State v. Barnes
| Decision Date | 30 May 1888 |
| Citation | 24 Fla. 153,4 So. 560 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. OWENS v. BARNES, Comptroller. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Motion for mandamus.
Syllabus by the Court
While in its ordinary sense, the word 'conviction' is used to indicate the ascertainment of the guilt of a prisoner by his plea of guilty, or by the verdict of a jury, it is often used in a broader sense, to include the sentence or judgment of the court.
It is used in this broader sense in section 2 of the act of 1883 c. 3459, in relation to 'conviction fees' of state attorneys; and the 'conviction fees' of county solicitors, as prescribed by the act of 1887, c. 3731, s 14 being the same paid to state attorneys in like cases, and to be paid in like manner, has the same meaning as in the former act.
Neither a state attorney nor a county solicitor is entitled, under these acts, to payment of a conviction fee by the state until after sentence of the court against the person convicted, and the failure of such person to pay the same, and a return of the sheriff that he has no goods of chattels out of which the same can be made. The last clause of section 14 c. 3731, does not remove these requirements.
COUNSEL A. W. Owens, for motion.
The Attorney General, contra.
This is an original proceeding for mandamus, in which the relator sets forth that, as county solicitor for the criminal court of record for Duval county, he filed at the February term 1888, three several informations,--one against Dave Holmes, charging him with gambling in a gambling-house, one against Joseph Welch, charging him with vagrancy, and the third against George White, charging him with trespass with malicious intent; that Holmes pleaded guilty, whereupon the court ordered that sentence be suspended upon payment of costs by him; that Welch also pleaded guilty, and the court simply ordered that sentence be suspended; and that White was tried and convicted by verdict, but the court set the verdict aside and granted him a new trial. The clerk of the court gave a certificate that the said parties have been convicted in the said court of the offenses charged against them, and that they have not paid the conviction fees of the relator, and that the sheriff of the county has made return that said defendants have not sufficient goods and chattels from which said fees can be made. Said certificates having been presented to the respondent as comptroller, and demand made that he should audit the same, he refused to do so; wherefore relator prays for a writ of mandamus commanding said comptroller forthwith to audit the claim. Upon motion for the writ, respondent resists, on the ground that the relator is not entitled to conviction fees in the cases mentioned, as those cases now stand, according to the facts of the petition.
No objection having been interposed to the proceeding because of its purpose to control the discretion of the comptroller, we understand that each objection is waived, and we proceed to consider the case on that understanding. The only question we have to decide is whether the relator was entitled to conviction fees from the state before final disposition of the cases by sentence or judgment. Section 14 c. 3731, Acts 1887, provides that 'the county solicitors shall be paid three dollars per diem, and receive the same conviction fees that are now paid to the state's attorneys in like cases to be paid quarterly by the state, in like manner as the per diem and conviction fees of the state's attorneys are now paid; and the said conviction fees shall be paid in cases when new trials are granted, and appeals taken, the same as in other cases of convictions.' The act of 1883, c. 3459, fixes the conviction fees of state attorneys; and the relator contends that the term 'conviction' means the ascertainment of the guilt of a party, either by a plea of guilty, or by the verdict of a jury. In its ordinary sense, and perhaps technically correct sense, that is its meaning. The law dictionaries so give it. Blackstone (book 4, p. 362) says 'If the jury find [the prisoner] guilty he is then said to be convicted of the crime whereof he stands indicted; which conviction may be in two ways,--either by his confessing the offense and pleading guilty, or by his being found so by the verdict of his country.' In Com. v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323, it is said: 'The ordinary legal meaning of 'conviction,' when used to designate a particular stage of a criminal prosecution triable by a jury, is the confession of the accused in open court, or the verdict returned against him by the jury, which ascertains and publishes the fact of his guilt; while judgment or sentence is the appropriate word to denote the action of the court before which the trial is had, declaring the consequences to the convict of the fact thus ascertained.' There are numerous other authorities to the same effect, some of which are cited in this case, but it is needless to multiply them here. On the other hand, there are numerous authorities that hold the judgment or sentence to be a necessary component part of 'conviction,' that is, that the use of a word in a constitution or statute or judicial decisions may be in such connection as to show that judgment or sentence was to be included in it. This is admitted in the case of Com. v. Lockwood, supra, in which Judge GREY says: 'When, indeed, the word 'conviction' is used to describe the effect of the guilt of the accused, as judicially proved in one case, when pleaded or given in evidence in another, it is sometimes used in a more comprehensive sense, including the judgment of the court.' In Smith v. Com. 14 Serg. & R. 69, the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life on a charge of having committed a second burglary. The statute under which he was indicted provided 'that if a man shall commit burglary a second time, and be thereof legally convicted, he shall be sentenced to undergo imprisonment * * * at hard labor during life.' The indictment charged that he was convicted on a former indictment, and the court gave judgment. It was held...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Patel
...evidence of intent to apply the secondary meaning. See, e.g., Ex parte Brown, 68 Cal. 176, 178–82, 8 P. 829 (1885) ; State v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 153, 157–62, 4 So. 560 (1888) ; Hamilton v. Auditor, 53 Ky. 230, 185–86 (1853) ; Blair v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. (25 Gratt). 850, 852–59 (1874).The his......
-
United States v. Clarke
...“conviction” as encompassing a guilty plea or verdict of guilty along with a judgment by the court. Over one hundred years ago, this Court in Barnes observed that in its “ordinary sense,” the term “ ‘conviction’ means the ascertainment of the guilt of a party, either by a plea of guilty, or......
-
State of La. v. Dedrick JerMe. JONES
...“means the ascertainment of the guilt of a party, either by a plea of guilty, or by the verdict of a jury.” State ex rel. Owens v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 153, 4 So. 560, 561 (1888). The supreme court also recognized that “numerous authorities” held that a “judgment or sentence [was] a necessary co......
-
State Of La. v. Dedrick Jerme. Jones
..."means the ascertainment of the guilt of a party, either by a plea of guilty, or by the verdict of a jury." State ex rel. Owens v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 153, 4 So. 560, 561 (1888). The supreme court also recognized that "numerous authorities" held that a "judgment or sentence [was] a necessary co......