 275 as to the accused's guilt. State v. Brown, 267 S.C. 311, 227 S.E.2d 674 (1976); State v. Barksdale, 311 S.C. 210, 428 S.E.2d 498 (Ct.App.1993). However, if the State presents any substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which reasonably tends t......
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State v. Peer, 2444
...jury to merely conjecture or speculate as to the accused's guilt. State v. Brown, 267 S.C. 311, 227 S.E.2d 674 (1976); State v. Barksdale, 311 S.C. 210, 428 S.E.2d 498 (Ct.App.1993). However, if the State presents any substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which reasonably t......
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Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., HI-RANGE
...See Manning v. Dial, 271 S.C. 79, 245 S.E.2d 120 (1978); Dickard v. Merritt, 256 S.C. 458, 182 S.E.2d 886 (1971); State v. Barksdale, 311 S.C. 210, 428 S.E.2d 498 Bragg's proposed charges 19, 20, and 23 related to the defenses asserted by Hi-Ranger of assumption of the risk, contributory ne......
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Robinson v. Reynolds, CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:15-3382-JFA-BM
...been equated to an "unlawful assemblage of persons." Cantey v. Clarendon County, 85 S.E. 228, 229 (1915); see also State v. Barksdale, 428 S.E.2d 498, 500 (S.C.Ct.App. 1993). Conversely, murder is "the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied." S.C. Code Ann......
-
State v. Watts, 2454
...conjecture or speculate Page 275 as to the accused's guilt. State v. Brown, 267 S.C. 311, 227 S.E.2d 674 (1976); State v. Barksdale, 311 S.C. 210, 428 S.E.2d 498 (Ct.App.1993). However, if the State presents any substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which reasonably tends t......
-
State v. Peer, 2444
...jury to merely conjecture or speculate as to the accused's guilt. State v. Brown, 267 S.C. 311, 227 S.E.2d 674 (1976); State v. Barksdale, 311 S.C. 210, 428 S.E.2d 498 (Ct.App.1993). However, if the State presents any substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which reasonably t......
-
Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., HI-RANGE
...See Manning v. Dial, 271 S.C. 79, 245 S.E.2d 120 (1978); Dickard v. Merritt, 256 S.C. 458, 182 S.E.2d 886 (1971); State v. Barksdale, 311 S.C. 210, 428 S.E.2d 498 Bragg's proposed charges 19, 20, and 23 related to the defenses asserted by Hi-Ranger of assumption of the risk, contributory ne......
-
Robinson v. Reynolds, CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:15-3382-JFA-BM
...been equated to an "unlawful assemblage of persons." Cantey v. Clarendon County, 85 S.E. 228, 229 (1915); see also State v. Barksdale, 428 S.E.2d 498, 500 (S.C.Ct.App. 1993). Conversely, murder is "the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied." S.C. Code Ann......