State v. Bauldwin

• Decision Date: 20 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. S–10–1217.,S–10–1217.
• Parties: STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Patrick B. BAULDWIN, appellant.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

283 Neb. 678

811 N.W.2d 267

STATE of Nebraska, appellee,

v.Patrick B. BAULDWIN, appellant.

No. S–10–1217.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

April 20, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Motions to Suppress: Confessions: Constitutional Law: Miranda Rights: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a motion to suppress a statement based on its claimed involuntariness, including claims that law enforcement procured it by violating the safeguards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court's findings for clear error. Whether those facts meet constitutional standards, however, is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court's determination.

2. Miranda Rights: Police Officers and Sheriffs. When a person is in custody and interrogated by government officials, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), requires a now-familiar set of warnings: The police must notify a person that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to an attorney, either retained or appointed.

3. Constitutional Law: Miranda Rights: Self–Incrimination. The Miranda warnings exist to shield individuals from the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation. They also ensure that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is protected.

4. Self–Incrimination. A suspect has the right to control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation.

5. Miranda Rights: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Self–Incrimination. Police officers are not required to guess whether a suspect wishes to end the interrogation; instead, the police must cease questioning the suspect only if the suspect's invocation of the right to remain silent is unambiguous, unequivocal, or clear.

6. Miranda Rights: Self–Incrimination: Appeal and Error. In determining whether a suspect clearly invoked his right to remain silent, an appellate court reviews the totality of the circumstances of the alleged invocation to assess the words in context.

7. Miranda Rights: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Self–Incrimination. Once a person has invoked his right to remain silent, the police must scrupulously honor that right.

8. Miranda Rights: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Self–Incrimination. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), requires a three-factor analysis in determining whether the police scrupulously honored the right to remain silent. Those factors are (1) whether the police immediately ceased the interrogation once the defendant invoked his right to remain silent; (2) whether the police resumed the interrogation after a significant time and a renewal of the Miranda warnings; and (3) whether the police restricted the renewed interrogation to content not covered by the first interrogation.

9. Constitutional Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Confessions. The test under Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), focuses on what law enforcement did, and when, and not on the suspect's response or lack thereof. Similar to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Mosley imposes obligations on the police, not the suspect, to protect individuals against the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation.

10. Constitutional Law: Convictions: Appeal and Error. Even constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction if that error was a trial error and not a structural defect.

11. Trial: Evidence: Confessions: Appeal and Error. The admission of an improperly obtained statement is a trial error, and so its erroneous admission is subject to harmless error analysis.

12. Verdicts: Appeal and Error. Harmless error review looks to the basis on which the trier of fact actually rested its verdict; the inquiry is not whether in a trial that occurred without the error a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but, rather, whether the actual guilty verdict rendered in the questioned trial was surely unattributable to the error.

13. Miranda Rights. Miranda protections apply only when a person is both in custody and subject to interrogation.

14. Arrests. Whether an individual is in custody requires an examination of all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. In making that determination, the test is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would have felt free to leave, and if not, then a defendant is considered to be in custody.

15. Miranda Rights: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Words and Phrases. “Interrogation” under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.

16. Expert Witnesses: Appeal and Error. The standard for reviewing the admissibility of expert testimony is abuse of discretion.

17. Rules of Evidence: Expert Witnesses. A trial judge acts as a gatekeeper for expert scientific testimony, and must determine (1) whether the expert will testify to scientific evidence and (2) if that testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact. This entails a preliminary assessment whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology may properly be applied to the facts in issue.

18. Courts: Expert Witnesses. In evaluating the admissibility of expert scientific testimony, a trial judge considers a number of factors. These factors include whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; whether, in a particular technique, there exists a high known or potential rate of error; whether standards exist for controlling the technique's operation; and whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientific community. These factors are, however, neither exclusive nor binding. Different factors may prove more significant in different cases, and additional factors may prove relevant under particular circumstances.

19. Trial: Evidence. DNA evidence without the accompanying probability assessment would be inadmissible because it would not aid the trier of fact.

20. Rules of Evidence: Appeal and Error. In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules apply, the rules control admissibility of the evidence; judicial discretion is involved only when the rules make discretion a factor in determining admissibility. When the Nebraska Evidence Rules commit the evidentiary question at issue to the discretion of the trial court, an appellate court reviews the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.

21. Trial: Rules of Evidence. A trial court exercises its discretion in determining whether evidence is relevant and whether its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

22. Appeal and Error. On appeal, a defendant may not assert a different ground for his objection to the admission of evidence than was offered at trial.

23. Rules of Evidence. Under Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27–403 (Reissue 2008), relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

24. Trial: Photographs. The admission of photographs of a gruesome nature rests largely with the discretion of the trial court, which must determine their relevancy and weigh their probative value against their prejudicial effect.

25. Homicide: Photographs. In a homicide prosecution, a court may receive photographs of a victim into evidence for the purpose of identification, to show the condition of the body or the nature and extend of wounds and injuries to it, and to establish malice or intent.

26. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. And in its review, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Those matters are for the finder of fact.

27. Sentences: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

28. Judgments: Words and Phrases. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence.

29. Sentences. When imposing a sentence, a sentencing judge should consider the defendant's (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense, and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.

30. Sentences. In imposing a sentence, the sentencing court is not limited to any mathematically applied set of factors. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge's observation of the defendant's demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's life.

Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and Kelly M. Steenbock, for appellant.

Jon Bruning, Attorney General, Erin E. Tangeman, and James D....