State v. Baskerville

• Decision Date: 10 April 1906
• Citation: 141 N. C. 811,53 S.E. 742
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE. v. BASKERVILLE.

53 S.E. 742

(141 N. C. 811)

STATE.

v.BASKERVILLE.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 10, 1906.

Courts—Establishment—Legislative Power.

Under Const, art. 4, § 27, prescribing the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in criminal matters, as modified by section 14, authorizing the General Assembly to provide for the establishment of special courts for the trial o(misdemeanors in cities, so as to authorize the Legislature to establish special courts in cities and give them exclusive jurisdiction of misdemeanors committed within the corporate limits, Priv. Laws 1905, p. 110, c. 36, § 13, establishing a police court for a city and conferring on it exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the ordinances of the city, is valid.

Appeal from Superior Court, Wake County; Justice, Judge.

Sarah Baskerville was convicted of a violation of a city ordinance, and she appeals. Judgment arrested.

Defendant, on warrant duly issued, was tried, convicted, and sentenced in a court of a justice of the peace of Raleigh township, for violating a valid ordinance of the city, and thereupon appealed to the superior court, contending that the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction to try the case. The cause coming on for hearing in the superior court, defendant moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Motion overruled, and defendant excepted. Defendant admitting that on the facts she was guilty, if the court had jurisdiction, the verdict was so entered and sentence imposed, and defendant excepted and appealed.

J. C. L. Harris & Son, for appellant.

The Attorney General, for the State.

HOKE, J. (sifter stating the case). In section 13, c. 36, p. 110, Priv. Laws 1905, the Legislature established a police court for the city of Raleigh and defined its jurisdiction as follows: (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses arising from the violation of the provisions of this act, or of all violations of ordinances, by-laws, rules, and regulations of the board of aldermen made In pursuance of this act, within the corporate limits of the city of Raleigh and within Raleigh township, (b) Jurisdiction, power, and authority for the trial and determination of all misdemeanors created by the laws of the state of North Carolina committed within the corporate limits of the city of Raleigh and within Raleigh township. In the case before us the defendant was tried and convicted before a justice of the peace of a misdemeanor in violating a lawful ordinance of the city of Raleigh. The act in question gives exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses to the police justice, and if the act is valid the justice of the peace who tried and sentenced the defendant was without jurisdiction of the case, and the motion of the defendant. should have been allowed.

The sections of our Constitution, in article 4, bearing on the question now before us, are as follows: Article 4, § 2, provides that "the judicial power of the state shall be vested In a court for the trial of impeachments, a Supreme Court, superior courts, courts of justices of the peace, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established by law." Section 12: "The General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government; but the General Assembly shall allot and distribute that portion of this power and jurisdiction which does not pertain to the Supreme Court, among the other courts prescribed In this Constitutionor which may be established by law, in such manner as it may deem best, provide also a proper system of appeals and regulate by law when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers, of all courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with other provisions of this Constitution." Section 14: "The General Assembly shall provide for the establishment of special courts, for the trial of misdemeanors, in cities and towns, where the same may be necessary." And section 27, so far as pertinent to this case, provides that the several justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction of the criminal matters arising within those counties where the punishment cannot exceed a fine of $50 or imprisonment for 30 days.

In Rhyne v. Lipscombe, 122 N. C. 650 et seq., 29 S. E. 57, the Legislature had created a criminal circuit court embracing several western counties, and had given same, to a certain extent, concurrent jurisdiction with the superior courts in that portion of the state, providing, among other things, that an appeal would lie in certain cases from a justice of the peace to said criminal court, and from this court direct to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court in substance decided: (1) "The superior courts and courts of justices of the peace were created by the Constitution (section 2, art. 4), and the General Assembly cannot abolish them." (2) "While the General Assembly may, under section 12 of article 4 of the Constitution, allot and distribute the jurisdiction of the courts below the Supreme Court, it must be done without conflict with other provisions of the Constitution." (3) "In construing legislation establishing courts inferior to the Supreme Court and affecting the jurisdiction of the superior courts, the term 'superior court' must be interpreted in the sense it had at the time of the adoption of the Constitution which established such court, which was that it was the highest court in the state next to the Supreme Court and superior to all others, from which alone appeals lay direct to the Supreme Court, and possessed of general jurisdiction, criminal as well as civil, and both in law and equity." (4) "The superior court cannot, under section 12, art. 4, of the Constitution, be deprived of the pre-eminence and superiority attaching to it at the time of its adoption by the Constitution or shorn of either its criminal or civil jurisdiction without conflict with the constitutional provisions creating it; and while its jurisdiction may be made largely appellate by conferring such part of its original jurisdiction on such inferior courts as the General Assembly may provide, its jurisdiction must be retained by original or appellate process. (5) "The allotment and Jurisdiction provided for in section 12 of article 4 of the Constitution cannot be such as to take from justices of the peace the jurisdiction conferred by section 27 of such article, or to repeal the right of appeal given by that section, both in criminal and civil actions, to the superior court from the courts of justices of the peace." The court thereupon held the statute unconstitutional in so far as it was in conflict with these principles.

In that case the Supreme Court was only considering the relative position, as to power and jurisdiction, of the superior courts as part of our judicial system, and the right of such courts alone to hear appeals from justices of the peace. The jurisdiction of the justices' courts, as established by section 27 of article 4, was only incidentally in question, and was only considered in so far as the same was affected by section 12 of article 4, conferring power on the Legislature to "allot and apportion the jurisdiction which does not pertain to the Supreme Court among the other courts prescribed by this Constitution, or which may be established by law in such manner as It may deem best, * * * so far as this...