State v. Barnett
| Decision Date | 13 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 103062,ED 103062 |
| Citation | 504 S.W.3d 807 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Mallorie M. BARNETT, Defendant/Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Andrew Scott Garnett, Hamlett & Bertels, LLC, Kristin L. Arnold, Co-Counsel, Mexico, MO, for Appellant.
Chris Koster, Attorney General, Christin Katherine Lesicko, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Mallorie M. Barnett (Defendant) appeals from the judgment upon her conviction following a jury trial for one count of Sexual Contact with a Prisoner or Offender by Probation/Parole Officer/Employee of Jail, Prison, or Correctional Facility, in violation of Section 566.145, RSMo 2000,1 for which she was sentenced to thirty days in the county jail. We affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the following evidence was adduced at trial: In August 2011, Defendant was hired by the Division of Youth Services to work as a special education teacher at the Montgomery City Youth Center (the Center). The Center is run by the Department of Social Services and is a secure residential facility for youth who have been convicted of crimes while under 17 and sentenced as adults.2
Shortly after Defendant began working at the Center, Loren Hume (Hume), the facility manager, received allegations that Defendant had brought contraband items, including a cell phone and chewing tobacco, into the Center for a 19-year-old man (Juvenile Prisoner) who was one of the Center's residents. Hume testified that for a while he tracked both Defendant and Juvenile Prisoner and eventually confronted Juvenile Prisoner about whether he had a cell phone. Juvenile Prisoner denied he possessed a cell phone.
From November 30 to December 2, the Center put on an annual play, in which both Center residents and employees participated. Certain portions of the play set, where Juvenile Prisoner and Defendant were during the play, were hidden from the security cameras. After the play, Hume still suspected that Juvenile Prisoner had a cell phone that was provided by Defendant, so he monitored Juvenile Prisoner on security cameras. Hume informed Defendant that there was going to be a search of Juvenile Prisoner. Hume testified that shortly after his conversation with Defendant he observed on security video what he believed to be Defendant contacting Juvenile Prisoner to warn him about the impending search. Following a strip search of Juvenile Prisoner, Hume found the cell phone. A few days later, Juvenile Prisoner disclosed to Hume that Defendant had indeed provided him with the cell phone and that Defendant had given Juvenile Prisoner oral sex during the play.
Thereafter, the Department of Social Services began an investigation into the allegations made by Juvenile Prisoner. Brian Lane (Lane), a Department of Social Services investigator, testified that he interviewed both Juvenile Prisoner and Defendant. Lane testified that Juvenile Prisoner told him Defendant provided him with the cell phone, chewing tobacco, and that she gave him oral sex. While Defendant initially denied providing anything to Juvenile Prisoner in the Center, she eventually admitted that she had provided both items and had given Juvenile Prisoner oral sex in the backstage area during the play when the security cameras were blocked by the play set.
The State then charged Defendant by amended information with one count of the class D felony of sexual contact with an inmate, pursuant to Section 566.145, for events that occurred on or between November 30 and December 2, 2011.
On April 22, 2015, following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty as charged. The jury recommended a punishment of 30 days in jail with no fine. The trial court sentenced Defendant in accordance with the jury's recommendation. This appeal follows. Additional facts will be set forth in the opinion as necessary to address Defendant's points on appeal.
In her first point, Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State Offense.3 Defendant contends that she was neither an employee of, or assigned to work in any jail, prison or correctional facility, nor was the alleged Juvenile Prisoner an offender or prisoner as contemplated by Section 566.145. We disagree.
The statute under which Defendant was convicted provides as follows:
Section 566.145. When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we accept "as true all of the evidence favorable to the state, including all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence." State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo.banc 1993). We reject "all contrary evidence and inferences." State v. Botts, 151 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Mo.App.W.D.2004). We are limited to determining "whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Grim, 854 S.W.2d at 405. We do not "act as a ‘super juror’ with veto powers, but give[ ] great deference to the trier of fact." State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo.banc 2011). Nor do we "weigh the evidence anew since the fact-finder may believe all, some, or none of the testimony of a witness when considered with the facts, circumstances and other testimony in the case." Id. Statutory interpretation raises a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 507.
Before trial, Defendant filed her Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State Offense in which she argued that Juvenile Prisoner was not a prisoner or offender and that the Center was not a "correctional facility, jail, or prison" under Section 566.145. The trial court held a hearing on the matter in which Ricky Dixon (Dixon), a former assistant manager of the Center, testified with regard to the purpose of the Center and the meaning of "dual jurisdiction."
On direct examination, Dixon testified that the purpose of the Center was to house dual-jurisdiction youth. He explained that dual jurisdiction was a sentencing option for the courts in which they can simultaneously impose a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence, resulting in a suspended execution of adult sentence while they are in custody of Division of Youth Services. Dixon testified that, by statute, to be eligible for the dual-jurisdiction program, the youth has to be under the age of 17 at the time of sentencing, and the trial court can ask the Division of Youth Services to do an assessment to determine if the youth is amenable to treatment through the program.
Once sentenced into the program and at some point before his 21st birthday, the youth will again appear before the trial court and, at that time, the court will determine whether it will release the youth on probation or impose the adult sentence and send the youth to the Department of Corrections. If the trial court sends the youth to the Department of Corrections, the court may, if it so chooses, give the youth credit on the adult sentence for the time spent at the Center.
Here, Juvenile Prisoner became eligible for the dual-jurisdiction program and became a resident of the Center following a conviction for robbery that occurred when he was 16 years old and after he had been certified as an adult by the juvenile court. During the time of the incident with Defendant, Juvenile Prisoner was 19 and was housed at the Center. At the time of trial, Juvenile Prisoner was 20 years old.
With regard to the daily operation of the Center, Dixon testified that the residents of the Center are considered to be in the custody of the Division of Youth Services, are not permitted to come and go as they please, are not allowed to move about within the facility as they please, and they are always confined to certain areas of the facility at particular times. Dixon testified that the outer perimeters of the facility are locked. Dixon also testified that whenever any resident needs to leave the facility for any reason, he is fully shackled and escorted by security officers. Following Dixon's testimony, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the case proceeded to trial.
Under Section 566.145, the term " ‘[o]ffender’, includes any person in the custody of a prison or correctional facility and any person who is under the supervision of the state board of probation or parole" and the term " ‘[p]risoner’, includes any person who is in the custody of a jail, whether pretrial or after disposition of a charge." Section 566.145.2(1) and (2). The legislature did not define the words "jail," "prison," or "correctional facility" for purposes of Section 566.145. In "the absence of a statutory definition, words will be given their plain and ordinary meaning as derived from the dictionary." State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Mo.banc 200...
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