State v. Barnes
Decision Date | 02 February 2022 |
Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2020-001230,Opinion No. 28081 |
Citation | 436 S.C. 202,871 S.E.2d 421 |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Steven Louis BARNES, Petitioner. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard III, of Lexington, all for Respondent.
Steven Barnes killed Samuel Sturrup on September 3, 2001. In 2010, a jury convicted Barnes of murder and sentenced him to death. In 2014, this Court reversed his convictions. State v. Barnes , 407 S.C. 27, 753 S.E.2d 545 (2014). On remand, the State continued to seek the death penalty. See State v. Barnes , 413 S.C. 1, 3, 774 S.E.2d 454, 455 (2015) ( Barnes II ) ( ). Eventually, however, the State dismissed the death notice and set his case for trial. Barnes filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss, alleging his right to a speedy trial was violated. The trial court denied the motion. A jury convicted Barnes of murder again in 2017, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison.
In a thorough opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Barnes' speedy trial motion. State v. Barnes , 431 S.C. 66, 91, 846 S.E.2d 389, 402 (Ct. App. 2020) ( Barnes III ). The court of appeals conducted a lengthy analysis of the factors the Supreme Court of the United States identified for consideration of a speedy trial claim in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530-32, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192-93, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 117-18 (1972), and which this Court repeatedly uses to analyze claims of a speedy trial violation, see, e.g. , State v. Hunsberger , 418 S.C. 335, 343, 794 S.E.2d 368, 372 (2016) ( ); State v. Foster , 260 S.C. 511, 513-14, 197 S.E.2d 280, 281 (1973) (same). Barnes III , 431 S.C. at 80-91, 846 S.E.2d at 396-402. While we agree with the court of appeals' analysis and ultimate decision to affirm, we grant certiorari to address one narrow point in the court of appeals' discussion of the second factor—the reason for the delay. We dispense with briefing and affirm as modified.
Analyzing the second factor, courts evaluate the reason for each specific period of delay and determine whether the reason weighs against the State, should be considered as "neutral" or "valid," or weighs against the defendant. See Hunsberger , 418 S.C. at 346, 794 S.E.2d at 374 ( ); see also Barker , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 117 .
Barnes III , 431 S.C. at 86, 846 S.E.2d at 399.
While we agree with the court of appeals that this period of delay should not be attributed to the State, we do not agree it "must be attributed to Barnes."
McGuire did not fail to act on Barnes' behalf;2 rather, he was under an order of protection that authorized him to focus on his representation of another client, presumably so the other client's case could be brought to trial in a timely manner. Additionally, during this period the State was still seeking the death penalty against Barnes. The State did not...
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