State v. Beard, M2000-02207-CCA-R3-CD
| Decision Date | 31 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | M2000-02207-CCA-R3-CD |
| Parties | STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MELVIN E. BEARDIN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Williamson County No. I-1098-345 Timothy L. Easter, Judge
After being indicted for aggravated perjury, the defendant, Melvin E. Beard, filed a motion for a bill of particulars. In response, the state filed two bills of particulars, one on January 22, 1999 and one on August 5, 1999. At the conclusion of a jury trial, which was held on March 8-9, 2000, the jury convicted the defendant of aggravated perjury. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II multiple offender to serve five years in confinement. The defendant now brings this appeal challenging his conviction and sentence on several grounds. Following a thorough review, we find none of the issues raised warrant relief and we therefore affirm the conviction and sentence.
Eric L. Davis, Franklin, Tennessee, for appellant, Melvin E. Beard.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Jennifer L. Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney General; Ron Davis, District Attorney General; and Derek K. Smith, Assistant District Attorney General, for appellee, State of Tennessee.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.
OPINION
On May 19, 1997, following a conviction of driving after being declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, the defendant was ordered to serve a four-year term in the Community Corrections program. On May 5, 1998, Tracie Johnson, who was serving as a confidential informant for the drug task force of the Williamson County Sheriff's Department, contacted the defendant, one of her drug suppliers, and arranged to meet him in order to buy some crack cocaine from him. Ms. Johnson, who had arranged to meet the defendant at his trailer, saw the defendant in a parking lot before their scheduled meeting time and purchased the crack cocaine from him at that time. The police monitored this transaction via a recording device that Ms. Johnson had agreed to wear. After the transaction was completed, Ms. Johnson met the police and gave the cocaine to them. Subsequent testing determined the weight of the cocaine to be 0.2 grams. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Johnson and Mr. Bennett, Ms. Johnson's husband who had also accompanied her when she made the earlier cocaine purchase, drove to the defendant's trailer to make a second cocaine purchase. Mr. Bennett purchased the cocaine this time while Ms. Johnson waited outside the defendant's trailer. Mr. Bennett and Ms. Johnson then met the police and gave them the cocaine from this transaction. The police later determined this amount to be 0.1 grams.
On May 7, 1998, Ms. Johnson and Mr. Bennett went to the defendant's trailer in order to make another cocaine purchase. The police also monitored this transaction through the wire transmitter that Ms. Johnson had agreed to wear. Once Ms. Johnson and Mr. Bennett arrived, Ms. Johnson showed the defendant her money, indicating that she wished to make a cocaine purchase. The defendant directed Ms. Johnson to a gentleman known to her as "Painter." Painter allotted a certain amount of crack cocaine for Ms. Johnson; asked the defendant if that amount was appropriate,1 to which the defendant nodded his head affirmatively; and then gave Ms. Johnson the cocaine.
On September 28, 1998, a court held a hearing to investigate the defendant's alleged Community Corrections program violation, as he had tested positive for cocaine use. At the hearing, the prosecutor asked the defendant, "While you've been on this Community Corrections program, have you been involved in any way in the sale of crack cocaine?" The defendant responded, "Not that I know of."2 The defendant gave this testimony while under oath. The trial court revoked the defendant's participation in the Community Corrections program, and the defendant was tried and convicted of aggravated perjury. He now brings this appeal challenging his conviction on eight grounds, alleging (1) that the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to offer hearsay by testifying about his conversation with Ms. Johnson; (3) that the trial court erred by giving the jury an unconstitutionally vague definition of material; (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to give one of the defendant's proposed jury instructions; (5) that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury regarding ignorance of mistake of fact; (6) that the trial court erred by refusing to grant the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; (7) that the trial court erred when sentencing the defendant; and (8) that the trial court erred by failing to arrest judgement, as the presentment failed to charge an offense. After reviewing these allegations, we find that none of them merit relief.
The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to support his conviction. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is obliged to review that claim according to certain well_settled principles. A verdict of guilty, rendered by a jury and state's witnesses and resolves all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the state. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, although the accused is originally cloaked with a presumption of innocence, the jury verdict of guilty removes this presumption "and replaces it with one of guilt." State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on appeal, the burden of proof rests with the defendant to demonstrate the insufficiency of the convicting evidence. Id. The relevant question the reviewing court must answer is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Harris, 839 S.W.2d at 75. In making this decision, we are to accord the state "the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom." Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914. As such, this Court is precluded from re-weighing or reconsidering the evidence when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Moreover, we may not substitute our own "inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence." Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at 779.
The defendant was convicted of aggravated perjury. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-703 sets forth the elements of this offense: (a) A person commits an offense who, with intent to deceive: (1) Commits perjury as defined in 39-16-702; (2) The false statement is made during or in connection with an official proceeding; and (3) The false statement is material. Tenn. Code Ann. 39-16-703. Section 39-16-702 defines perjury as follows: (a) A person commits an offense who, with intent to deceive: (1) Makes a false statement, under oath; (2) Makes a statement, under oath, that confirms the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath; . . . . Tenn. Code Ann. 39-16-702.
The defendant argues that the state failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant made a false statement under oath, that the defendant made the statement with the intent to deceive, or that the defendant's statement was material. However, after reviewing the record, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of every element of aggravated perjury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant claims that the state failed to meet its burden of proving that his statement was false because his response was merely a vague, either true or half-true, response to the state's overly broad question. The defendant claims that the state purposefully asked the defendant an overly broad question, rather than a series of specific questions about the defendant's various drug transactions, thereby hoping to illicit a superficially false response. However, we find that the question that the state posed to the defendant, namely, "While you've been on this Community Corrections program, have you been involved in any way in the sale of crack cocaine?," was sufficiently specific to convey to the defendant what types of conduct the question encompassed. Moreover, the defendant's response, "Not that I know of," was neither true nor half-true, but literally false. C.f. State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. Crim. App.1995) (). The police monitored three separate crack cocaine sales by the defendant during the period in which the defendant was placed in the Community Corrections program, indicating that the defendant had indeed been involved in the sale of crack cocaine while in the Community Corrections program. While the defendant argues that he did not make those drug sales, the jury's verdict of guilt accredits the state's witnesses, who testified that the defendant did indeed sell cocaine on these three occasions. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that his statement was literally true. Therefore, a rational jury could have found that the defendant's response to the state's question was a literally false statement.
The defendant also avers that his statement was not made with an intent to...
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