State v. Bates

• Citation: 464 S.W.3d 257
• Decision Date: 16 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. ED 101325,ED 101325
• Parties: State of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Rickey Bates, Defendant/Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

464 S.W.3d 257

State of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent

v.Rickey Bates, Defendant/Appellant.

No. ED 101325

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION TWO .

Filed: June 16, 2015

Evan J. Buchheim, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for Plaintiff/Respondent.

Maleaner R. Harvey, 1010 Market Street, Suite 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101, for Defendant/Appellant.

Sherri B. Sullivan, P.J.

Introduction

Rickey Bates (Appellant) appeals from the trial court's judgment entered upon a jury verdict convicting him of first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and two counts of armed criminal action. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The State charged Appellant with first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and two counts of armed criminal action involving the shooting death of Antoine Shaw (Victim). The evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is as follows.

At 8:23 p.m. on March 4, 2011, police officers responding to a call of shots fired found Victim's vehicle partially on the sidewalk against a street sign with the engine running and the doors closed and locked. Victim was located in the driver's seat, dead from several gunshot wounds to the head. Victim's pockets were turned inside out and he was holding a plastic bag of marijuana. A second bag of marijuana was found in the center console and $180 in currency was found in the glove box.

Police found four bullet holes in the driver's side door and recovered five .38 caliber bullets from the vehicle. Three bullets were identified as being fired from the same gun, while the other two were too damaged to make a comparison.

Victim had three gunshot entrance wounds on the right side of his face and exit wounds on the left side of his face. Victim also had gunshot wounds to his nose and brow. Stippling or tattooing, which occurs when a gun is fired close to the skin, was found on the right side of Victim's nose. Two .38 caliber bullets were recovered from Victim's body, one in his left scalp and the other in the cranial cavity on the left side of his skull. Victim suffered extensive skull fractures and devastating brain injuries from the gunshots, resulting in his death. The bullets recovered from Victim's body were fired from the same gun as the three matching bullets recovered from the vehicle.

Quintavian Rogers (Rogers), Appellant's cousin, testified he was friends with Victim and learned from family members that Appellant was involved in his murder. Shortly after learning of Appellant's involvement, Rogers surreptitiously recorded Appellant confessing to the crime with his cell phone while Rogers and Appellant were sitting in Rogers's car. Rogers brought the recording to the police hoping they could help Rogers's mother obtain a sentence reduction on a federal drug conviction and because Rogers believed Appellant was not remorseful for killing Victim.

During this taped conversation, Appellant described how he killed Victim and how Victim's body was positioned. Appellant said he was angry with Victim and planned to rob him. Appellant said Victim gave Appellant some marijuana, and then Appellant “upped” his gun, shot Victim in the head one time, and left. Appellant returned to the car and found Victim was still breathing, so he shot him again, firing a total of five bullets. Appellant stated he shot Victim with a .38 caliber handgun.

Two weeks later, Appellant was arrested by police. After being advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Detectives Lon Ray (Det. Ray) and Scott Sailor (Det. Sailor) conducted a recorded interview of Appellant. During this interview, Appellant denied knowing Victim or having anything to do with Victim's murder. When police played Appellant a portion of the recording taken by Rogers, Appellant told detectives that it was not him in the recording. Approximately 15 to 20 minutes later, when Det. Sailor advised Appellant he was being charged with the murder and robbery, Appellant said he wanted to tell the detectives what happened.

The detectives reactivated the camera, advised Appellant of his Miranda rights again, and conducted a second interview. Appellant told the detectives that a man named A.J. or Arkeith Hill (A.J.) contacted Victim to arrange a meeting. A.J. got into the car with Victim and tried to grab the marijuana from Victim, but Victim put A.J. in a headlock. Appellant stated he was carrying a black snubnose .38 caliber handgun that A.J. had given him and that he shot Victim in the head. Appellant took money out of the car's armrest and he and A.J. left the scene. Appellant said A.J. took the gun from Appellant, returned to the car, and shot Victim several more times. Appellant traded the gun for another after the murder.

Det. Ray testified that as part of their investigation he obtained Victim's cell phone records, which showed he received a phone call about an hour before his murder. Det. Ray testified further investigation revealed this call was initiated from Appellant's mother's phone and was the same number Appellant gave as an emergency contact number when he was arrested.

While awaiting trial, Appellant told one of his cellmates, Jarvis Bell (Bell), that he had a disagreement with a man over a marijuana sale. Appellant told Bell he later called this man, ostensibly to buy more marijuana, but when the man arrived for the meeting, Appellant shot him.

The jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and two counts of armed criminal action. The court sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole on the first-degree murder conviction and to concurrent 30–year sentences on the remaining convictions. This appeal follows.

Points Relied On

In his first point, Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his videotaped statements to police over defense counsel's objection because, under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant's statements were unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntarily made and the product of a coercive interrogation in which detectives knew he was 18 years old, could neither read nor write, and had a learning disability and was thereby incapable of understanding his rights under Miranda.

In his second point, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to strike Det. Ray's testimony, or in the alternative, request for a mistrial after Det. Ray testified he reviewed Victim's cell phone records and determined a call was made to Victim's cell phone from Appellant's mother's phone within an hour of Victim's death because the State failed to lay a proper business records foundation for admitting Det. Ray's testimony concerning information contained in the records.

In his third point, Appellant maintains the trial court plainly erred, causing a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice, in imposing a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a first-degree murder conviction for an offense committed when Appellant was 18 years and 11 days old, had a learning disability, and could neither read nor write because under Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) and State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. banc 2013), the sentence violated the principle of proportionality and Appellant's constitutional rights to due process of law and protections against cruel and unusual punishments.

Discussion

Point I—Motion to Suppress Statements

Upon a defendant's challenge to the admissibility of a statement on the ground that it was involuntary, the State has the burden of proving the voluntariness of the statement by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 845 (Mo. banc 1998). When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the inquiry is limited to whether the court's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Id. We give deference to the trial court's superior opportunity to determine the credibility of the witness and to the court's factual findings and credibility determinations. Id. This Court views the facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the court's decision. State v. Kelly, 119 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Mo.App.E.D.2003). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 845. The trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence will be affirmed unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Davis, 980 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Mo.App.E.D.1998).

The 14th Amendment Due Process Clause bars involuntarily obtained confessions from being admissible at trial. State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193, 203 (Mo. banc 2011), citing Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192 (1944). “The test for whether a confession is voluntary is whether the totality of the circumstances created a physical or psychological coercion sufficient to deprive the defendant of a free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer the examiner's questions.” Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d at 203 (internal quotations omitted). In order for a defendant's statements to be considered involuntary due to coercive tactics by the police, it must be demonstrated that the defendant's “will was overborne” as a result of said tactics. State v. Mateo, 335 S.W.3d 529, 537 (Mo.App.W.D.2011).

In determining whether a defendant's confession resulted from improper coercion, this Court considers factors such as age, experience, intelligence, gender, lack of education, infirmity, and unusual susceptibility to coercion. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d at 203. The Court also considers whether the defendant was advised of his rights and understood them, the length of the detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, the presence of police coercion and intimidation, and the use of coercive techniques such as deprivation of food, water, or other physical needs. Id. ; Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 845. When considering the totality of the circumstances, no single...