State v. Barnett

• Decision Date: 08 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 3751.,3751.
• Citation: 358 S.C. 199,594 S.E.2d 534
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. John BARNETT, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

358 S.C. 199

594 S.E.2d 534

The STATE, Respondent, v. John BARNETT, Appellant.

No. 3751.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted June 9, 2003.

Decided March 8, 2004.

Rehearing Denied April 22, 2004.

Assistant Appellate Defender Tara S. Taggart, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson and Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Warren Blair Giese, of Columbia, for Respondent.

HOWARD, J.:

John Barnett was convicted of two counts of kidnapping, two counts of first-degree burglary, and one count of grand larceny of a motor vehicle. Subsequently, he was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for each of the kidnapping charges, forty years imprisonment for each of the burglary charges, and five years imprisonment for the grand larceny of a motor vehicle charge, all to run concurrently. Barnett appeals, arguing the indictment charging grand larceny of a motor vehicle was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction because the body of the indictment failed to allege the motor vehicle's value was in excess of one thousand dollars. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A grand jury indicted Barnett for two counts of kidnapping, two counts of first-degree burglary, and one count of grand larceny of a motor vehicle. The indictment for grand larceny of a motor vehicle was captioned "GRAND LARCNY OF MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER $5000 S.C.Code: 16-13-30(B)(1)," and alleged:

[t]hat John Barnett did in Richland County on or about March 10, 2000, feloniously take and carry away the personal property of Rosa Daniels to wit: 1988 Pontiac 6000 with S.C. tag 542KJD, valued under $5000.00. Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.¹

(emphasis added).

Subsequently, Barnett was convicted on all the charges and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for each of the kidnaping charges, forty years imprisonment for each of the burglary charges, and five years imprisonment for the grand larceny of a motor vehicle charge, all to run concurrently. Barnett appeals.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Barnett argues the indictment for grand larceny of a motor vehicle was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction because the body of the indictment did not allege the stolen vehicle was valued at more than one thousand dollars. We disagree.

In evaluating the sufficiency of an indictment, this Court should "look at the issue with a practical eye in view of the surrounding circumstances." State v. Gunn, 313 S.C. 124, 130, 437 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1993); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 504 n. 1, 409 S.E.2d 420, 425 n. 1 (Ct.App.1991)

(holding when evaluating an indictment, this Court should give "a common sense reading [to] the indictment as a whole"). If the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the trial court to know what judgment to pronounce, and the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer, the indictment is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Carter v. State, 329 S.C. 355, 362, 495 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1998). "The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could be made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the necessary elements of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet." Browning v. State, 320 S.C. 366, 368, 465 S.E.2d 358, 359 (1995) (citations omitted). "An indictment passes legal muster if it `charges the crime substantially in the language of the ... statute prohibiting the crime or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood....'" State v. Reddick, 348 S.C. 631, 635, 560 S.E.2d 441, 443 (Ct.App.2002) (quoting S.C.Code Ann. 17-19-20 (1985)).

South Carolina Code Annotated section 16-13-30(B) (2003) defines grand larceny as "[larceny] of goods, chattels, instruments, or other personalty valued in excess of one thousand dollars...." See State v. Parker, 351 S.C. 567, 570, 571 S.E.2d 288, 289 (2002)

("[G]rand larceny is the felonious taking and carrying away of the goods of another, where the value exceeds $1,000."). Larceny is the taking and carrying away of the goods of another without consent. State v. Brown, 274 S.C. 48, 49, 260 S.E.2d 719, 720 (1979).

It is clear the indictment sufficiently alleges larceny, a misdemeanor, as it alleged Barnett feloniously took a motor vehicle from Rosa Daniels against the peace and dignity of the State. See Brown, 274 S.C. at 49,

260 S.E.2d at 720 (holding larceny is the taking and carrying away of the goods of another without consent). However, the remaining inquiry is whether the indictment sufficiently alleges the motor vehicle was worth more than one thousand dollars, elevating the charge to grand larceny. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-13-30(B).

