State v. Bean

• Decision Date: 05 January 1978
• Docket Number: Nos. 44747 and 44748,s. 44747 and 44748
• Citation: 572 P.2d 1102,89 Wn.2d 467
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Verlon Gale BEAN, Appellant. The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Steve TROUTMAN, Appellant.

Page 467

89 Wn.2d 467

572 P.2d 1102

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Verlon Gale BEAN, Appellant.

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Steve TROUTMAN, Appellant.

Nos. 44747 and 44748.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 5, 1978.

Roethler & McCulloch, Don L. McCulloch, Longview, for appellant bean.

Walstead, Mertsching, Husemoen, Donaldson & Barlow, C. C. Bridgewater, Jr., Longview, for appellant Troutman.

Henry R. Dunn, Pros. Atty. for Cowlitz County, James E. Warme, Chief Deputy Pros. Atty., Kelso, for respondent.

HICKS, Associate Justice.

These factually interrelated cases were certified to this court from the Court of Appeals, Division Two. Thereafter, we ordered the cases consolidated for purposes of review.

Appellants, Bean and Troutman, appeal convictions for possession of controlled substances in violation of RCW 69.50. The issues concerned are with suppression of evidence.

On April 24, 1975, a black Chevrolet van was halted on the Longview Fibre Road in Cowlitz County by law enforcement officers posing as a road survey crew. A marked sheriff's car drove in behind the van and a deputy approached the vehicle and requested the operator's license. Upon ascertaining the driver's name was Verlon Gale Bean and upon a pretext getting him to leave the van Bean was arrested. The van was searched and 100,000 tablets of methamphetamine, commonly known as "speed", were found. A search of Bean's person produced a small container with 6 more of the tablets in it. Both the arrest and search were conducted without a warrant. Bean was charged with possession of methamphetamine in violation of RCW 69.50.208(b)(1).

Prior to this time, one Hawn had been arrested for a drug offense. Hawn, with his attorney present, Officer Reel and a deputy prosecuting attorney entered into an agreement where, in return for a favorable recommendation to the court at the time of his sentencing, Hawn would furnish good information to the police concerning a more important figure in the illicit drug business in the area.

Hawn disclosed to the authorities that he normally received his drugs through a middleman by the name of Stanley. He stated that on at least one occasion he had been present when Stanley obtained drugs from a man in a brown van while they were on the Longview Fibre Road. Hawn stated his belief that the van driver's name was "Beam". On one occasion at night, Hawn had accompanied Stanley when he drove to Bean's residence. Because they approached the house by an alley and Hawn did not leave the car, he did not know the exact address of the house. However, he was able to give its general vicinity. Later, Hawn was able to supply the information that Bean had a new black van.

With the information furnished them, the officers were able to identify Bean as living at 621 22nd Avenue, Longview. Steve Troutman also lived in the house. Bean was found to have access to two vans, one an older brown one with Oregon license plates and the other a 1974 black Chevrolet van. Neither was registered in Bean's name. Other informants, characterized by the police as reliable in past occurrences, revealed (1) Bean had a ready supply of money though he had no known employment, (2) he made trips to California and Mexico, and (3) he was "involved in drug traffic in the area".

Hawn had previously arranged with Stanley to purchase 100,000 "hits of speed" for $9,000. On the day of Bean's arrest at about 3 p. m., Hawn advised Officer Reel that Stanley would have the drugs later that afternoon. The exact site of the transaction was not given as Stanley had not revealed it. Several possible locations had been discussed in police briefing in the sheriff's office and teams were dispatched to cover as many sites as possible.

Stanley and Hawn, in a white Toyota, were followed by police to the Longview Fibre Road. Within a few minutes, the black van appeared and the arrest followed. The arrest took place shortly after 5 p. m. and out of the sight of the white Toyota which was not bothered.

Based primarily upon the discovery of drugs in Bean's van, the police sought a search warrant for the house at 621 22nd Avenue, Longview, Washington. Almost immediately following Bean's arrest and prior to obtaining a warrant, the officers who had the residence under surveillance were ordered to secure the house and it was immediately entered.

The evidence is in dispute as to whether an arrest was made at that time. In any event, defendant Troutman was read his Miranda ¹ rights and all persons present were "detained" for as much as 45 minutes. The officers, upon entering the house, observed a small amount of marijuana and pipes for smoking it in plain view in the living room. The officers who "secured" the residence contacted Officer Reel and informed him of the circumstances of the securing prior to his obtaining the search warrant for the residence.

After the search warrant was obtained and served, a greater amount of marijuana was seized in the kitchen and a small amount of other drugs were found throughout the house. Troutman was formally arrested and again read his Miranda rights. Subsequently, at the sheriff's office, he made a full confession which was admitted against him at trial.

The issue in both these cases is the constitutional validity of the arrests and the contemporaneous searches and seizures accompanying them.

We are satisfied that (1) appellant Bean was legally arrested, (2) the van he was driving was lawfully searched, (3) denial of his motion to suppress evidence was proper, and (4) his conviction should be affirmed. For authority in Bean's case, we rely upon State v. McGee, 15 Wash.App. 563, 550 P.2d 552 (1976); State v. White, 10 Wash.App. 273, 518 P.2d 245 (1973); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

Because of the strong motive that Hawn had to be accurate in the information he provided the officers, we believe Hawn qualifies as a reliable informant upon whom the police were justified in placing reliance. In addition, since verification of previously furnished details concerning Bean had established their accuracy, the police were justified in stopping the van and arresting Bean when he appeared on schedule. See State v. McGee, supra; State v. White, supra ; and Draper v. United States, supra.

We hold that Bean's warrantless arrest was lawful, since the officers had probable cause to believe that a felony was being committed at the time. Under the circumstances that exist in this case, warrantless search of a vehicle and seizure of contraband found therein is justified by McGee, White and Carroll.

The warrantless "securing of the house" at 621 22nd Avenue in Longview, and the warrantless arrest of the defendant Troutman are another matter. That the warrantless search of a house and the warrantless search of an automobile stand on different ground, compare Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970) with Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970).

Subject only to a few exceptions, a search without a warrant is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Katz v. United States,389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). "The exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be 'a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.' '(T) he burden is on those seeking the...