State v. Beane

• Decision Date: 11 June 1951
• Citation: 81 A.2d 924,146 Me. 328
• Parties: STATE v. BEANE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 924

81 A.2d 924

146 Me. 328

STATE v. BEANE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

June 11, 1951.

Irving Isaacson, Asst. County Atty., Lewiston, for the State.

Benjamin L. Berman, David V. Berman, Lewiston, for respondent.

Before MURCHIE, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, MERRILL, NULTY and WILLIAMSON, JJ.

MURCHIE, Chief Justice.

When the transcript of testimony in a case carries evidence clearly indicating that the verdict rendered was the only one which could have been returned, if the true issue had been comprehended by the jury, it seems unfortunate to disturb it. Notwithstanding this is such a case, we feel constrained to sustain respondent's Exception X, which challenges the propriety of the refusal of the court below to give certain requested instructions (quoted infra) to the jury. We do so to safeguard against the possibility, remote as it appears, that he did not have, in every respect, 'a fair and impartial trial'. The requirement that every respondent in a criminal case shall have such a trial is fundamental. State v. Merrick, 19 Me. 398; State v. King, 123 Me. 256, 122 A. 578; or State v. Brown, 142 Me. 16, 45 A.2d 442.

In the second of these cases, an exception to the admission of improper testimony was sustained, as this Court said, 'with reluctance, considering the evidence'. It is with great reluctance that we take the action we do. A reading of the evidence supporting the charge that the defendant operated a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, within the meaning of R.S.1944, Chap. 19, Sec. 121, produces grave uncertainty if there could have been any reasonable doubt of his guilt, without reference to the testimony to which the requested instructions relate. That concerned a test, made at defendant's request, to determine the alcoholic content of his blood. The instructions given the jury gave unwarranted force to that testimony, which, under the statute, provided prima facie evidence of the defendant's guilt.

The statute provides that: 'Evidence that there was * * * 7/100%, or less, by weight of alcohol in * * * blood, is prima facie evidence that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor * * *. Evidence that there was * * * from 7/100% to 15/100% * * * is relevant evidence * * * not to be given prima facie effect * * *. Evidence that there was * * * 15/100%, or more, * * * is prima facie evidence that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor * * *.'

The defendant's blood, when tested, showed an alcoholic content of 21/100% by weight. The testimony of the pathologist, to that effect, supplemented, and confirmed, evidence of defendant's guilt, given by three police officers who testified on the basis of his appearance and actions and the manner in which he was driving an automobile along the public highway. The defense offered was brief, and in some respects unusual. The defendant did not deny the consumption of alcoholic beverages prior to his arrest, but deposed that he had consumed no more than two bottles of beer, drunk one and three hours, respectively, earlier. He did not deny that his appearance and actions were, substantially, as the officers described them, but ascribed them to a war disability and a highly nervous state resulting therefrom. He explained the course of the automobile as it traveled along the highway by asserting that there was a defect in the steering equipment, which caused the vehicle to 'shimmy', as he said, when driven at some speeds.

It is obvious that the evidence of the pathologist made a prima facie case against the defendant, under the statute, and that it tended strongly to support what the officers had said and to contradict what he had said, as well as the testimony of a witness presented by him, who was at the police station when he was admitted to bail. This was that the defendant appeared then, as often before, red of face, with eyes 'kind of bad'.

Despite the apparent strength of the State's case, and the obvious weakness of that of the respondent, the factual issue as to whether he was, at the pertinent time, 'at all under the influence of intoxicating liquor', to use the words of the statute, was for jury determination, under our system of jurisprudence. It is unnecessary to cite precedents for a principle of law so fully established, or for the companion one that a jury should perform its allotted function under proper instructions from the Court.

The particular issue, in this case, arises in connection with special instructions requested on behalf of the defendant, and refused. Reference to the charge shows that the jury was instructed, thoroughly and appropriately, that the burden of the State was to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the respondent was entitled to the protection of a presumption of innocence. Thereafter, however, the Court dealt specifically with the evidence of the pathologist, in two paragraphs, as follows:

'There is a law in this state which I want to read to you, which has to do with this offence. 'Evidence that there was, at the time, 15/100%, or more, by weight of alcohol in his blood, is prima facie evidence that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of this section.' Dr. Beliveau has testified, as I understand his testimony, and again I say it is your recollection that controls and not mine, that his test showed 21/100% by weight of alcohol in the blood of this respondent, which, as I figure it, is at least 6/100% more than the 15/100% which the law says shall be prima facie evidence that the respondent in this case was under the...