State v. Barnett, 3751.

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: HOWARD, J.
• Citation: 358 S.C. 199,594 S.E.2d 534
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. John BARNETT, Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 3751.,3751.
• Decision Date: 08 March 2004

358 S.C. 199
594 S.E.2d 534

The STATE, Respondent,
v.
John BARNETT, Appellant

No. 3751.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted June 9, 2003.

Decided March 8, 2004.

Rehearing Denied April 22, 2004.

358 S.C. 201

Assistant Appellate Defender Tara S. Taggart, of Columbia, for Appellant

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson and Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Warren Blair Giese, of Columbia, for Respondent.

HOWARD, J.:

John Barnett was convicted of two counts of kidnapping, two counts of first-degree burglary, and one count of grand larceny of a motor vehicle. Subsequently, he was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for each of the kidnapping charges, forty years imprisonment for each of the burglary charges, and five years imprisonment for the grand larceny of a motor vehicle charge, all to run concurrently. Barnett appeals, arguing the indictment charging grand larceny of a motor vehicle was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction because the body of the indictment failed to allege the motor vehicle's value was in excess of one thousand dollars. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A grand jury indicted Barnett for two counts of kidnapping, two counts of first-degree burglary, and one count of grand larceny of a motor vehicle. The indictment for grand larceny of a motor vehicle was captioned "GRAND LARCNY OF MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER $5000 S.C.Code: 16-13-30(B)(1)," and alleged:

[t]hat John Barnett did in Richland County on or about March 10, 2000, feloniously take and carry away the personal property of Rosa Daniels to wit: 1988 Pontiac 6000 with S.C. tag 542KJD, valued under $5000.00. Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.¹

(emphasis added).

Subsequently, Barnett was convicted on all the charges and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for each of the kidnaping

358 S.C. 202

charges, forty years imprisonment for each of the burglary charges, and five years imprisonment for the grand larceny of a motor vehicle charge, all to run concurrently. Barnett appeals

LAW/ANALYSIS

Barnett argues the indictment for grand larceny of a motor vehicle was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction because the body of the indictment did not allege the stolen vehicle was valued at more than one thousand dollars. We disagree.

In evaluating the sufficiency of an indictment, this Court should "look at the issue with a practical eye in view of the surrounding circumstances." State v. Gunn, 313 S.C. 124, 130, 437 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1993); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 504 n. 1, 409 S.E.2d 420, 425 n. 1 (Ct.App.1991) (holding when evaluating an indictment, this Court should give "a common sense reading [to] the indictment as a whole"). If the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the trial court to know what judgment to pronounce, and the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer, the indictment is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Carter v. State, 329 S.C. 355, 362, 495 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1998). "The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could be made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the necessary elements of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant

358 S.C. 203

of what he must be prepared to meet." Browning v. State, 320 S.C. 366, 368, 465 S.E.2d 358, 359 (1995) (citations omitted). "An indictment passes legal muster if it `charges the crime substantially in the language of the ... statute prohibiting the crime or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood....'" State v. Reddick, 348 S.C. 631, 635, 560 S.E.2d 441, 443 (Ct.App.2002) (quoting S.C.Code Ann. 17-19-20 (1985))

South Carolina Code Annotated section 16-13-30(B) (2003) defines grand larceny as "[larceny] of goods, chattels, instruments, or other personalty valued in excess of one thousand dollars...." See State v. Parker, 351 S.C. 567, 570, 571 S.E.2d 288, 289 (2002) ("[G]rand larceny is the felonious taking and carrying away of the goods of another, where the value exceeds $1,000."). Larceny is the taking and carrying away of the goods of another without consent. State v. Brown, 274 S.C. 48, 49, 260 S.E.2d 719, 720 (1979).

It is clear the indictment sufficiently alleges larceny, a misdemeanor, as it alleged Barnett feloniously took a motor vehicle from Rosa Daniels against the peace and dignity of the State. See Brown, 274 S.C. at 49, 260 S.E.2d at 720 (holding larceny is the taking and carrying away of the goods of another without consent). However, the remaining inquiry is whether the indictment sufficiently alleges the motor vehicle was worth more than one thousand dollars, elevating the charge to grand larceny. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-13-30(B).

This case is analogous to State v. Wilkes, 353 S.C. 462, 578 S.E.2d 717 (2003). In Wilkes, the defendant was convicted of one count of resisting arrest and two counts of assault on a correctional facility employee. One of the indictments was captioned, "ASSAULT ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY EMPLOYEE § 16-3-630," and the other indictment was captioned "ASSAULT ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY EPLOYEE." Both indictments alleged the defendant "did in Chester County on or about April 24, 1999[,] assault ... [an officer] while she[/he] was attempting to process him after his arrest." Neither of the indictments, within their bodies, alleged the officers were correctional facility employees.

On appeal, this Court vacated the two indictments for assault on a correctional facility employee, holding the indictments

358 S.C. 204

were jurisdictionally defective because they failed to allege the officer was a correctional facility employee. This Court further held the captions of the indictments could not cure the otherwise defective indictments. Id. at 464, 578 S.E.2d at 718.

On grant of certiorari, our supreme court reversed, holding the indictments were sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit court because, reading the captions in conjunction with the body of the indictment, the indictments "stated the offense with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the trial court to know what judgment to pronounce and ... [the defendant] to know what he was being called upon to answer." Id. at 465, 578 S.E.2d at 719.

In the present case, although the body of the indictment fails to...