State v. Trent

Citation618 S.W.3d 616
Decision Date15 December 2020
Docket NumberNo. SD 36468,SD 36468
Parties STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Calvin L. TRENT, Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTJedd C. Schneider, Columbia, MO.

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTMichel A. Trapasso, Jefferson City, MO.

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J.

Calvin L. Trent ("Defendant") appeals his convictions for first-degree murder, § 565.020, and armed criminal action, § 571.015, following a jury trial.1 Defendant claims the trial court erred in: (1) admitting into evidence his statements to law enforcement because he did not receive his Miranda2 warnings; (2) overruling his motion to dismiss the first-degree murder count because the State's opening statement did not contain sufficient facts on the element of deliberation; and (3) overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal on the first-degree murder count because there was insufficient evidence on the element of deliberation. Defendant's arguments are without merit, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Belton , 153 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc 2005).

The body of Devin Hunt ("Victim") and his bicycle were found in a creek near Sons Creek bridge. An autopsy of Victim's body later revealed three gunshot wounds to Victim's head and one to his shoulder/collar bone fired from two different weapons.

Law enforcement was informed Victim had been in a relationship with Defendant's daughter, Connie Trent ("Daughter"). Trooper Rutledge, Trooper Tyrell, Sergeant Nash, and Sergeant Bracker with the Missouri State Highway Patrol went to Defendant's residence to speak with Daughter.3 At this point in the investigation, they did not have any suspects. When the troopers arrived, Defendant's wife invited them into the house and asked if they could help her get Defendant, who has a prosthetic leg, into his wheelchair after he had fallen onto the bathroom floor. Sergeant Nash, Trooper Tyrell, and Trooper Rutledge assisted Defendant's wife in getting Defendant into his wheelchair, while Sergeant Bracker spoke to Daughter.

Daughter told Sergeant Bracker her brother Willis ("Son") and Defendant had left "to go find [Victim]" because Son and Defendant believed Victim "was going to report them for selling their prescription narcotics illegally" and that they were going to "take care of the situation[.]" Sergeant Bracker informed the other troopers of Daughter's statements.

Defendant's wife wheeled Defendant out of the house and to a location under an oak tree in their yard, where he remained for approximately two hours. Sergeant Nash asked Defendant if he would be willing to speak with him about Victim and Defendant agreed. Sergeant Nash recorded the interview by placing a tape recorder in a notebook on the chair next to Defendant. Defendant's wife was present during most of the questioning.

Sergeant Nash asked the majority of the questions, although other officers also participated. He began by telling Defendant they were "trying to figure out what happened to [Victim,]" and they had heard Defendant might have been "upset with [Victim] over the last couple of days." Defendant told Sergeant Nash he had been upset with Victim "for the last six months" and initially denied his involvement in Victim's death. Sergeant Nash proceeded to question Defendant.

Defendant eventually admitted he had seen Victim at the Sons Creek bridge when he and Son "[w]ent to talk to [Victim]." Defendant stated he shot Victim with "[t]he .45" while Victim was riding his bicycle towards Defendant's truck. Defendant admitted he "got [Victim] once in the shoulder. Gave him something to remind me of." After Victim was shot, Victim started peddling away faster trying to flee. Defendant stated he turned the truck around on the bridge, chased Victim and "clipped him with the bumper of the truck." Defendant and Son tried to "put [Victim] in the back of the truck, but he wouldn't stay there." Defendant stated he was with Son when Son shot Victim in the head and he later helped Son dump Victim's body off the bridge. Defendant was arrested after the questioning concluded.

During Defendant's interrogation, Son arrived at the residence. Sergeant Nash spoke with Son. Son admitted to Sergeant Nash that he and Defendant shot Victim. While at Defendant's residence, the troopers seized several guns, including a .45 caliber and a .22 caliber gun.

In addition to the recorded statement4 and the testimony of several officers, the jury heard testimony from Jacob Watts ("Watts"). According to Watts, Defendant drove the truck to Watts' house after shooting Victim.5 Defendant told Watts "they had found [Victim] on the road, going to work on his bike. And [Defendant] said ... he had shot [Victim] in the chest with a .45 and then [Son] had a .22 and shot [Victim] with it." Defendant told Watts they shot Victim because Victim had "threatened to turn them in for selling pills." After Defendant's arrest, Watts went to retrieve the truck. He saw blood in the bed of the truck and found a name tag belonging to Victim.

The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and to thirty years' imprisonment with the sentences to run consecutively to each other. This appeal followed.

Discussion
Point 1: Non-Custodial Interrogation

In point 1, Defendant argues the trial court erred in overruling the motion to suppress his recorded statement and his subsequent objection at trial because he was in custody when the statement was taken and was not given his Miranda warnings.

We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the ruling and defer to the trial court's determinations of credibility. State v. Rice , 573 S.W.3d 53, 66 (Mo. banc 2019). A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will only be reversed if the decision is clearly erroneous. State v. Harper , 517 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017). A ruling is clearly erroneous if we are "left with a definite and firm belief a mistake has been made." Rice , 573 S.W.3d at 66 (quoting State v. Holman , 502 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Mo. banc 2016) ). Whether a suspect was in custody for Miranda purposes is an issue of law that we review de novo. State v. Little , 473 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).

The right to Miranda warnings is not triggered during non-custodial interrogations. State v. Glass , 136 S.W.3d 496, 510-11 (Mo. banc 2004). "In Missouri, ‘custodial interrogation’ is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Harper , 517 S.W.3d at 3 (quoting Glass , 136 S.W.3d at 511 ). "Ordinarily, suspects are in custody when they have been informed that they are under arrest or when restraints have been placed on them." State v. Quick , 334 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). "When there is no declaration of arrest, and no physical restraint, the usual assumption is that a suspect is not in custody." Id. (quoting State v. Brooks , 185 S.W.3d 265, 273 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) ). A person who is being asked preliminary investigatory questions by the police is generally not in custody and need not be advised of his rights under Miranda . Id. at 611-12. "The simple fact that investigative questioning takes place in a potentially coercive environment does not require Miranda warnings[.]" State v . Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 632 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting State v. Isa , 850 S.W.2d 876, 894 (Mo. banc 1993) ). However, there are instances where a person can be in custody absent a formal declaration of arrest and handcuffs or other physical restraints placed on the suspect. Quick , 334 S.W.3d at 612.

In determining if a person is in custody, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the accused's freedom to leave the scene and the purpose, place, and length of an interrogation. State v. Bruce , 503 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016). The Supreme Court of Missouri has identified six factors for courts to take into consideration when determining custody:

(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not under arrest;
(2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning;
(3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to answer questions;
(4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning;
(5) whether the atmosphere was police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of questioning.

State v. Werner , 9 S.W.3d 590, 595 (Mo. banc 2000). These factors, while not exhaustive, serve as a guide.6 Bruce , 503 S.W.3d at 358. Our determination of custody must be resolved based "on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned." Id. (quoting State v. Hill , 247 S.W.3d 34, 46 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008) ). "[T]he ultimate question before us is whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to terminate or leave the interrogation." Id.

Defendant argues that his interrogation was custodial. In making this argument, Defendant emphasizes that he uses a wheelchair, that the police used deceptive interrogation practices, that the interview lasted about two hours, that there were several officers present at his residence, and that he was arrested after the interview. These facts alone do not tip the interrogation into custodial territory.

While Defendant is...

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