This case is analogous to State v. Wilkes, 353 S.C. 462, 578 S.E.2d 717 (2003). In Wilkes, the defendant was convicted of one count of resisting arrest and two counts of assault on a correctional facility employee. One of the indictments was captioned, "ASSAULT ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY EMPLOYEE § 16-3-630," and the other indictment was captioned "ASSAULT ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY EPLOYEE." Both indictments alleged the defendant "did in Chester County on or about April 24, 1999[,] assault ... [an officer] while she[/he] was attempting to process him after his arrest." Neither of the indictments, within their bodies, alleged the officers were correctional facility employees.

On appeal, this Court vacated the two indictments for assault on a correctional facility employee, holding the indictments were jurisdictionally defective because they failed to allege the officer was a correctional facility employee. This Court further held the captions of the indictments could not cure the otherwise defective indictments. Id. at 464, 578 S.E.2d at 718.

On grant of certiorari, our supreme court reversed, holding the indictments were sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit court because, reading the captions in conjunction with the body of the indictment, the indictments "stated the offense with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the trial court to know what judgment to pronounce and ... [the defendant] to know what he was being called upon to answer." Id. at 465, 578 S.E.2d at 719.

In the present case, although the body of the indictment fails to specifically state the motor vehicle's value was in excess of one thousand dollars, the caption of the indictment states the charge is "GRAND LARCENY" and cites "S.C.Code: 16-13-30(B)(1)." We conclude this language, coupled with the language in the body of the indictment, is sufficient to state the offense of grand larceny with certainty and particularity such that the circuit court knew what judgment to pronounce and Barnett knew what to defend against. Thus, the indictment is not jurisdictionally defective.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court is

AFFIRMED.

GOOLSBY, J., concurs.

BEATTY, J., dissenting in a separate opinion.

BEATTY, J.:

I respectfully dissent. Barnett maintains the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the grand larceny charge because he was not properly indicted on the charge. Specifically, he contends the language of the indictment could be construed to mean he faced the misdemeanor charge of petit larceny rather than grand larceny, which is a felony. Put differently, Barnett alleges the indictment failed to include an essential element of grand larceny—that the value of the property stolen was in excess of $1,000. I agree.

In July 2000, a grand jury indicted Barnett for two counts of kidnapping, two counts of first-degree burglary, and grand larceny. The caption of Barnett's indictment for grand larceny read "GRAND LARCENY OF MOTOR VEHICLE UDER $5000" and referenced S.C.Code Section 16-13-30(B)(1). The body of the indictment alleged:

That John Barnett did in Richland County on or about May 10, 2000, feloniously take and carry away the personal property of Rosa Daniels, to wit: 1988 Pontiac 6000 with S.C. tag 542KJD, valued under $5000.00.

Grand larceny involves stolen property valued in excess of $1,000, whereas petit larceny applies to stolen property valued at $1,000 or less. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-13-30, et seq. (Supp.2002); State v. Parker, 351 S.C. 567, 570, 571 S.E.2d 288, 289 (2002). "The monetary value of the goods taken is an element of the offense of grand larceny." Parker, 351 S.C. at 571, 571 S.E.2d at 290; see also Johnson v. State, 319 S.C. 62, 64, 459 S.E.2d 840, 841 (1995)

(grand larceny involved taking and carrying away of goods valued at $200 or more; value is element of grand larceny offense); State v. Ates, 297 S.C. 316, 318, 377 S.E.2d 98, 99 n. 1 (1989) ("In a grand larceny prosecution, value is critical element; it is the State's burden to prove value of stolen goods exceeds $200.") (emphasis added).²

The circuit court lacks jurisdiction to convict a defendant of an offense unless the defendant waives presentment, the offense is a lesser-included offense of the crime charged in the indictment, or there is an indictment that sufficiently states the offense. State v. Owens, 346 S.C. 637, 648, 552 S.E.2d 745, 751 (2001). "An indictment is sufficient if it apprises the defendant of the elements of the offense intended to be charged and apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet." Granger v. State, 333 S.C. 2, 4, 507 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1998) (emphasis added). The indictment sufficiency criteria must be viewed with a "practical eye"; all the surrounding circumstances must be weighed before an accurate determination of whether a defendant was or was not prejudiced can be reached. State v. Gunn, 313 S.C. 124, 130, 437 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1993). This includes...